Essays On Land Nutrient Policy, Dairy Management Adjustments And Environmental Quality, And Resource-Based Sustainable Development by Enahoro, Dolapo
  
ESSAYS ON LAND NUTRIENT POLICY, DAIRY MANAGEMENT 
ADJUSTMENTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY;  
AND RESOURCE-BASED SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation 
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School 
of Cornell University 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
Dolapo Keshia Enahoro 
January 2011
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2011 Dolapo Keshia Enahoro
 ESSAYS ON LAND NUTRIENT POLICY, DAIRY MANAGEMENT 
ADJUSTMENTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY;  
AND RESOURCE-BASED SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
 
Dolapo Keshia Enahoro, Ph. D.  
Cornell University 2011 
 
 In addition to a weakening demand for their products, livestock producers have 
faced historically high feed costs and struggle to meet increasingly stringent 
regulations on the management of animal wastes. In two related papers, we analyze 
the important linkages between farm management adjustments and changes in farm 
income and restrictions on land application of nutrients. Using regional and 
representative farm mathematical programming models, we account explicitly for new 
restrictions on land application of nutrients, and determine the optimal farm 
management responses to the regulations. Our models are specifically applied to 
confined animal feeding operations (CAFOs) in New York State. We incorporate into 
our model empirical methods for estimating environmental nutrient loading and thus 
determine the effects of the regulations on the distributions of nitrogen and 
phosphorus residuals.  
 The combination of our mathematical methods and the availability of two 
unique datasets allows for the assessment of the differential effects on income and 
nutrient loading for specific New York State production regions. Our results suggest 
that without any regulation, on-farm manure application would lead to soil nutrient 
levels well in excess of crop requirements. While the regulations will correct for this 
problem at the farm and regional levels, our results indicate that CAFOs could 
experience considerable income losses that depend critically on the cost of off-site 
 manure disposal. Our results also indicate that cropland in the region could take on 
enhanced value for waste disposal and that significant risks of nutrient loading remain 
during extreme weather events.  
 In a third essay, we present a stylized optimization model for Nigeria’s energy 
sector that incorporates important social-economic objectives with traditional energy-
sector planning goals of resource allocation and cost minimization. With a rapidly 
growing economy, Nigeria aspires to use revenue from rent of its natural resources to 
fund economic development. To this end, the formulation of energy-sector planning 
techniques has been an important objective for scholars and policy makers. We offer a 
new approach with our development of a resource-planning tool useful for a peculiar 
economic environment that integrates elements from the macroeconomics, open 
economy and natural resource literatures.  
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CHAPTER 1 
ASSESSMENT OF NEW YORK’S POLLUTION DISCHARGE ELIMINATION 
PERMITS FOR CAFOS I: REPRESENTATIVE FARM ANALYSIS1 
 
Summary 
 Weakening demand for livestock and dairy products, historically high prices 
for feed ingredients and increasingly strict regulations on animal waste management 
continue to put significant pressure on livestock and dairy operating margins. In this 
paper, we use representative farm mathematical programming models to analyze 
important linkages between farm management adjustments and changes in farm 
income due to recent changes in relevant agricultural prices and restrictions on land 
application of nutrients.  We account explicitly for new restrictions on land application 
of nitrogen and phosphorus that are specific to confined animal feeding operations 
(CAFOs). 
 Our mathematical methods and the distinctive data available allow for the 
assessment of the effects on farm income and environmental nutrient loading for New 
York State dairy farms. The results suggest that with current relative prices for feed 
ingredients, adjustments to dairy rations lead to increased nitrogen and phosphorus 
content in dairy waste and soil nutrient levels being applied well in excess of crop 
requirements. While the regulations will correct for this problem at the farm level, our 
results indicate that CAFOs could experience some reductions in income. Although 
the policy leads to reductions in nutrient loadings, our results also demonstrate that 
significant risks of excess nutrient loading remain during extreme weather events. 
 
                                                 
1 Enahoro, D., T. M. Schmit and R. N. Boisvert. New York Pollution Discharge Elimination Permits for 
CAFOs, Management Adjustment and the Environment: Representative Farm Analysis. In Preparation 
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Introduction  
 Reports from the USDA indicate that farm incomes declined in 2008, in part 
due to the global recession resulting from the collapse of international financial 
markets.  While most agricultural producers experienced significant reductions in farm 
income, livestock operations and, in particular, dairy farms may have been most 
affected (USDA, 2009).  Prior to the more recent downward pressure on milk prices 
from recession-driven lowered demand, dairy farmers in the Northeast also 
experienced a significant increase in feed prices following short-run increases in grain 
prices (NASS, 1991-2009).  The pressure on commodity prices was mostly attributed 
to local expansions in the biofuels industry and increased international demand for 
grains and oilseeds from fast-growing economies such as China and India.  
  While the record-high feed costs in 2008 have moderated somewhat with the 
general downward movements in all commodity prices, feed costs remain well above 
historical levels.  Thus, there continues to be significant pressure on livestock and 
dairy operating margins.  Margins are squeezed further as dairy farmers and livestock 
producers struggle to meet increasingly stringent regulations on the management of 
animal wastes.  In order to lower expenditures on animal feed, producers need to 
reexamine important decisions on feed composition and consider which ingredients 
should be grown rather than purchased.  The need to lower feed costs may lead to the 
inclusion in the feeding regime of less conventional ingredients as distillers dried 
grains with solubles (DDGS).  While the by-products from ethanol production offer 
some potential alternative feed ingredients, the switch to lower cost feed ingredients 
necessarily implies changes in nutrient composition in both the feeds and the manure.   
 Other research suggests that the recent changes in agricultural markets increase 
the potential for higher nutrient loadings of nitrogen and phosphorus (Schmit, et al., 
2009).  Thus, the farm management decisions on feed composition and on on-farm 
3 
production must also be evaluated relative to the current regulations regarding soil 
nutrient applications and their effects on the environment. The research reported here 
analyzes the implications for New York dairy producers and environmental quality of 
emerging regulations on land application of nutrients. The issues that we address form 
part of the more general inquiry into the environmental issues associated with 
agricultural production.    
 Earlier research outlines the growing threats to water quality in the United 
States from increasing numbers of animal feeding operations in high agricultural 
production areas. The increased need to dispose of farm animal manure raises the 
potential for water pollution in these areas (Lander, et al., 1998; Kellogg, et al., 2000). 
The efficient management of soil nutrients on the animal feeding operations is thus 
central to achieving the goals of good water quality in the United States. This is 
emphasized in the Clean Water Action Plan of 1998 that seeks to minimize the 
negative effects of animal feeding operations on public health and the environment.  
Implementing the tenets of sound water quality however - while improving or 
maintaining the quality of surrounding waters and aiding compliance with regulation – 
could have significant economic implications for the farm establishment. Czymmek, et 
al. (2005), for example, suggest that it is economically challenging for confined 
animal feeding operations (CAFOs) to put the guidelines of new nutrient regulations 
into practice.  In particular, the costs of transporting excess manure off-farm could 
prove rather prohibitive when the manure produced is of relatively high volume and 
low nutrient concentration. More generally, conflicts could exist for the farm operator 
between enhancing farm profitability by taking advantage of favorable market 
situations and meeting self- or regulation-imposed nutrient management objectives. 
This divergence underscores the need for analyses of the linkages between the farm 
4 
management decisions, changes in relevant agricultural markets, and environmental 
policy and regulation.        
The primary purpose of the research reported here is to analyze the important 
linkages between farm management adjustments and changes in farm income due to 
recent changes in relevant agricultural prices and restrictions on land application of 
nutrients.  Because management responses to these changes in the market and 
increased regulation are not apparent in existing agricultural data, our analysis is based 
on a representative farm mathematical programming model for dairy production in 
New York State that accounts explicitly for new restrictions on land application of 
nitrogen and phosphorus, and is specific to confined animal feeding operations 
(CAFOs). The new restrictions are based on comprehensive nutrient management 
plans (CNMPs) that CAFOs must develop to obtain and/or maintain New York State’s 
pollution discharge elimination permits that allow them to operate. In this paper, we 
analyze farm-level effects on environmental quality. Since the nutrient restrictions are 
specific to CAFOs, it is entirely possible that in direct response to the increased 
regulations on nutrient use, manure is exported off of CAFOs and onto farms that are 
not directly affected by the restrictions, increasing manure application on those lands. 
We investigate the effects of CAFO field nutrient regulations and farm management 
adjustments on regional environmental quality, in a related study.  
 Our research is unique in several respects.  It is one of the first attempts to 
assess the impact of new state-specific nutrient management restrictions. In particular, 
we model the effects of CNMPs that set realistic crop yield objectives and the 
application of manure at rates consistent with soil nutrient recommendations 
developed by the appropriate Land Grant University, in this case Cornell University. 
This is made possible through the availability of two unique data sets developed for 
agricultural production regions in New York State: (1) the distribution of cropland on 
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dairy farms according to crop productivity class and (2) multi-year summaries of soil 
nutrient tests. Using these data and results from previous research, we are also able to 
incorporate into our model empirical methods for estimating nutrient runoff and 
leaching that are calibrated specifically for New York State. We go on to estimate the 
effects of the regulations on the distributions of nitrogen and phosphorus residuals 
based on historical weather conditions. Using the distributions of nitrogen and 
phosphorus residuals, we are also able to interpret the results from a safety-first 
perspective - e.g., assessing the probabilities that these residuals will exceed certain 
critical thresholds with and without the regulations.  
  Through a set of non-linear constraints we also allow for the endogenous 
determination of the nutrient composition of manure from feeding various 
combinations of animal rations. Without any regulation, adjustments to the dairy 
rations that are driven by price concerns would lead to increased nitrogen and 
phosphorus content in dairy waste and to on-farm application of manure nutrients well 
in excess of crop requirements. While the regulations will correct for this problem at 
the farm level, CAFOs could experience reductions to income from increased manure 
management costs. We thus consider explicitly the cost implications of disposing of 
manure off-the farm. This analysis is particularly important for those dairy operations 
that would be required to haul manure long distances to suitable sites in compliance 
with the nutrient standards. We determine the manure transportation costs that inhibit 
the dairy farm’s compliance with the new regulations. 
 In the next section of this paper, we outline the new nutrient restrictions 
guiding CAFOs in New York State. We then discuss the mathematical framework of 
our model and its application to the empirical setting.  A description of the basic 
structure of the non-linear programming model follows, including the framework for 
investigating the dairy management adjustments to changes in DDGS prices. The data 
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used in our study are described. Next, we show how to extend the base model to 
include the new nutrient application standards and to account for changes in the costs 
of off-site manure disposal.  We then outline the empirical measurement of 
phosphorus runoff and nitrate runoff and leaching associated with changes in the 
management decisions. The results of the empirical analysis are presented and 
discussed.  We compare solutions to the programming model and the associated 
implications for environmental nutrient loading, for a base case with no nutrient 
standards and a policy scenario in which we simulate the new nutrient regulations. 
Finally, we offer a summary of the work and conclusions that can be drawn. 
 
Soil Nutrient Regulation and Management 
 The Clean Water Act of 1998 requires certain animal-feeding operations to 
develop CNMPs to minimize the detrimental effects of their operations on water 
quality (USDA-EPA, 1999; USDA-NRCS 2003a).2  The setting of realistic crop yield 
objectives is central to the USDA criteria for implementing nutrient management 
plans, and thus to the CNMPs.  The implementation of these plans also requires the 
use of reliable soil and manure nutrient tests and recommendations from the 
appropriate Land Grant University for the optimal rates of soil nutrient application. In 
the case of New York State, Cornell University is the relevant Land Grant University.  
The guidelines on nutrient application on New York farms take into consideration the 
results of soil testing for samples from agricultural lands across the state and restrict 
the application of soil nutrients (particularly N and P) accordingly. More generally, the 
states have some flexibility to adapt the federal policy to more local conditions.   
                                                 
2 A 2001 proposal for revision of the Clean Water Act increased the number of animal feeding 
operations regulated under the Act, and further recommended that CAFOs with insufficient land be 
required to export excess manure to off-site recipients (For further discussion, see Feinerman, et al., 
2004). 
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 In New York State, CAFOs are required to obtain a pollution discharge 
elimination system (SPDES) permit in order to operate (NYSDEC, 2003).3 One of the 
conditions for maintaining the permit is that the CAFOs develop and implement a 
CNMP on their farms. The CNMPs in turn are guided by the Natural Resources 
Conservation Service (NRCS) Code 590 standard that emphasizes the reduction of 
ground and surface water pollution from over-application of fertilizer and manure, and 
the prevention of direct manure losses to streams and lakes (USDA-NRCS, 1999).  
 The goal of nutrient management under the CNMPs is to ensure that the crops 
receive adequate nutrients during the growing season while minimizing losses of the 
same to surface and ground waters. Since fields could vary in their potential for 
environmental nutrient loading, two indicators, the Phosphorus Runoff Index (PI) and 
the Nitrogen Leaching Index (NLI) have been developed to aid in determining the 
susceptibility of fields to nutrient losses (see Ketterings, et al., 2003a and 2003b).  We 
summarize the application of the PI and NLI in determining field nutrient management 
in the appendix (Appendix 1.A).  
 The NRCS nutrient guidelines rely on the use of these nutrient loss 
susceptibility indicators to determine N and P management on field crops in New 
York. On soils where the PI is the relevant index, i.e., where P loss is considered the 
larger threat of nutrient loading, P-based management is followed.  The NLI is the 
important index otherwise. The nutrient standards also take into consideration the fact 
that the leaching indexes of the soils are highly related to soil test values. When soil P 
levels, for example, far exceed what P is required for optimum productivity, then there 
is an accumulation of P in the soil so that the nutrient may be readily available for loss 
to ground and surface waters. This increases the risks of P runoff from soils.  
                                                 
3  Gollehon, et al. (2001) report that more than fifty percent of the excess manure nitrogen and two-
thirds of the excess manure phosphorus generated nation-wide are produced on CAFOs. 
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 Nitrogen-based management applies manure and commercial fertilizers at rates 
that supply all of the nitrogen recommendation for a crop and account for 
volatilization losses.  Typically, this application regime results in the over application 
of phosphorus.  P-based nutrient management on the other hand tends to make the 
application of nitrogen fertilizers necessary (USDA-NRCS. 1999). As outlined by the 
Cornell University nutrient management program, our modeling of the nutrient 
restrictions on N and P for field crops in New York limits crop nutrient applications to 
the agronomic uptake levels. We use the soil P tests as indicators of loss of P to the 
environment and thus restrict P application on the soils that are considered more 
susceptible to P loss. Further, we account for the inherent differences in nutrient 
management on corn, orchard grass and alfalfa acres. These conditions and allowable 
application rates are summarized in Figure 1.1. 
 P-based management is followed for fields that are considered to have high 
(i.e., soil Morgan P test of 40 lbs/acre and greater) or medium (i.e., test of 9 – 39 
lbs/acre) risks of phosphorus run-off.  While no manure or P fertilizer is allowed on 
high P soils, P may be applied on fields with a medium phosphorus index, but 
application is restricted to 40 percent of the P-removal rates of the crops on those 
fields. P application is least restrictive on the low STP soils, where applications can 
meet the entire crop P-removal requirement.  
 A nitrogen management regime is simultaneously applied to the crop land that 
accounts for the differential requirements and nitrogen utilization of the crops. For 
acres on which corn or orchard grass is grown, N application can not exceed the 
requirement levels necessary for optimum productivity for all three classifications of 
land based on the soil P test. Alfalfa cropping, however, allows for a little more 
flexibility with manure and soil nutrient management. 
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Figure 1.1. Nitrogen and phosphorus management for field crops following nutrient standards 
in New York  
 
With regards to nutrient use-efficiency, alfalfa may not require any manure 
application since it typically meets its nitrogen requirements through N fixation. 
However, alfalfa has the ability to reduce its N fixation activity when other sources of 
N are readily available making it a better alternative for manure application (at least 
from an environmental loading standpoint) than corn that has had all of its N 
requirements met (see Ketterings, et al., 2006). On the low and medium P soils, 
manure P application is thus allowed for alfalfa that is based on the crop’s phosphorus 
requirements so that nitrogen is simultaneously applied. Nutrient management on the 
high P land does not allow for manure to be spread on alfalfa, recognizing the high 
potential for P loss.   
 Using relevant soil test results from New York State counties, we are able to 
model manure and fertilizer nitrogen and phosphorus application for CAFOs that 
follow the nutrient management guidelines from Cornell University. We compare the 
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using Morgan 
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solutions to models that impose nutrient standards on N and P management to the 
solutions for a base case in which no nutrient standards are imposed.  We thus assess 
the implications of the new nutrient application standards.  
 
Mathematical Framework and Empirical Application  
 From as far back as the 1950’s, mathematical programming methods have been 
applied to farm planning, including the formulation of minimum-cost animal feeds 
(e.g., Heady and Candler, 1958 and Waugh, 1951). While the earlier applications 
relied almost exclusively on linear programming methods, more recent advances have 
facilitated the application of both non-linear and mixed-integer models to farm 
planning such that the models have the enhanced capabilities to, among other 
functions, accommodate more realistic production relationships, relax the assumption 
of fixed input and output prices, accommodate management response to price and 
production risk and incorporate lumpy investment or management decisions (e.g., 
McCarl and Spreen 1980; Boisvert and McCarl 1990; Barry 1971; Cabrini, et al., 
2004; Wui and Engle 2004).  
 Programming methods have also been used extensively to evaluate new 
opportunities and challenges facing farm operators, including the analyses of such 
issues as policies and management alternatives related to the interface between 
agricultural production and the environment (e.g. Casler and Jacobs 1975; Schmit and 
Knoblauch 1995; Teague, et al. 1995).  Schmit and Knoblauch in 1995 assessed the 
effects of nutrient loading restrictions on the profitability of dairy farms using linear 
programming techniques. More recently, other studies have used mathematical 
programming techniques for the assessment of the implications of alternative soil 
nutrient application standards for manure nutrient management; to account for new 
nutrient management costs associated with environmental regulations compliance in 
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the formulation of livestock feed and to analyze the economic and environmental 
implications of federal regulations on land nutrient application (e.g., Feinerman, et al., 
2004; Hadrich, et al., 2008;  Kaplan, et al., 2004). 
 Kaplan, et al. (2004) used a regional optimization model to provide important 
insights into the linkages between restrictions on the land application of nutrients, and 
the local economy and the environment. The constrained partial equilibrium model 
developed in that study was useful to illustrate the impacts of imposing nutrient 
standards on the largest of AFOs on various sectors of the agricultural economy – 
livestock,  poultry and crop producers, local consumers, the environment and rural 
economies. In general, it was found that some of the costs of meeting the limitations 
on land application of nutrients on CAFOs passed through to local consumers as 
higher prices and to rural economies as lower production rates and labor expenditures. 
Further, by adopting a nation-wide approach that considered U.S. farm production 
regions following USDA classification, the study could account for regional 
differentiation in impacts of federal nutrient regulation on the sectors that were due to 
differences in CAFO concentration (and manure production) and land availability 
across the regions. The regions in the study by Kaplan, et al. (2004) were of relatively 
large geographical scope, each covering 2 to 11 states. In comparison, the studies by 
Feinerman, et al. (2004) and Hadrich, et al. (2008) applied mathematical programming 
models that accounted for nutrient standards within the context of individual U.S. 
states.  
 Feinerman, et al. (2004) used a mathematical programming model to 
determine the response of manure demand to nutrient regulations in Virginia, 
incorporating the identified manure demand relationships into a highly stylized spatial 
equilibrium model to estimate the welfare costs of alternative soil N and P application 
standards on manure application. Their notion of demand assumed that manure 
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demand is by crop farmers who do not own livestock or poultry and who can choose 
between manure and commercial fertilizers to meet crop nutrient needs. Further, 
manure demand is relatively elastic and depends on the relative prices of manure and 
commercial fertilizers, the relative costs of spreading manure and fertilizers, manure 
nutrient concentration, and environmental regulations regarding the rates and methods 
of nutrient applications.  Manure prices in turn are composed of the purchase prices at 
the supplier’s gate and the costs of transportation to the recipient’s fields.4  
 The model developed in Feinerman, et al. (2004) explored three alternative soil 
fertilization strategies – the use of commercial fertilizers only, manure only, and the 
applications of both fertilizers and manure. The model also took into account two 
major sources of manure production in Virginia - poultry litter and dairy manure; three 
possible scenarios for nutrient regulations - no standard, N-based management and P-
based management; and a cropland availability constraint that imposed barriers to 
manure application in the short-term. However, the focus of the study was on the short 
run where manure supply was assumed to be fixed. The specification of the 
optimization model did not include possibilities for changes to the production 
activities of the animal feeding operations that could affect manure production and 
supply.   
 Hadrich, et al. (2008), on the other hand, allowed for variations in livestock 
production in their development of a model of a representative farm in Michigan. By 
incorporating manure management costs associated with environmental regulations in 
Michigan into the linear programming formulation of livestock feed rations, Hadrich, 
et al. (2008) demonstrated the possibility of formulating confined animal feed rations 
to minimize jointly feed and net nutrient disposal costs. This approach could account 
                                                 
4 Manure suppliers could be regulated CAFOs with insufficient land to spread manure and farm gate 
manure prices include costs for storage and testing.   
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for costs of compliance with environmental regulations that may have been previously 
ignored.   
 In contrast to some cited studies, our current application of mathematical 
programming techniques to the assessment of soil nutrient regulations is state-specific; 
we follow a whole-farm management approach that allows for changes in animal and 
crop production and explicitly accounts for nutrient standards and nutrient 
management considerations in the farm manager’s decisions on crop production as 
well as on feeding and other aspects of animal production. Further, we estimate the 
economic and environmental nutrient loading implications of the response of farm 
management to the new nutrient regulations. By comparing the estimates for nutrient 
leaching and runoff, we determine the effects on nutrient loading to the environment 
of the new guidelines for water quality as regarding CAFOs (i.e., restrictions on land 
application of nitrogen and phosphorus); within the contexts of changes in the market 
conditions (i.e., relative prices for DDGS prices) and varying economic conditions 
(i.e., costs of off-farm transportation of manure). 
 We adopt an optimization model of a representative dairy farm in New York. 
To account for limitations on land application of soil nutrients for CAFOs, we impose 
NRCS nutrient application standards following Ketterings, et al. (2003a; 2003b). Our 
specification of the nutrient regulations allows for a scenario in which there are no 
limits on land application of manure and commercial fertilizer nutrients and a nutrient 
standards scenario. It is thus possible to isolate the direct effects of the nutrient 
regulations. We are also able to include components in the model that link bio-energy 
feed ingredients, feed prices, and manure nutrient loadings by using the CPM-Dairy 
program.5  Our mathematical programming model accommodates the potential for the 
                                                 
5 The CPM-Dairy program, jointly developed by Cornell University, the University of Pennsylvania 
Veterinary College and the Miner Institute, is a software tool for formulating and evaluating dairy feed 
rations. 
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dairy operation to use lower cost feed alternatives (as in Schmit, et al., 2009) so that 
we investigate how the whole-farm nutrient management and planning responds to the 
use of DDGS in feed rations. The structure of the model also allows for the 
endogenous determination of the nutrient composition of manure from feeding the 
various combinations of animal rations and accounts explicitly for the cost 
implications of disposing manure off the farm.   
 Further, we use techniques developed in Boisvert, et al. (1997) and in Vadas, 
et al. (2009) to extend our now non-linear programming model to determine nitrate 
runoff and leaching and phosphorus loss in runoff to the environment associated with 
the fertilizer and dairy manure application. The nutrient loss estimation techniques that 
we adopt follow markedly different strategies in estimating field nutrient losses. 
Boisvert et al. (1997) derived equations for estimating N loading using N runoff and 
leaching data generated for specific New York soils and agro-climatic conditions 
using the Ground Water Loading Effects of Agricultural Management Systems 
(GLEAMS). On the other hand, Vadas et al. (2009) developed their methods for 
estimating P loss in runoff from extensive field studies and for a variety of soil, 
fertilizer management and climate conditions. The methods in Vadas et al. (2009) 
were designed to be compatible with ground water transport models such as GLEAMS 
and the Erosion-Productivity Impact Calculator (EPIC) model. 
  
The Base Model and Empirical Setting 
 In the base model, the goal of the farm manager is assumed to be to maximize 
expected annual revenue over expected variable costs. The mathematical formulation 
of our non-linear programming (NLP) model is presented in the Appendix 1.B. The 
model includes the objective function and 33 sets of constraint equations. Our non-
linear programming model makes use of means of input and output coefficients 
15 
developed in Schmit (1994) for an optimization model of a representative dairy 
establishment in New York.  We update the model in Schmit (1994) to address the 
agricultural market, nutrient management and environmental considerations relevant 
to the current research, and update crop and livestock budgets to reflect more recent 
prices paid and received. The model differentiates between the production of 
agricultural commodities and their uses. For example, sales activities are clearly 
defined for milk, cull cows and cull calves, as are activities for the purchase of crops, 
and the growing and the sale of farm-grown crops.  Separate activities are also defined 
for the purchase of all feed ingredients and for major inputs such as labor, fuel, and 
fertilizers. The structure of the optimization model allows us to explore the potential 
uses of low-cost alternatives to traditional feed ingredients. It demonstrates how the 
composition and amounts of final feed rations are affected by relative prices of the 
component feed ingredients. We thus investigate including DDGS in feed rations.   
 The representative dairy farm in our model has characteristics similar to those 
of equivalently-sized farms participating in the Cornell Dairy Farm Business 
Summary program.  Dairy cows on the representative farm are assumed to weigh 
1,400 pounds and to produce 21,000 pounds of milk per cow per year on average.  
Milk cows, dry cows and replacement heifers are raised on rations formulated from 
purchased and farm-grown feed.  Realistic assumptions are made about labor, 
livestock, and land resources available to the dairy operation. The dairy operation has 
5,000 hours of labor available from the farm management or ownership, and access to 
additional off-farm labor at two different wage levels.  Equations 1.B.8 – 1.B.10 (in 
Appendix 1.B) account for the three types of labor.   
 The maximum herd size is restricted to 250 lactating cows and the numbers of 
dry cows, heifers, cull cows and cull calves are constrained to be in appropriate fixed 
proportions to the number of milking cows (Equations 1.B.2 –1.B.5).  
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We use the CPM-Dairy program to generate alternative dairy rations. Ten (10) 
separate dairy cow activities are included in the model that differ in terms of the corn 
or hay-silage base and whether or not DDGS is included as a feed ingredient. Where 
DDGS is included, the ration may contain either 10 or 20 percent DDGS on a dry 
matter basis, and with a DDGS fat content of either 8 or 12 percent.  The dairy cow 
activities are summarized in Table 1.1. 
 Separate activities are included for feeding dry cows and raising heifers, 
although these activities allow for more limited feeding options than for the lactating 
cows (shown in Table 1.2).  For any of the feeding activities that include the bio-
energy byproducts, milk production is not allowed to fall relative to the no-DDGS 
rations. This constraint on the results of the CPM-Dairy program has considerable 
empirical support.    
 Alfalfa hay, orchard grass, corn silage and corn for grain are either purchased 
or grown. The acres available limit crop production and crops grown on the farm are 
fed to the animals or are sold. The constraints on growing, buying and selling of crops 
and on their use as feed are defined in equations (1.B.12 – 1.B.15). The representative 
dairy operation owns or rents 620 acres of cropland on which it could produce corn 
(grain and silage), orchard grass and alfalfa hay following cropping rotations typical of 
the Central New York farming region.6 Restrictions imposed on the crop rotations are 
specified in the model (Equations 1.B.31 – 1.B.33). The crop rotations influence the 
soil nutrient requirements of the field crops (see Table 1.3). 
 Land that is owned or rented by the farm is characterized by production 
capacity and by the soil phosphorus status; i.e., soil P test levels before applications of 
fertilizers and manure. 
                                                 
6 Corn silage is grown for on-farm feed but not sold. 
 Table 1.1: Feed rations for lactating cows based on type and level of corn distillers dried grains with solubles fed (ton DM) 
 
 2:1 Corn Silage to Hay Crop Silage Ration1  1:2 Corn Silage to Hay Crop Silage Ration 
Ingredient, tons DM/yr  CS CS0810 CS0820 CS1210 CS1220   A A0810 A0820 A1210 A1220
Corn silage 3.07 2.95 2.90 2.90 2.90  1.40 1.40 1.42 1.40 1.40
Mixed hay silage2 1.51 1.45 1.43 1.43 1.43  2.84 2.84 2.81 2.84 2.84
Corn grain 0.96 0.62 0.04 0.67 0.03  1.68 1.24 0.65 1.17 0.96
Soy hulls 0.00 0.61 0.61 0.57 0.61  0.00 0.21 0.50 0.27 0.00
Wheat middlings 0.37 0.13 0.00 0.16 0.00  0.39 0.06 0.00 0.07 0.00
8% fat DDGS3 0.00 0.73 1.46 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.73 1.46 0.00 0.00
12% fat DDGS 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.70 1.40  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.70 1.40
Soybean meal4 0.70 0.45 0.30 0.40 0.31  0.56 0.30 0.08 0.30 0.30
Other5 0.15 0.24 0.51 0.24 0.46  0.15 0.29 0.43 0.29 0.27
   Total (tons DM) 6.78 7.18 7.25 7.08 7.15  7.03 7.07 7.35 7.03 7.18
TMR CP, % 16.1 16.8 19.3 16.6 18.4  16.8 18.6 19.1 18.7 19.7
Total manure, tons/yr 21.11 21.35 21.81 21.23 21.20  22.40 22.40 21.81 22.40 22.81
   N in manure, lbs/yr 247.78 269.02 332.08 261.83 307.20  265.06 304.99 325.35 305.66 337.59
   P in manure, lbs/yr 29.91 30.18 36.50 29.98 34.62  30.59 30.59 34.69 30.59 40.00
Milk production6, cwt/yr 213.50 213.50 213.50 213.50 213.50   213.50 213.50 213.50 213.50 213.50
1 Rations are on an annual basis and are based on the CPM-Dairy program assuming a 1,400 lb Holstein cow and a 305 d lactation. Ration headings are 
   formatted by primary forage base, DDGS fat percentage, and percentage of DDGS fed on a dry matter basis, respectively; e.g., CS0810 = primary corn  
   silage forage base, 8% fat DDGS, and 10% DDGS fed.  
2 Mixed hay silage includes both alfalfa and grass hay crops. 
3 DDGS = corn distillers dried grains with solubles. 
4 Soybean meal includes heat-treated soybean meal, SoyPlus (West Central Coop, Ralston, Iowa). 
5 Other ingredients include blood meal, fat, Mepron (Evonik Deguss GmBH, Hanau-Wolfgang, Germany), and mineral mix. 
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Table 1.2: Feed rations for dry cows and replacement heifers based on type and level 
of corn distillers dried grains with soluble fed (tons DM/yr) 
 
  Dry cow1 Replacement heifer 
Ingredient  
(% CP, % fat) DC DC8 DC12 RH RH8 RH12
Corn silage(8.0, 3.2) 0.36 0.36 0.36 1.10 1.10 1.10
Grass silage (10.0, 3.0) 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00
Hay silage(19.9, 3.0) 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.10 1.10 1.10
Wheat straw (4.8, 2) 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00
Corn grain (9.0, 4.2) 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.55 0.55 0.55
Soybean meal  
(55.0, 2.8) 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.00
Soy hulls (12.1, 2.6) 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.18 0.18 0.18
DDGS-8 (30.4, 8.0)3 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.00
DDGS-12 (30.4, 12.0) 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.32
Mineral-vitamin mix 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.08 0.08
     Total (tons DM) 0.86 0.89 0.89 3.19 3.33 3.33
Total manure, tons/yr 2.40 2.40 2.40 7.30 7.30 7.30
N in manure, lbs/yr 33.56 29.40 29.40 165.96 164.91 164.91
P in manure, lbs/yr 4.48 5.51 5.51 14.00 17.54 17.54
1 Rations are on an annual basis and are based on the CPM-Dairy program assuming a 1,400 lb cow for 
   a 60 d dry period and an average 750 lb replacement heifer for 365 d. Ration headings are formatted 
   by type of DDGS fed. DDGS were included in dry cows’ rations at approx. 13% of total dry matter,  
   heifers rations included DDGS at 10% of total dry matter, e.g., DC12 = dry cow ration with 12% fat 
   DDGS, and RH8 = replacement heifer ration with 8% fat DDGS. 
2 Mixed hay silage includes both alfalfa and grass hay crops. 
3 DDGS = corn distillers dried grains with solubles. 
  
Table 1.3: Nitrogen requirements for corn grain and corn silage rotations 
(lbs/ac) 
 
Year in rotation Corn grain following Corn silage following 
 Alfalfa Orchardgrass Alfalfa Orchardgrass 
1 20 20 20 20 
2 20 39 20 35 
3 56 66 52 62 
4 92 92 87 87 
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 While land productivity class depends on the capability of the land for corn 
grain production, the soil phosphorus classifications indicate the levels of naturally-
occurring P in the soil and build-up of residual P from previous years’ applications.  
Table 1.4 presents the crop productivity and soil phosphorus level classifications of 
the land available to the representative dairy operation. It also includes summaries of 
the classifications for the sample of soil survey data that we apply to the representative 
farm model.   
 
Table 1.4: Distribution of land on the representative dairy farm 
 
  Mean1 (Range) % of Land in Class 
Land (acres) 620 100 
   
Productivity  
(tons of corn silage/ac)2   
  Land Class 1 113 23 
  Land Class 2 121 66 
  Land Class 3 135 11 
    
Soil Test P (lbs/ac)2  
  Low 4 (0 – 8) 44 
  Medium 24 (9 – 39) 48 
  High 120 (40 – 200) 8 
    
Hydrologic Groups   
   Hydrologic Group A - 7 
   Hydrologic Group B - 31 
   Hydrologic Group C - 62 
1 The means are for Western New York farm production regions as defined as in  
   Dairy Farm Business Summaries (DFBS). 
2 The proportions of soils in the crop productivity classifications are from soil survey 
   data as reported in Boisvert et al., 1997. Soil P test distributions follows Rao et al.,  
   2007.  
  
 About 10 percent of the land is assumed to be of considerably high quality, 
where land quality classification is based on the (corn) production capability of the 
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land. Soils in land class 1 (the lowest quality) make up about 23 percent of the soils 
available to the representative farm while land class 2 (medium quality) account for 66 
percent of the cropland. More than half of the soils are in the medium or high soil test 
phosphorus category.7  
 
Field Management of Nitrogen and Phosphorus and the Nutrient Standards 
 The soil nutrient management involves decisions on the purchase and land 
application of commercial fertilizers and on the use and off-site disposal of manure. 
Except for starter nitrogen requirements that are fulfilled using commercial fertilizers 
only, all crop N and P requirements on the farm can be met using either commercial 
fertilizers purchased from off-farm sources or manure produced on-farm. The use of 
animal waste as crop nutrients leads to cost-savings on commercially available 
nutrients; and the amount that the farm thus saves is assumed equivalent to the market 
value of the corresponding nutrient.  
 Since the amounts of nutrients available in the manure produced depend on the 
composition of rations fed to the animals, the demand for nutrients by the crops (and 
restrictions on soil nutrient applications) necessarily influence the choice of rations 
fed.  It should be noted that the CPM-Dairy program generates output with higher 
amounts of N and P in manure for rations that include DDGS as feedstock (see Table 
1.1). As such, relatively high prices for commercial fertilizers and increasing demand 
for manure nutrients could trigger the use of low-cost feed alternatives in our model.  
 A distinguishing feature of our current model is that we endogenize the rates of 
manure application, matching the amounts of manure nutrients available for crop use 
                                                 
7 The proportions of soils in the crop productivity classifications are based on soil survey data as 
explained in Boisvert et al., 1997. Soil P test distributions follows Rao et al., 2007.  The soil P test 
distributions are assumed constant across the soil productivity classes.  
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with the nutrient requirements of the crops.8 To do this, we accumulate the total 
volume of manure produced from lactating and dry cows and heifers on the 
representative dairy farm as in Equation 1.B. 20.  The amounts of N and P nutrients 
produced in the farm manure are similarly accumulated (Equations 1.B.21 – 1.B.22). 
Manure that is produced on the farm is either spread as N and P fertilizer on corn and 
orchard grass acres, applied on land growing alfalfa hay to meet phosphorus 
requirements, or transported to off-farm locations. The total manure applied (i.e., for 
all of the cropping activities that come into the nonlinear programming solutions) is 
accumulated in Equation 1.B.23. Equation 1.B.24 takes inventory of manure 
production, application and disposal on the farm. However, not all of the manure 
nutrients produced on the farm can be available for plant uptake and we account for 
handling, storage and field losses. Equations 1.B.25 and 1.B.26 determine N and P 
available for plant uptake per ton of manure that is produced.  The fields’ starter N 
requirements are fulfilled with fertilizer purchases, as shown in Equation 1.B.27. 
Further, the other nutrient requirements of the crops are matched to the nitrogen and 
phosphorus nutrients available in the manure produced.   
 As illustrated in the appendix, Equations 1.B.28 and 1.B.29 hold for as many 
cropping activities as come into solutions. We thus are able to account for field 
differences in the soil-crop nutrient needs. The two equations also hold simultaneously 
as less-than/equal-to constraints, so that manure nutrient application could just meet, 
or exceed the nutrient requirements, depending on the assumptions on land nutrient 
restrictions. Equations 1.B.28 and 1.B.29 are less-than constraints when over 
application of N or P is possible, and equality constraints otherwise.  To concurrently 
fulfill N and P requirements on the fields, one of the nitrogen or phosphorus equations 
                                                 
8 In Schmit (1994) and Schmit et al. (2009), average nutrient levels were assumed and manure was 
applied to the fields at predetermined rates of 10 or 20 tons per acre. 
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holds.  Where the constraint on manure application is binding (as in the nutrient 
standards scenario) the lower of the manure application rates that meets the cropping 
N or P requirements is applied. Crop nutrient requirements in excess of what is 
available in manure can then be met in the model using commercially-available 
fertilizers. 
We model land application of manure and commercial fertilizers under two 
conditions.  The first case assumes no restrictions on the land application of nutrients 
so that the dairy operation can spread on-farm up to 100 percent of the manure that is 
produced9.  Under the alternative policy simulation, farm nutrient planning follows 
NRCS guidelines for nutrient application to field crops. We limit P and N applications 
to the levels necessary for optimal crop yield and further take into consideration the 
potential for P losses from the fields. By assuming similarity in other important 
characteristics such as the field topography, we assume that the differences in potential 
for P loss to surrounding waters are due entirely to differences in soil P status and field 
nutrient management. Based on Figure 1.1, we restrict manure and fertilizer 
applications of phosphorus based on the soil P levels of the cropped land (i.e., for the 
nutrient standards scenario). To do this, we designate the cropping acres available to 
the representative dairy farm as being of high, medium, or low soil P status, adopting 
relevant means and distributions from soil survey data of soil phosphorus for farmland 
in high milk-producing counties in Western New York (Rao, et al., 2007).  The 
relevant soil P test summaries that we apply to our model are reported in Table 1.4. 
Eight percent of the land is of high soil test phosphorus (STP); 48 percent is medium 
soil P; and the rest of the land is in the low soil P classification. We apply these 
                                                 
9 We assume no limits to commercial and manure fertilizer application but since commercial nutrients 
must be purchased at market prices while manure is produced and applied at no significant additional 
costs to the operation, the farm in the model chooses manure over fertilizers whenever possible, and 
dumps on the land all manure produced in excess of requirements.  
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proportions to the 620 acres available to the representative dairy establishment and 
assume that the proportions are constant for the land productivity classes (also 
reported in Table 1.4).  
Phosphorus application is not allowed on soils with high P and manure may 
not be spread on these fields. Commercial N fertilizers may however be used to fulfill 
N requirements, up to the agronomic N-uptake level for the crop.  On soils with 
medium or low P, manure may be applied at the application rates at which either of P 
or N requirements of the crop is fulfilled, whichever is more limiting.  Nutrient 
requirements beyond that supplied by manure at this limiting rate can then be fulfilled 
using either N or P single nutrient amendments. We account for available soil P in 
determining the agronomic P-uptake level of growing crops, thus restricting P 
application on medium and high soil P lands. To distinguish the no-policy (base) from 
the nutrient restriction scenarios in our specifications of the model, we assume in the 
base case that manure and fertilizers can be applied on all of the land at economically 
optimal rates that do not take nutrient over-application or environmental loading 
concerns into consideration. In the scenario that does account for over-application 
through the implementation of new land nutrient restrictions, there is an increased 
need for manure management. Transporting excess manure off the farm is one option 
that the representative dairy farm must consider.  
 
Off-Site Manure Disposal  
 Manure that is produced on the farm and not applied to the fields as crop 
nutrients is assumed to be transported to off-farm recipients. This manure may be 
available for field application on other farms. Although there may be some merit to 
accounting for the cash value of the nutrients available in animal manure, it is assumed 
that no payment is received from the manure-importing farm. Costs associated with 
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the off-farm land application are also not included in the model. Instead, the exporting 
farm incurs the cost of transporting the manure to the receiving centers.  These 
simplifying assumptions do not distract from the focus of our farm-level analysis and 
are consistent with work done to assess the costs associated with the implementation 
by livestock operations of comprehensive nutrient management plans (USDA, NRCS 
2003a).  The costs of manure transportation may be a function of the volume of 
manure transported and the distance covered, amongst others (see Harrigan, 2001). 
The farm operator in our model faces an aggregate cost that encompasses manure 
volumes and distances. We investigate the effects of changes in off-site manure 
disposal costs on management adjustments by parametrically increasing the costs of 
transporting manure to off-farm receiving centers, from an initial low cost.  
 
Environmental Nutrient Loading 
 The dairy management adjustments to dairy feed prices and new nutrient 
standards have implications for nutrient loading to the environment. Given the 
growing focus on P loading risks from agricultural operations and the development of 
newer water quality assessment tools useful to analyze these risks, the emphasis of our 
environmental analysis for the representative animal feeding operation is necessarily 
on P loss in runoff. We however are also able to include in our assessment something 
on the potential N loading associated with the farm management adjustments. This is 
made possible by the availability of derived equations and data for estimating N runoff 
and leaching specific for soils in the agricultural production region that our model is 
based on (Boisvert, et. al., 1997). We thus examine P and N loading effects in our 
representative farm model using two distinct techniques for determining the 
distributions of phosphorus and nitrogen residuals from crop land.  
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 To quantify the amounts of P lost to the environment due to farm nutrient 
management practices, we follow the methods developed in Vadas et al. (2009) for 
reliably quantifying field-level loss of P in runoff from surface-applied manure and 
fertilizer for a variety of soil types, crop and fertilizer management patterns, and geo-
climatic conditions. According to Vadas et al. (2009), these modified methods are 
compatible with and attempt to update the procedures used for ground water quality 
assessment models such as the Erosion-Productivity Impact Calculator (EPIC) model. 
On the other hand, our estimations of N loading make use of derived equations from 
Boisvert, et al. (1997) that relate nitrate loading from corn production to soil 
characteristics, weather, crop rotations and fertilizer application methods using nitrate 
runoff and leachate data generated from GLEAMS for specific New York soils.   
 We incorporate solutions to our nonlinear programming model into the 
abstractions of the known relationships between nutrient application, land vegetative 
cover and soil characteristics, weather, and nutrient loading. Land nutrient application 
rates in turn also differ in our model by crops grown on land owned or rented by the 
farm (i.e., corn grain, corn silage, alfalfa or orchard grass); the position of the current 
(corn) crop in the rotation (i.e., whether corn follows other corn, alfalfa or orchard 
grass in rotations); classification of the land based on crop productivity (i.e., low; 
medium, or high); and levels of soil test phosphorus (i.e., low; medium or high). We 
account for these field-level differences in cropping and nutrient management, in our 
estimation of the phosphorus and nitrogen runoff from the dairy farm. Due to 
limitations in our empirical data, we estimate phosphorus and nitrate loss in runoff for 
corn fields only, thereby placing a conservative limit on our estimates. 
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Phosphorus Runoff 
 Many studies have attempted to assess field level losses of phosphorus from 
agricultural land based on soil characteristics and applied manure, compost and 
fertilizers (see for example, Davis, et al., 2005; Sharpley and Moyer, 2000; Sharpley, 
et al., 2001; and Vadas, et al., 2008). The more recent studies make use of some 
notion of P runoff indexes that account for differences in nutrient management 
practices, soil characteristics and geographical and agro-climatic conditions, and rank 
the potential for P loss from agricultural fields.  These methods of classifying P loss 
risks have gained popularity such that several U.S. states have adopted a P index (PI) 
as their primary risk assessment tool for ranking the vulnerability of fields to P loss. 
Sharpley, et al., (2003) for example, reports that 47 states used the PI approach by 
2003 and had mostly developed the index to suit local conditions and policy. A 
drawback to the use of P indexes is that most of them do not explicitly quantify P loss, 
posing a challenge to P loss reduction planning. Process-based simulation models 
address these concerns in that they can quantify field-level losses of P in runoff. These 
models are however considered difficult to use for routine management purposes and 
may have excessive field-specific data requirements (Vadas, et al., 2009)  
 New techniques developed by Vadas, et al., (2009) offer an improvement on 
the indexation methods without requiring the expertise or additional data associated 
with the process-based models.  Their methods, which are compliant for use with 
existing tools such as EPIC, were validated against data from several independent 
published field studies, and are useful for predicting annual dissolved P in runoff from 
surface-applied manure and fertilizers. Their techniques incorporate manure and 
fertilizer P runoff equations in the development of a P loss quantification tool to 
estimate total dissolved and sediment P in runoff from soil, eroded sediment, manure 
and fertilizer. We follow this general method in our estimation of phosphorus loss in 
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runoff. However, the focus of our study on the marginal changes in nutrient loadings 
attributable only to differences in field nutrient management allows us to ignore 
without consequence, the determination of P runoff losses that are a function of the 
soil characteristics or erosion factors.10 We thus restrict our adoption of the models by 
Vadas, et al., (2009) to the estimation of P loss in runoff from manure and fertilizers.  
 We incorporate our solutions from the nonlinear programming model that 
represent the optimal nutrient management decisions of the representative farm into 
abstractions of the relationships between land nutrient application, weather incidences 
and environmental loading. We make use of available data on soil characteristics and 
weather events representative of agricultural soils and regions in New York State.  
 
Estimation of P Runoff from Manure 
 For our modeling purposes, dissolved P in runoff from applied manure is 
estimated as in equation (1.1): 
 
 PPTROPDFPRROP manmanman  4.0     (1.1) 
 
where ROPman is the amount of dissolved phosphorus lost in runoff from manure in a 
rainstorm event (lbs/ac.); PRman is P released from applied manure (lbs/ac.) and is the 
amount of dissolved P leached out of manure particles by precipitation during an 
event; PDFman is a factor for manure application that distributes released P between 
runoff and infiltration, and ranges between 0.0 and 1.0; RO is the precipitation runoff 
(in.) from the relevant storm incidence; and PPT is the measured amount of 
precipitation from the storm event (in.). PRman is further defined as P available for 
                                                 
10 It is reasonable to assume that the land nutrient management factors are the only relevant variables 
from the no-policy to the nutrient regulations scenario. Soil characteristics such as initial soil nutrient 
status and topography are constant.  
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runoff from the applied manure in water extractable phosphorus (WEP) and non-WEP 
forms. All P that is in non-WEP form at the time of manure application is unavailable 
for runoff at that time. According to Vadas, et al. (2009), 40 percent of applied manure 
WEP is available for direct loss to runoff from applied liquid manures and 10 percent 
of non-WEP becomes mineralized and available through the year.  In our model, the 
estimates of total P produced in manure for the various fed rations come from the 
CPM-Dairy program output and are for all manure P that is available for plant uptake. 
The data do not distinguish manure WEP from non-WEP and we assume in our model 
that 40 percent of total manure P is available for direct runoff in a storm event.  
 The manure P distribution factor is determined as follows in equation (1.2): 
 
  225.0PPTROPDFman        (1.2) 
 
where PDFman is the manure distribution factor and RO and PPT are the runoff and 
precipitation variables, respectively, as defined above in equation (1.1).  We adopt the 
curve number method developed by the Natural Resources Conservation Service 
(NRCS) to predict RO, the amount of precipitation runoff from fields (NRCS, 2003b).  
The curve number method uses empirically-determined mathematical relationships 
and appropriate values read off a curve number chart in the prediction of runoff.  Its 
suitability for use in models that estimate P-runoff from variable source areas has been 
questioned (see Easton, et al., 2007). Notwithstanding, the results of our study do not 
account for spatial distribution of P runoff within the context of the cropland available 
to the dairy farm, thus making the curve number approach suitable for our purpose.   
 Our estimation of the field runoff from precipitation follows equation (1.3): 
 
   SPPTSPPTRO  8.02.0 2     (1.3) 
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where RO is the depth of runoff from the cornfields (in.) and is measured as rainfall in 
excess of the soil’s capacity for infiltration. It depends on the intensity of rainfall as 
well as on such field characteristics as land use type, vegetative cover, and soil 
hydrologic group. PPT is the observed depth of rainfall for a single storm incidence in 
inches as earlier defined; and S is the depth (in inches) of effective available storage 
on the fields.  
 Further, S is determined following equation (1.4): 
 
  101000  CNS        (1.4) 
 
where S is the effective storage capacity of the field and CN is the curve number. The 
CN is read off the appropriate NRCS charts (NRCS, 2003b). It varies by soil 
hydrologic group, as well as by land use type. The latter distinction does not occur in 
our model as all of the fields for which we calculate P runoff loss are agricultural plots 
with row (corn) crops. However, following available soil survey data for the New 
York agricultural production region that our representative farm model captures, we 
identify soil hydrologic groups A, B, and C and the proportions of croplands on the 
representative farm that belong to each of these groups (see Table 4 in Boisvert, et al., 
1997). Our estimation of the P runoff thus accounts for the soil hydrologic groups. 
 
Estimation of P Runoff from Commercial Fertilizers 
 The estimation of phosphorus runoff from fertilizers applied is similar to that 
for P loss from manure in equations (1.1) through (1.4), with some modifications. 
Estimation of the amount of dissolved P in runoff from applied fertilizers follows 
equation (1.5): 
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 PPTROPDFPRROP ferferfer       (1.5) 
 
where ROPfer is the amount of dissolved phosphorus lost in runoff from fertilizer in a 
rainstorm event (lbs/ac.); PRfer is P released from applied fertilizer (lbs/ac.) and is the 
amount of dissolved P leached out of fertilizer by precipitation during an event. It 
includes all of the P applied in fertilizer form. PDFfer is a fertilizer distribution factor 
which estimation is defined shortly; RO and PPT are runoff and precipitation (in.) as 
defined above.  
 The fertilizer P distribution factor is determined as in equation (1.6): 
 
  PPTROPDFfer  4.3exp034.0     (1.6) 
 
where PDFfer is the fertilizer distribution factor and lies between 0.0 and 1.0; and RO 
and PPT are the runoff and precipitation variables as defined. RO is as determined in 
equation (1.3).  
 
Incorporating P Runoff into the NLP Model 
 Solutions to our NLP model enter into the equations for estimating P loss in 
runoff as values for the amount of P available for release from applied manure and 
fertilizers (i.e., PRman and PRfer in the P runoff equations).  Since fertilizer and manure 
application rates potentially differ by cropping activity (i.e., by land capability class, 
crops grown, position of cropping in rotations and in the CAFO regulations case, 
restrictions on land nutrient application), we necessarily apply equations (1.1) through 
(1.6) to each cropping activity that comes into the NLP solution. Further, we evaluate 
the equations for each of three particular measures of rainfall in the year and for 30 
years of weather observations. The total P runoff for any cropping activity in any 
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given year is calculated as the sum of  residual P associated with manure and with 
fertilizer application and accumulates P lost to runoff through the storm incidences 
occurring in that year.  
 Total annual P runoff for individual cropping activities cumulatively sum up 
the runoff P associated with each of the storm events. This is such that P leached out 
of applied manure or fertilizer in a first (second) storm incidence is no longer available 
for loss through runoff during a second (third) storm event. In particular, equations 
(1.1) and (1.5) can be re-written as in equations (1.7) and 1.8): 
 
 PPTROPDFPRPRROP mantmantmantman   )(4.0 1   (1.7) 
 
   PPTROPDFPRPRROP fertfertfertfer  1    (1.8) 
 
where ROPman, ROPfer, PRman, PRfer, PDFman, PDFfer, RO and PPT are defined as in 
equations (1) through (6). The superscript t represents the three rainfall observations 
that are relevant to our estimation [i.e., t = 1, 2 and 3; the measures of rainfall 
observed in the 14 days after planting, fertilizer application, and harvesting, 
respectively (in.)].   
We determine the cumulative sum of P runoff for a single cropping activity, 
from all weather incidences within the year or season as in equation (1.9): 
 
   3 13 1 t tjfert tjmanj ROPROPPRO   j= 1,…, J  (1.9) 
 
where PROj  is the amount of dissolved phosphorus lost in runoff (lbs/ac.) from 
manure and/or fertilizer application associated with cropping activity j over all storm 
events.   
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Total P runoff for all of the grown corn acres is then determined as: 
 
    Jj jj AcPROTPRO 1       (1.10) 
 
where TRPO is the amount of P runoff from manure and fertilizer application on all 
cropped corn acres (lbs). PROj is the amount of dissolved phosphorus lost in runoff 
from manure and/or fertilizer application associated with cropping activity j (lbs/ac.); 
and Acj is the relevant number of crop acres (ac.). 
 
Nitrate Runoff and Leaching 
To determine the effects of new nutrient restrictions on nitrogen loading on our 
representative dairy establishment, we predict potential levels of N runoff and 
leaching associated with the changes in land application of manure and fertilizer on 
corn acres. To do this, we make use of empirical techniques developed in Boisvert, et 
al. (1997).  In that work, estimates of N runoff and leachate were obtained for different 
length corn rotations and fertilizer application rates using GLEAMS for 105 New 
York soils. The resulting data were then used to estimate recursively equations relating 
nitrate runoff and leaching from corn production to soil characteristics, weather, 
rotations and fertilizer application. The relationships between nitrate runoff and 
leaching estimates and soil characteristics, weather and cropping practices in the 
agricultural production regions of New York were represented in translog functional 
form. The nutrient loading function is stated in its general form as: 
 
  
   

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h
G
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lkklkkhh WWfWeDdeY
1 1 1 1
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where Y is either nitrate runoff or leaching; d, e and f are the relevant parameters of the 
equation, Dh are dummy variables that take on the value of one if a soil is in 
hydrologic group h and zero otherwise; and Wk is the kth of G variables representing 
soil characteristics, cropping practices and weather factors. The set of recursive 
equations for estimating nitrate runoff and leaching are presented in detail in 
Appendix 1.C.  
 Nitrate runoff appears as an explanatory variable in the leaching equations to 
account for the fact that increased surface runoff leaves less N to leach out from the 
soil. Dummy variables account for differences in the hydrologic groups of the soils A, 
B and C. Soils in group C have potential for higher runoff as they are heavier and have 
greater slope.  
 In evaluating programming model solutions, we allow to change in the nitrate 
loading equations only the values for those variables that are directly related to soil 
nutrient management – i.e., manure and fertilizer application.  The means and 
regression coefficients for all other variables are assumed constant. Field 
characteristics such as the slope, soil horizon depth, N mineralization rates, organic 
matter content and erodibility are assumed to take on the mean values for the region 
and do not change with cropping patterns.  
 We allow for the effects of variation in weather by evaluating the regression 
equations for a sample of historical weather observations. We keep the nutrient 
management variables constant for any single weather observation, thereby restricting 
variations in weather across the fields. Our sample of weather observations consists of 
actual weather data for New York State counties (Boisvert, et al., 1997).  
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Results and Discussions 
 We present results that indicate the direct implications of the new nutrient 
restrictions on CAFOs in New York State. First, we present the results for a base 
scenario in which there are no restrictions on manure and fertilizer application for the 
representative dairy farm. Next, we look at the implications for the base case of 
changes in the prices and availability of DDGS. We then investigate the policy case in 
which nutrient restrictions are applied.  
 Our analysis uses average prices for (year) 2008 as the relevant starting 
coefficients in the model.  It is increasingly clear however, that the elevated feed 
prices experienced early in 2008 may not be sustainable in the long term. The relative 
prices of low-cost alternatives for feed ingredients - such as DDGS - could continue to 
change. We thus first conduct a parametric analysis of feed prices, allowing the 
relative price of DDGS to change so that we investigate the effects of changes in 
relative feed prices on the dairy management response. The dairy farm responses to 
the prices of feed ingredients have implications for the nutrient content in manure, and 
for farm nutrient management. They also have implications for the extent to which 
CAFOs can respond to feed price-related changes in agricultural markets in the face of 
new restrictions on land nutrient application.  
 Our modeling of the nutrient regulations sets yield expectations consistent with 
agriculture in the production region and limit land application of manure and fertilizer 
nutrients to agronomic uptake rates. To determine the implications of the new state-
specific nutrient standards, we compare the solutions to the NLP model for the 
scenario that assumes restrictions to N and P application on field crops to that which 
does not include nutrient use limitations in the management decisions. To determine 
other market effects on the management response to nutrient policy, we systematically 
vary the costs associated with off-site transportation of animal manure to account for 
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the increased need for manure disposal. The manure disposal costs encompass the 
volumes of manure that need to be shipped to off-farm sites as well as the distances 
travelled to find suitable land. Throughout, we link the indicators of nutrient 
management adjustments generated from our NLP optimization models – for example, 
the rates of fertilizer and manure nutrients applied to the fields – to sets of equations 
that estimate phosphorus loss in runoff and nutrient runoff and leaching from acres 
growing corn. We track the changes of the farm income of the representative animal 
feeding operation under the different policy and market scenarios. 
 
The Base Scenario 
 At 2008 average prices for production inputs and outputs, 250 milk cows, 250 
dry cows, and 195 replacement heifers are raised on the representative farm.  The 
milking cows are fed a primarily corn silage-base ration of 10 percent dry matter 
content of 8 percent fat DDGS; 10 percent of the dry matter fed to dry cows is 8 
percent fat DDGS while heifers are fed 13 percent dry matter of 8 percent fat DDGS.   
 In Table 1.5, we summarize major revenues and costs associated with the base 
simulation of the representative dairy farm management decisions where no 
restrictions on land nutrient application are in effect. In this base case, the total 
receipts to the farm per cow are $4,360. About 67 percent of this gross farm income is 
expended in production (i.e. $2,929/cow), with feed purchases accounting for the 
largest share of production costs at $1,108 per cow. Milk sales are expectedly the 
biggest income source and are 86 percent of all farm proceeds.  Manure and nutrient 
management costs are a small fraction of the total production costs .11  As seen in 
Table 1.5, nutrient management, although still a relatively small factor of the 
                                                 
11 Manure and nutrient management costs include the cost of spreading manure on land, purchasing and 
spreading fertilizers; and in the policy case, disposal of excess manure off-site. 
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production outlay at $132 per cow per year is a more important cost component for the 
model simulation that includes restrictions on land nutrient application. We however 
leave to a later section the discussions on revenues and costs associated with the 
nutrient policy scenario. We instead focus here on how the programming solutions to 
the base scenario change as DDGS pricing is adjusted.  
 
Table 1.5: Net annual revenues, receipts and costs:  
Base and Policy scenarios 
 
 Base Policy 
 Solution Solution 
 
(No Policy) 
 
(Nutrient 
Standards) 
 $/cow 
Net annual revenue  1,432 1,388 
Total receipts  4,360 4,360 
    Milk 3,744 3,744 
    Crop sales 340 340 
    Livestock sales 276 276 
Total Costs 2,928 2,972 
    Feed 1,108 1,108 
    Labor 661 650 
    Crop production1 362 362 
    Other production costs2 720 720 
    Nutrient management 75 132 
        Manure spreading    44 26 
        Offsite disposal3 0 48 
        P fertilizer purchases 12 18 
        N fertilizer purchases 19 19 
        K fertilizer purchases4 0 21 
1 Custom lime, seeds, herbicides and soil testing. 
2 Livestock production (utilities, veterinary, supplies, repairs and maintenance). 
3  Manure disposal costs assumed to be $4/ton. 
4 The model assumes that up to 4 lbs/ac of potassium is available in manure. This  
   amount is sufficient to meet crop demands. Fertilizer K purchases are likely only  
   required on acres where manure is not spread. 
 
 We examine modeling programming solutions that are associated with DDGS 
prices for relevant DDGS-to-corn price ratios as presented in Table 1.6. We examine 7 
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sets of our programming solutions that are associated with relative DDGS prices. The 
price ratios range from more than twice the (2008) per ton cost of corn grain (i.e. a 
DDGS-to-corn price ratio of 2.04:1) to less than one half of the same price (i.e. 
0.45:1). Six of the solution sets are the programming solutions obtained when the 
optimal dairy management solution changes in response to the change in DDGS 
prices. The solution set representing the biofuels byproduct feed-to-corn ratio of 0.60-
to-1 is for 2008 prices of DDGS (see Table 1.6). The 2008 price for corn is $234.7 per 
ton DM. As DDGS prices are allowed to change relative to other feed prices, the 
combined demand for (8 and 12% fat-) DDGS also changes. While the optimal 
numbers of animals do not change as the relative prices and utilization of other feed 
ingredients to DDGS changes, the amounts fed of the biofuels byproduct change.  In 
general, a greater proportion of the animals are fed with rations that include DDGS as 
its relative price falls. For a DDGS-to-corn price ratio of 2.04:1, no DDG is fed. 
However, when the price ratio falls to 0.45:1, all of the animals are fed DDGS in 
rations, and the low-cost feed ingredient is up to 17% of the total mixed ration (not 
shown in table).  
As more DDGS is fed, the total volume of manure produced does not change 
by any significant amount. However, the amounts of nitrogen and phosphorus 
available in the manure produced increase.  The levels of nitrogen and phosphorus in 
rations that include DDGS tend to be higher than in those without the distillers’ by-
products.  As shown in Table 1.6, 71 pounds of manure phosphorus are produced per 
cow per year when no DDGS is fed, compared to 84 pounds of P produced per cow 
when the DDGS-to-corn price ratio is 0.45:1; i.e., where all of the animals are fed 
DDGS in rations.
 Table 1.6: Feeding, nutrient management and environmental loading as DDGS prices change: Base scenario  
 
Price ratio1 2.04 1.91 1.46 0.84 0.78 0.601 0.45 
Net revenue ($/cow) 1,287 1,290 1,309 1,361 1,382 1,432 1,452 
Rations fed2  (% cows):        
CowCS 100 100 100 17 0 0 0 
CowCS1210 0 0 0 83 100 100 0 
CowALF0820 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 
DCow 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DCow8 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Hef 100 100 0 0 0 0 0 
Hef8 0 0 100 100 100 100 100 
Manure produced (tons) 7300.0 7300.0 7300.0 7325.4 7330.5 7330.5 7475.4 
P in manure (lbs/cow/yr) 71.27 72.89 77.23 77.32 77.34 77.34 84.74 
N in manure (lbs/cow/yr) 179.18 177.36 177.00 182.11 183.13 183.13 210.84 
P application on fields3 (lbs/ac) 39.99 40.05 39.94 40.02 40.03 40.03 39.95 
  Manure P (%) 77 80 81 89 91 91 96 
N application on fields3 (lbs/ac) 97.36 97.96 94.00 103.86 106.11 106.11 115.42 
  Manure N (%) 79 80 79 81 81 81 83 
P runoff (lbs/ac): Mean 4.89 5.04 5.06 5.43 5.50 5.50 5.72 
P runoff (lbs/ac): Maximum 12.15 12.33 12.36 12.82 12.92 12.92 13.19 
P runoff (lbs/ac): Std Deviation 3.58 3.67 3.68 3.90 3.95 3.95 4.08 
N loading (lbs/ac): Mean 6.88 6.95 6.48 7.32 7.52 7.52 8.19 
N loading (lbs/ac): Maximum 15.55 15.89 14.81 16.82 17.28 17.28 19.14 
N loading (lbs/ac): Std Deviation 3.14 3.23 3.01 3.43 3.52 3.52 3.94 
1 Ratio of the price of DDGS to the price of corn grain on a per ton basis (dry matter). To compute the DDGS price,  
   multiply ratio by $234.7/ton. The price ratio of DDGS-to-corn in 2008 is 0.60:1. 
2 Ration headings are formatted by primary forage base, DDGS fat percentage, and percentage of DDGS fed on a dry matter basis,  
   respectively; e.g., CS0810 = primary corn  silage forage base, 8% fat DDGS, and 10% DDGS fed. 
3 Nutrient applications on corn acres. N application includes starter nitrogen. 
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 In the case of nitrogen, 180 pounds are produced in manure per cow for the 
DDGS-to-corn price ratio of 2:04:1, compared with 210 pounds for the 0.45:1 price 
ratio. As more P is produced in manure, more of the crop P requirement is met using 
manure and smaller amounts of phosphorus need be purchased as commercial 
fertilizer (see Table 1.6). Phosphorus applied on corn fields from manure (as a percent 
of total P applied) goes up from 77 to 96 percent, as the relative cost of DDGS 
declines. The additional savings on fertilizer purchases lead to an increase in the 
farm’s net revenue. However, the higher rates of nutrient applications from manure 
lead to more phosphorus and nitrate being available for runoff and leaching to the 
environment.   
According to our model, field N and P are applied from commercial and 
manure sources at 97.36 and 40 pounds/acre, respectively, when the DDGS to corn 
ratio is 2.04: 1. Nitrogen loading from the cornfields is 6.88 pounds/acre on average at 
this price level while P loading to the environment is 4.89 pounds/acre on average. On 
the other hand, mean N and P runoff and leaching at the lowest DDGS-to-corn ratio 
that we examine (0.45:1) are 7.52 and 5.5 pounds/acre respectively, representing 9 
percent and 11 percent increases in environmental loading.  
No manure is shipped off from the dairy farm under the base (no policy) 
scenario.  
 
The Policy Scenario 
The dairy management follows the same feeding regime in the nutrient policy 
scenario as in the no-policy case. As the relative price of DDGS falls, more of the 
alternative feed ingredient is fed in the dairy ration. However, manure produced in 
excess of the farm’s crop requirements must be shipped off the farm when the new 
regulations are in effect, so that net revenues fall with the increased costs of off-farm 
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manure disposal. We report the programming solutions for the base and policy 
scenarios for a given set of feed prices and estimates of the unit costs of off-site 
manure disposal in Table 1.7. The off-site disposal costs implicitly represent the 
distances that dairy operators must travel to find suitable land for manure disposal. 
These distances (and manure costs) would increase substantially if the representative 
farm is in a region with a high concentration of similar operations such that the 
volume of manure nutrients produced outstrips the absorptive capacity of nearby 
farmlands suitable for disposal. When the costs associated with transporting manure 
off the farm to other (net receiving) farms or collection centers are increased 
systematically, we are able to observe the critical points at which current farm 
operations are no longer optimal. We also determine changes in the dairy operation 
that must accompany the rising costs, for the farm feeding, cropping and whole-farm 
nutrient management plan to become optimal. With the new nutrient standards in 
effect, the representative dairy farm in our model can respond to prohibitive costs for 
off-farm manure disposal by reducing the herd size to effectively cut back on manure 
production. This nutrient management strategy is unlikely to be observed in practice 
so we restrict our discussion of the results to the feasible range of off-site disposal 
costs where the animal feeding establishments keep their dairy operations in business.  
Using 2008 estimates of $4 per ton for manure disposal, our analysis shows 
only minimal changes in the farm animal production and feeding activities from the 
base to the policy simulations.12 The herd size and the composition of the total mixed 
ration fed to milking cows, dry cows or heifers do not change. Farm income from milk 
and livestock sales are also essentially the same (see Table 1.5).  Expected net 
revenues however fall from $1,430 per cow to $1,388 per cow. While the overall crop 
                                                 
12 Our estimates of manure disposal costs in 2008 compare with calculations from Harrigan (2001) and 
Hadrich, et al., (2008) that place manure disposal costs between $2.2/ton and $4.4/ton. 
41 
production costs (not including manure and fertilizer application or manure disposal) 
do not change, other factors associated with cropping do change. In particular, the 
number of labor hours needed for spreading manure on crop acres falls, as well as the 
acreages of farmland devoted to corn. The most important changes that we find are 
related to crop nutrient management and environmental nutrient loading. 
 
Nutrient Management and Off-Farm Manure Disposal 
 As outlined in the previous sections, all of the manure that is produced is 
applied on the land in the base representation of the dairy farm where the new nutrient 
use restrictions are not followed. This optimal management decision would not change 
in response to changing costs of disposing of manure off-site. On the other hand, some 
of the manure produced is shipped off the farm and increasing off-farm shipping costs 
have major implications in the policy case. In Table 1.7, we compare manure and 
fertilizer application on the representative dairy operation for the base scenario and 8 
policy scenarios representing increasing costs for off-site manure disposal. Manure 
disposal costs start out at $2 per ton (14 miles roundtrip if we assume $0.14 per ton-
mile) and rise in $2 increments to $16/ton (114 miles roundtrip).13 The travel distances 
implied in our analysis fall within the limit of the maximum distances (170 miles) for 
which manure-exporting farms could receive subsidies under a poultry litter 
transportation program as modeled for Virginia in Pelletier, et al. (2001).  
 In our evaluation of the base and policy scenarios, we find that nitrogen is 
applied as manure and fertilizer N at 106 lbs/acre on average in the base case. This 
application rate is significantly reduced in the policy scenario, to 68 lbs/acre.  
 
                                                 
13 Information on per ton-mile estimates for dairy manure follow Pelletier, et al. (2001); Feinerman, et 
al. (2004) and USDA indices of agricultural prices paid.  
 Table 1.7: Manure and fertilizer management and environmental loading with increasing costs for off-site manure  
disposal: Base and Policy scenarios 
 
 
Disposal Costs $/ton 
Base 
Scenario 2 41 6 8 10 12 14 16 
Net revenue ($/cow) 1,432 1,412 1,388 1,364 1,341 1,319 1,297 1,276 1,255 
Manure produced (tons): 7330 7330 7330 7330 7330 7330 7330 7330 7330 
Disposed off-farm (%) 0 41 41 40 40 36 36 36 36 
Nutrient management on corn: 
P application2 (lbs/ac) 40 31 31 27 27 15 15 15 15 
  Manure P (%) 91 64 64 68 68 88 88 88 88 
N application2 (lbs/ac) 106 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 
  Manure N (%) 81 70 70 64 64 45 45 45 45 
P runoff from fields (lbs/ac) 
Mean 5.5 3.4 3.4 3.0 3.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Minimum 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Maximum 12.9 8.7 8.7 7.9 7.9 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 
Std. Deviation 4.0 2.5 2.5 2.3 2.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 
N runoff and leaching from fields (lbs/ac) 
Mean 7.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 
Minimum 3.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 
Maximum 17.3 9.6 9.6 9.5 9.5 9.3 9.3 9.3 9.3 
Std Deviation 3.5 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 
1 The relevant policy scenario for comparison with the base case is the model simulation when off-site manure disposal is $4/ton. 
2 Nutrient applications on corn acres. N applications include starter nitrogen. 
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 Similarly, P application rates are 40 lbs/acre and 31 lbs/acre on average, 
respectively, for the base and nutrient standards scenarios. Following the reductions in 
P and N applications, environmental nutrient loading risks fall on average. We leave 
the detailed discussion on the implications of the policy for environmental nutrient 
losses to a later section. 
 Of the N that is applied to the fields, 81 percent is from manure in the base 
case while 70 percent is from manure in the policy case. About 91 percent of applied P 
is from manure in the base case compared with 64 percent under the simulation of the 
new nutrient restrictions. These results show that the representative farm purchases 
relatively more of commercial fertilizers under the policy than in the no-policy case. 
Further, the representative farm purchases more than 6 pounds per acre of fertilizer P 
for corn cropping under the nutrient restriction scenario. More than twice that amount 
is disposed of off-farm as manure nutrients (not shown in Table). 
 
Off-site Manure Disposal Costs  
 From Table 1.7 we note that net incomes fall as the manure disposal costs go 
up. The expected net revenue is $1,412 per cow when manure disposal cost is $2/ton 
and $1,255/cow when the cost increases to $16 per ton. This represents an 11 percent 
drop in expected net farm incomes over the relevant range of manure disposal costs. 
To mitigate the effects of the increasing costs and associated losses to farm income, 
less of the manure produced is taken off the farm as the off-farm manure 
transportation costs (distances) increase in the model. When the off-site disposal cost 
goes up from $2 per ton to $16 per ton, off-farm manure disposal drops from 41 
percent to 36 percent of the total volume of manure produced.   
 We find that nitrogen application per acre does not change by very much 
across the policy simulations when off-site manure disposal costs are increased while 
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P applications on the other hand are noticeably reduced. Mean phosphorus application 
falls by 42 percent over the range of manure disposal costs that we examine. 
Underlying the changes in nutrient application are cropping and land nutrient 
management adjustments that the representative dairy farm makes to accommodate the 
need to spread more manure on (ship less manure off) the farm.   
 
Adjustments to Cropping and Nutrient Management  
More manure may be spread on land growing alfalfa than is needed to meet 
nitrogen requirements in the model simulation of the environmental regulations.14  We 
find that the representative farm manager takes advantage of this manure management 
option to compensate for increased restrictions on using manure to supply nutrients to 
growing corn. While the total acreages are equivalent for corn and alfalfa under the 
alternative policy scenarios (i.e., base versus nutrient restrictions), the proportion of 
corn or alfalfa land that manure is spread on changes. We find that while nutrients in 
manure form are applied to all of the corn acres in the base case, only 235 of the 310 
acres (i.e., 76 percent) of land in corn receive manure in the nutrient standards case.  
Manure application in the policy case covers 100 percent (up from 90 percent) of 
cropped alfalfa acres (see Table 1.8). The optimal nutrient management option in the 
base case is to apply manure at 13.8 tons/acre on corn land, and 9.8 tons/acre on 
alfalfa (Table 1.9). These application rates allow for application of N and P above the 
levels required for optimal production. With the nutrient policy in effect, the average 
rate of manure application falls to 6.3 tons/acre on corn and 8.3 tons/acre on alfalfa. 
The representative farm manager similarly makes adjustments to cropping and land 
                                                 
14 Application of other sources of nitrogen to alfalfa is unnecessary since it typically meets all of its 
requirements through biological fixation of N.  Its agronomic characteristics however ensure that alfalfa 
may receive up to 10 tons per acre of manure and still conform to nutrient management plans in New 
York State (Ketterings et. al., 2006). 
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nutrient management to accommodate increasing off-site manure disposal costs.  
These adjustments underlie the reduced P applications reported in the previous section 
for increased off-farm manure disposal costs (i.e., in Table 1.7). 
 
Table 1.8: Manure and nutrient management on corn and alfalfa acres:  
Base and Policy scenarios 
 
 
 
Base Solution 
(No Policy) 
Policy Solution 
(Nutrient 
Standards)1 
Manure management:   
Manure produced (tons) 7,330 7,330 
    shipped off-farm (%) 0 41 
Corn grain and silage cropping:   
Cropped land (acres) 310 310 
    With manure application (%) 100 76 
    With fertilizer N application (%) 0.0 67 
    With fertilizer P application (%) 20 17 
Alfalfa hay cropping:   
Cropped land (acres) 310 310 
    With manure application (%) 89 100 
    With fertilizer N application (%) 0 0 
    With fertilizer P application (%) 77 0 
1 The relevant policy scenario for comparison with the base case is the model simulation  
   when off-site manure disposal is $4/ton. 
 
The dairy farm essentially switches corn from low soil test P land (i.e., 
requiring 40 lbs/ac of P application) to medium soil test P soils (i.e., with no more 
than 15 lbs/ac P requirements).  On the other hand, more alfalfa is grown on low P 
soils to meet the higher allowed P application rates while allowing for the over 
application of nitrogen nutrients from manure (not shown in tables).  The crop 
production and nutrient management adjustments to the new nutrient standards are 
important from an environmental nutrient loading perspective. 
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Table 1.9: Manure and fertilizer nutrient applications:  
Base and Policy scenarios 
 
  
Base 
Solutions 
(No Policy) 
Policy 
Solutions 
(Nutrient 
Standards)1 
Corn grain and silage:  
Soil nutrient application (per acre):  
Manure (tons) 13.8 6.3 
   N in manure (lbs) 86.1 39.0 
   P in manure (lbs) 36.4 16.5 
N in fertilizer2 (lbs) 20.0 28.5 
P in fertilizer (lbs) 3.7 6.47 
Alfalfa hay:   
Soil nutrient application (per acre):  
Manure (tons) 9.9 8.3 
   N in manure (lbs) 61.7 51.6 
   P in manure (lbs) 26.1 21.8 
N in fertilizer (lbs) 0.0 0.0 
P in fertilizer (lbs) 4.0 0.0 
1 The relevant policy scenario for comparison with the base case is the model  
   simulation when off-site manure disposal is $4/ton. 
2 Includes purchase of 20 lbs/ac of pre-sidedress nitrogen. 
 
Nutrient Loading to the Environment 
 To estimate environmental loading of P and N, we apply equations predicting 
phosphorus runoff and nitrogen leaching and runoff from the corn fields to manure 
and fertilizer nitrogen application rates from our solutions to the representative farm 
programming model.15 We compare environmental nutrient loading for the base and 
nutrient policy cases. The base case simulates 2008 prices for all production inputs 
and outputs, including prices of low cost feed ingredients. The relevant policy scenario 
is where off-site manure transportation costs reflect costs of manure disposal in 2008. 
                                                 
15 Nitrogen runoff and leaching from alfalfa cropping is assumed negligible and is not estimated. 
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Estimations of phosphorus and nitrate loss in runoff and leaching are derived for soils 
of hydrologic groups A, B and C so that weighted average loadings are calculated for 
the representative dairy operation following the empirical distribution of soils in the 
relevant agricultural production region of New York (Boisvert, et al., 1997). 
 Nutrient loading is estimated for each of the 30 years of weather for which 
historical data are available.  The nutrient loading estimations we derive do not 
necessarily predict nutrient leaching and runoff over time but represent a sample of 30 
observations from the underlying distributions of runoff and leaching.  For the various 
crop production activities, we assume that the soil characteristics do not change such 
that it is possible to isolate variations in P and N runoff and leaching that are due to 
differences in weather and to differences in field nutrient management. 
 
Phosphorus Loss in Runoff 
To examine the effect on P loading of the new nutrient restrictions, we rank by 
the severity of the historical precipitation incidences (i.e., from low to high) our 
estimates of P loss in run-off for the 30 years for which we have precipitation data.  
This is shown in Figure 1.2 for the base and policy scenarios. The mean P loss in 
runoff is 5.5 pounds/acre in the base case, and 3.4 pounds/acre under the nutrient 
regulations, representing a 38 percent reduction in P loading per acre with the policy. 
The maximum possible P runoff, given our sample of weather data, is 12.9 
pounds/acre in the base case, with simulation of the nutrient policy reducing this 
measure of P loading by 30 percent. While these results suggest that the new nutrient 
standards could reduce P loading on average, they also indicate that significant risks of 
P runoff could remain for severe storm events. 
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Figure 1.2. Phosphorus loss in runoff for the Base and Policy scenarios 
 
Nitrate Runoff and Leaching 
As with P loading, we rank our estimations of the mean nitrate loading for the 
base and policy scenarios for corn acres grown and for the historical weather data. 
This ranking is shown in Figure 1.3 for the base and policy scenarios. Expectedly, 
limiting land nutrient application to the agronomic soil uptake rates leads to reduced 
amounts of nitrate loss in runoff and leaching throughout.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3. Nitrate runoff and leaching under the Base and Policy scenarios 
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 The mean nitrate loading for the base scenario is 7.5 pounds/acre, while the 
maximum level of runoff and leaching associated with the 30 years of weather data is 
17.3 pounds/acre.  Mean nitrate loading for the policy scenario is 4.5 pounds/acre with 
the estimations ranging from 2.0 to 9.6 pounds/acre/year. However, as with P loading, 
there may still remain significant risks of nitrate loss to the environment. 
 
Conclusions 
To obtain New York State’s Pollution Discharge Elimination Permits, large 
concentrated animal feeding operations in the State must develop comprehensive 
nutrient management plans (CNMPs). The CNMPs include restrictions on land 
application of manure and fertilizer nutrients outlined by the appropriate Land Grant 
University. In this analysis, we assess the potential implications for farm 
characteristics such as income and for environmental effects such as nutrient loading 
of implementing the new nutrient standards.  To do this, we incorporate salient details 
of the guidelines for soil nitrogen and phosphorus management in New York State into 
regional and representative farm mathematical programming models.  We analyze 
important linkages between farm management adjustments and changes in farm 
income that are due to restrictions on land application of nutrients and to changes in 
relevant agricultural prices. Our focus on changes in agricultural market prices is 
informed by the trend of shrinking operating margins experienced by dairy farms in 
part due to recent volatilities in feed and agricultural markets. In particular, we explore 
the potential for low-cost feed ingredients in the dairy rations. We also investigate 
how nutrient management and environmental loading respond to changes in off-site 
manure disposal costs. Using historical weather data and results from previous 
research, we are able to associate estimates of nutrient runoff and leaching with the 
management adjustments deduced from our model solutions.  
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Our investigation of the potential for low-cost feed ingredients provides some 
indication that the new restrictions on land application of manure and fertilizer 
nutrients may not be entirely compatible with the otherwise potential gains to animal 
feeding operations of incorporating DDGS in feed rations. As DDGS prices fall, more 
of the bio-energy byproducts are fed, effectively increasing the N and P content in 
manure, and increasing the risks loading of these nutrients to the environment. This 
increases the need for off-site manure disposal, with additional cost implications.  
Further, we find that the application rates of manure and fertilizer nitrogen on 
corn fields are reduced with the simulation of the new restrictions on nutrient 
application. While all of the manure produced by the dairy establishment is applied to 
the land in the base case, upwards of 40 percent of produced manure is shipped to off-
site locations under the nutrient standards scenario. However, although sufficient 
nutrients are produced in animal manure that could meet the crop requirements of land 
owned or rented by the representative farm, a substantial amount of these nutrients are 
not utilized. For example, more than twice the amount of P that is purchased for crop 
production (3,500 lbs) in the policy case is disposed of in manure shipped off the farm. 
The requirement for the dairy operation to concurrently fulfill individual restrictions 
on nitrogen and phosphorus application underlies this result. While N and P are 
available in manure only in fixed ratios, this ratio could differ significantly from the 
N-to-P requirement of the soil-crop combination so that there is increased potential for 
over application of one nutrient in trying to meet the crop requirements for the other. 
Our results may suggest that policies that by design seek to regulate the application of 
any single nutrient whose over-application is considered a threat to the immediate 
environment have at least two major effects. Expenditures on manure application 
could be reduced while the costs of fertilizer purchases increase. Since the policies in 
essence require that regulated establishments take account of soil nutrients already 
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available in the soil, they discourage the (otherwise) unnecessary application of 
manure at rates that exceed the soil nutrient requirements.  However, as outlined 
above, these policies also have the potential to induce regulated CAFOs to purchase 
more rather than less of single nutrient commercial fertilizers.  
Simulating the new nutrient application guidelines in our model also indicates 
some implications for environmental nutrient loading and for farm incomes.  Our 
estimations of nitrate runoff and leaching are reduced on average by more than a third 
under the nutrient policy scenario. P loading is similarly reduced. However, there may 
remain significant risks of nutrient loading in extreme weather events. The dairy farm 
income is expectedly affected by implementation of the nutrient standards, falling by 
about 6 percent from the base to policy scenarios, and by up to 11 percent for our 
assumptions on off-site manure disposal costs. Increased purchases of fertilizers 
account for this decrease in income, with this effect somewhat off-set by such factors 
as lower requirements for and expenditures on labor. 
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APPENDIX 1.A 
 PHOSPHORUS AND NITROGEN LEACHING INDICES 
 
Application of the Phosphorus Index and Nitrogen Leaching Index  
in Nutrient Management on New York large CAFOs1 
 
Index  Recommended nutrient management strategy 
Step 1: 
PI  100 
Check Phosphorus Runoff Index (PI) 
No manure; no P fertilizers allowed  
PI 75 – 99 
PI 50 – 74 
 
PI < 50 
 
Manure and/or fertilizers allowed up to crop P-removal 
Manure and/or fertilizers allowed up to crop N-removal 
rates. Implement Best Management Practices (BMPs)2 
Manure and/or fertilizers allowed up to crop N-removal 
rates. N management based on Nitrogen Leaching Index 
Step II: If PI < 50; Check Nitrogen Leaching Index (NLI) 
NLI < 2 BMPs are not required 
NLI 2 - 10 Consider implementing BMPs on a case-by-case basis  
NLI > 10 Implement BMPs 
1 Adapted from Ketterings, et al., 2003a and 2003b.  
2 BMPs include recommendations about optimal rates, methods and timing of manure 
 and fertilizer application. See Ketterings, et al., (2003a) for discussion. 
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APPENDIX 1.B 
 THE NON LINEAR PROGRAMMING OPTIMIZATION MODEL 
 
Variable and Symbol Definitions: 
 
COWi = Lactating cows being fed on ration i (i = 1,…,10); 
DCOWm = Dry cows being fed on ration m (m = 1,…,5); 
HEFn = Heifer replacements being fed on ration n (n = 1,…,5); 
MILK = Total milk production, and sold (cwt);  
CULLCOW = Sales of cull cows (cwt.); 
CULLCALF = Sales of cull calves (cwt.); 
OWNLAB = Amount of owner/management labor utilized (hours);  
LABOR1 = Amount of level one labor employed (hours);   
LABOR2 = Amount of level two labor employed (hours);   
BALF = Amount of alfalfa purchased (tons on dry matter basis); 
BOG = Amount of orchard grass purchased (tons on dry matter basis); 
BCS = Amount of corn silage purchased (tons on dry matter basis); 
BCG = Amount of corn grain purchased (tons on dry matter basis); 
SALF = Amount of alfalfa sold (tons on dry matter basis); 
SOG = Amount of orchard grass sold (tons on dry matter basis); 
SCS = Amount of corn silage sold (tons on dry matter basis); 
SCG = Amount of corn grain sold (tons on dry matter basis); 
BDDGS8 = Amount of DDGS8 purchased (tons on dry matter basis); 
BDDGS12 = Amount of DDGS12 purchased (tons on dry matter basis); 
BSOY = Amount of Soybean meal purchased (tons on dry matter basis); 
BOPFq = Amount of other minor feed q purchased (tons on dry matter basis) (q = 
1,…,9); 
BMANcjk = Manure applied on cropland of land class k and soil P- level j for cropping 
activity c (tons) (k = 1,…,3; j = 1,…,3 and c = 1,…,8); 
TMAN = Manure produced by milk cows, dry cows and heifers (tons); 
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SMAN = Manure applied as fertilizer on-farm (tons); 
DMAN = Manure disposed off-farm (tons);  
NMAN = Nitrogen in manure produced (lbs.); 
PMAN = Phosphorous in manure produced (lbs.); 
NAV = Nitrogen available per ton of manure spread (lbs.); 
PAV = Phosphorus available per ton of manure (lbs.); 
BSNIT = Amount of Nitrogen fertilizer purchased as Starter (lbs.); 
BNcjk = Amount of Nitrogen fertilizer less starter, purchased cropland of land class k; 
Phosphorus-level type j and cropping activity c (lbs.); 
BPHcjk = Amount of phosphorus fertilizer purchased for cropland of land class k; 
Phosphorus-level type j and cropping activity c (lbs.); 
BPOT = Amount of potash fertilizer purchased (lbs.); 
BFf = Amount of fuel of type f purchased (gallons) (f = diesel and propane);  
Acreages under cropping activity: 
CSjk  = Acres of corn silage following corn (grain or silage) on land class k and soil P-
level type j  
CGjk = Acres of corn grain following corn (grain or silage) on land class k and soil P-
level type j; 
CSAjk = Acres of corn silage following alfalfa on land class k and soil P-level type j; 
CGAjk = Acres of corn grain following alfalfa on land class k and soil P-level type j; 
CSOGjk = Acres of corn silage following orchard grass on land class k and soil P-level 
type j; 
CGOGjk = Acres of corn grain following orchard grass on land class k and soil P level 
type j; 
Ajk = Acres of alfalfa on land class k and soil P level type j; and  
OGjk = Acres of orchard grass on land class k and soil P level type j. 
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Mathematical Representation of the NLP Model: Equations 1.B.1 – 1.B.33 
  
 Objective Function (Maximize Net Revenue):  
 
 
n
nn
m
mm
i
ii HEFobjhefDCOWobjdcowCOWobjcow  
objaBALFLABORobjLABORobjobjlOWNLAB  2211  
88BDDGSobjdobjcgbBCGobjcsbBCSobjogbBOG   
 
f
ff
q
qq NobjdmanDMABFobjfBOPFobjpfBDDGSobjd 1212  
 
k j
jkk
k j
cjk
c
cjk CSobjcsBMANobjbmanNobjdmanSMA  
 
k j
jkjk
k j
jkjk
k j
jkjk CGobjcgCSOGobjcsoCSAobjcsa  
 
k j
jkjk
k j
jkjk
k j
jkjk AobjaCGOGobjcgoCGAobjcga  
objcgsSCGobjcssSCSobjogsSOGobjasSALFOGobjog
k j
jkjk   
LLCALFobjccalfCULCOWobjccowCULKobjmilkMIL   
 
Constraints:  
 
CowCap: COWMAXCOW
i
i     (1.B.1) 
DryCow: 0
m
m
i
i DCOWCOW    (1.B.2) 
CullCow: 0 CULLCOWcwtcowCOW
i
i    (1.B.3) 
CullCalf: 0 CULLCALFcwtcalfCOW
i
i    (1.B.4) 
Heifer: 078.0 
n
n
i
i HEFCOW    (1.B.5) 
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Milk: 0 MILKCOWmcow
i
ii    (1.B.6) 
Labor:       
1LABOROWNLABHEFlhefDCOWldcowCOWlcow
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k j
jkk
k j
jkk
k j
jkk OGlogAlaCGOGlcgo    (1.B.7) 
Own Labor Available:  OWNLABMAXOWNLAB      (1.B.8) 
Labor1 Available:  MAXLABLABOR 11     (1.B.9) 
Labor2 Available:  MAXLABLABOR 22      (1.B.10) 
Land:  (k = 1,2,3;  j = high P, medium P, low P) 
jkjkjkjkjkjkjkjkjk LANDMAXOGACGOGCGACGCSOGCSACS    
     (1.B.11) 
Alfalfa: (k = 1,2,3;  j = high P, medium P, low P) 
BALFSALFHEFahefDCOWadcowCOWacow
n
nn
i
mm
i
ii    
0
k j
jkk Aayield     (1.B.12) 
Orchard Grass: (k = 1,2,3;  j = high P, medium P, low P)                
BOGSOGHEFoghefDCOWogdcowCOWogcow
n
nn
i
mm
i
ii    
0
k j
jkkOGogyield     (1.B.13) 
Corn Silage: (k = 1,2,3;  j = high P, medium P, low P) 
BCSSCSHEFcshefDCOWcsdcowCOWcscow
n
nn
i
mm
i
ii    
  0
k j
jkjkjkk CSOCSACScsyield     (1.B.14) 
                                                 
 In the base solution with no nutrient policy, we assume that all of the crop acres are in the low soil P 
category 
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Corn Grain: 
BCGSCGHEFcghefDCOWcgdcowCOWcgcow
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  0
k j
jkjkjkk CGOCGACGcgyield     (1.B.15) 
DDGS: 
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     (1.B.16) 
Soybean Meal: 
 0  BSOYHEFsbmhefDCOWsbmdcowCOWsbmcow
n
nn
m
mm
i
ii  
     (1.B.17) 
Other Purchased Feeds: (q = 1,…,8) 
 0  q
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mmq
i
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     (1.B.18) 
Fuel: (f = 1, 2) 
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Manure Production: 
 0  TMANHEFhmanDCOWdcmanCOWcman
n
nn
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mm
i
ii  (1.B.20) 
Nitrogen in Manure: 
 0  NMANHEFNhmanDCOWNdcmanCOWNcman
n
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mm
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ii  
     (1.B.21) 
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Phosphorus in Manure: 
 0  MANPHEFPHhmanDCOWPHdcmanCOWPHcman
n
nn
m
mm
i
ii  
     (1.B.22) 
Inventory of on-farm Manure Application: 
 0 SMANBMAN
k j
cjk
c
    (1.B.23) 
Inventory of Manure Production, Application and Disposal: 
 0 TMANDMANSMAN     (1.B.24) 
Nitrogen available per ton of Manure Produced: 
 TMANNMANNAV /)436.0(      (1.B.25) 
Phosphate available per ton of Manure Produced: 
 TMANPMANPAV /))44.0/692.0((      (1.B.26) 
Starter Nitrogen for Crops:  
     
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jkjkjk
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Nitrogen (less Starter N) for Crops (C = 1, …,8): 
 0)(  cjkcjkjkjk BMANNAVBNITCnc     (1.B.28) 
Phosphorus for Crops (C = 1, …,8):  
 0)(  cjkcjkjkjk BMANPAVBPHCphc     (1.B.29) 
Potash for Crops:         
    
k j
jkj
k j
jkjkjkjkjkjkj ApotaCGOCSOCGACSACGCSpotc  
0 BPOTOGpoto
k j
jkj     (1.B.30) 
Rotation Soilk-CA: (k = 1,2,3)    
   04  
j
jk
j
jkjk ACGACSA      (1.B.31) 
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Rotation Soilk-CO: (k = 1,2,3)    
  04  
j
jk
j
jkjk OGCGOCSO     (1.B.32) 
Rotation Soilk-C: (k = 1,2,3) 
    03  
j
jkjk
j
jkjkjkjk CGCSCGOCSOCGACSA   (1.B.33) 
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APPENDIX 1.C 
 ESTIMATING NITRATE RUNOFF AND LEACHING  
 
The Nitrate Runoff and Leaching Model 
Table A.1: Regression model to estimate N runoff and leaching on cornfields1 
 
  Runoff Leaching 
  All soils A and B C Soils 
Variable2 Estimate Mean3 Estimate Mean3 Estimate Mean3
CON -4.402  -75.568  -42.276  
NITRUN -6.739 NRO -11.576 NRO
SQNITRUN 2.119 NRO 3.880 NRO
HYDA -0.453 0.159 0.290 0.199  
HYDB -0.359 0.640  
LOGORG 3.241 1.466 5.235 1.472 0.876 1.439
SQLOGORG -1.040 2.178  
LOGKAY 0.058 -1.216 -5.594 -1.233 -3.838 -1.149
LOGMINN -0.581 4.271 5.442 4.260 -0.357 4.318
LOGPRECIP 0.652 PPT 5.768 PPT 7.593 PPT
LOGPRSTM 0.089 PPT  
SQLOGPRSTM 0.023 PPT 0.056 PPT 0.068 PPT
LOGFRSTM 0.256 PPT 0.098 PPT
SQLOGFRSTM 0.005 PPT 0.094 PPT 0.080 PPT
LOGLBMAN 0.628 NLP 4.824 NLP 3.916 NLP
LOGORGH1 -2.127 2.643 -1.259 3.017
LOGKAYH1 2.287 -2.221 2.062 -2.535
LOGH1 5.638 1.806 4.663 2.066
LOGSLP -1.154 1.466 -0.525 1.660
LOGSLPH1 0.453 2.719 0.209 3.578
LAGCORN -0.668 0.000 -1.167 0.000
LOGROT -0.627 1.534 -0.417 1.347
NITPRSTM 0.363 NRO 0.280 NRO
LOGHRSTM 0.039 PPT 0.116  PPT
MANURE 0.235 NLP 0.102 NLP
1 Modified from Boisvert, et al., 1997.  
2 Variables defined in section following on the Nitrate Runoff and Leaching Equations.  
3 The mean values for field application of nitrogen and manure, denoted NLP, come out of the non-
linear programming model solutions; NRO are nitrate runoff estimates determined in the model 
following the Nitrate Runoff and Leaching Equations; PPT represents precipitation means for the 
sample of rainfall data.  All other means are from Boisvert, et al., 1997. 
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The Nitrate Runoff and Leaching Equations 
Variable and Symbol Definitions: 
CON = Constant; 
EXP = Exponential; 
FRSTM.Y = Rainfall in storms w/in 14d of fertilizer application in year y (y = 1,…,30) 
(in.); 
H1 = Soil horizon depth (in.); 
HRSTM.Y = Rainfall in storms w/in 14d of harvest in year y (y = 1,…,30) (in.); 
HYD.X =   Dummy for hydrologic soil group x (x = A, B, C); 
KAY = K erodibility factor; 
LAGCORN = Dummy of corn in previous year; 
LBMAN.Z = Total N application on crop land z16  from manure and commercial 
fertilizer (z = 1,…,Z) (lbs.); 
LCH.X.Y.Z =   Estimation of leaching for soils of hydrologic group x in year y, for corn 
cropping activity z (x = A, B and C; y = 1,…,30; and z = 1,…,Z) (lbs.); 
LCoefV = Coefficient for variable v from regression function for leaching (v = 1,…,V); 
LMnV = Mean value for variable v from regression function for leaching (v = 1,…,V); 
LOG = the (natural) Logarithm; 
MANURE.Z = Dummy for manure application on corn crop land z (z = 1,…,Z); 
MINN = N mineralized by soil (lbs./acre); 
NITLCH.X.Y.Z = Logarithm of estimated N leaching for soils of hydrologic group x in 
year y, for corn land z (x = A, B and C; y = 1,…,30; and z = 1,…, Z) (lbs.); 
NITRUN.X.Y.Z = Logarithm of estimated N runoff for soils of hydrologic group x in 
year y, for cropping activity z (x = A, B and C; y = 1,…,30; and z = 1,…,Z) 
(lbs.); 
ORG = Organic matter content (percent); 
PRECIP.Y = Total annual rainfall in year y (y = 1,…,30) (in.); 
PRSTRM.Y = Rainfall in storms w/in 14d of planting in year y (y = 1,…,30) (in.); 
                                                 
16 z is land classification for cropping activity c on land class k and soil P-level type j (c, j and k are as 
defined for the NLP model in Appendix B). 
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RCoefV = Coefficient for variable v from regression function for runoff (v = 1,…,V); 
RMnV = Mean value for variable v from regression function for runoff (v = 1,…,V); 
ROT = Years of corn in 10 year rotation; 
RUN.X.Y.Z =   Estimation of runoff for soils of hydrologic group x in year y, for corn 
cropping activity z (x = A, B and C; y = 1,…,30; and z = 1,…,Z) (lbs.); 
SLP = Average field slope (percent); 
SQ = Squared; 
TLCH.Y.Z = Estimation of leaching for soils in year y and for cropping activity z (z = 
1,…,Z) (lbs.); 
TRUN.Y.Z = Estimation of runoff for soils in year y and for cropping activity z (z = 
1,…,Z)  (lbs.); 
 
Equations 1.C.1 – 1.C.7: Estimating Nitrate Runoff and Leaching  
 
Nitrogen loss in runoff: 
NITRUN.X.Y.Z = RCoefCON* RMnCON + RCoefHYD.X* RMnHYD.X  
+ RCoefLOGORG*RMnLOGORG + RCoefSQ.LOGORG*RMnSQ.LOGORG  
+ RCoefLOGKAY*RMnLOGKAY  + RCoefLOGMINN*RMnLOGMINN   
+ RCoefLOGPRECIP*RMnLOGPRECIP.Y + RCoefLOGPRSTM*RMnLOGPRSTM.Y   
+ RCoefSQ.LOGPRSTM*RMnSQ.LOGPRSTM.Y + RCoefSQ.LOGFRSTM*RMnSQ.LOGFRSTM.Y  
+ RCoefLOGLBMAN*RMnLOGLBMAN.Z      (1.C.1) 
 
Square of nitrogen loss in runoff: 
SQNITRUNX.Y.Z = SQ(NITRUN.X.Y.Z)     (1.C.2) 
 
Nitrogen loss in leaching: 
NITLCH.X.Y.Z = LCoefCON* LMnCON + LCoefHYD.X*LMnHYD.X  
+ LCoefNITRUN*NITRUN + LCoefSQ.NITRUN*SQNITRUN  
+ LCoefLOGORGH1*LMnLOGORGH1 + LCoefLOGORG*LMnLOGORG  
+ LCoefLOGKAY*LMnLOGKAY + LCoefLOGKAYH1*LMnLOGKAYH1  
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+ LCoefLOGH1*LCoefLOGH1 + LCoefLOGSLP*LMnLOGSLP 
+ LCoefLOGSLPH1*LMnLOGSLPH1 + LCoefLOGMINN*LMnLOGMINN 
+ LCoefLAGCORN*LMnLAGCORN + LCoefLOGROT*LMnLOGROT 
+ LCoefLOGPRECIP*LMnLOGPRECIP.Y + LCoefSQ.LOGPRSTM*LMnSQ.LOGPRSTRM.Y 
+ LCoefNITPRSTRM*LMnNITRUN.X* LOGPRSTRM.Y + LCoefLOGFRSTM*LMnLOGFRSTRM.Y   
+ LCoefSQ.LOGFRSTRM*LMnSQ.LOGFRSTRM.Y + LCoefLOGHRSTRM*LMnLOGHRSTRM.Y 
+ (LCoefMANURE / 20) *LMnMANURE. + LCoefLOGLBMAN*LMnLOGLBMAN.Z (1.C.3) 
 
Exponential of runoff: 
RUN.X.Y.Z =   Exp (NITRUN.X.Y.Z)      (1.C.4) 
 
Exponential of leaching: 
LCH.X.Y.Z =   Exp (NITLCH.X.Y.Z)      (1.C.5) 
 
Total runoff from soils A, B and C: 
TRUN.Y.Z17  = 0.07*RUNA + 0.31*RUNB + 0.62*RUNC   (1.C.6) 
 
Total leaching from soils A, B and C: 
TLCH.Y.Z = 0.07*LCHA + 0.31*LCHB + 0.62*LCHC   (1.C.7) 
 
                                                 
17 Consistent with the weather, cropping and soils data used, we assume that the proportion of soils in 
each of the hydrologic groups follows the classification for the Western Plains Region in New York 
(the 1992 National Resource Inventory). 
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CHAPTER 2 
ASSESSMENT OF NEW YORK’S POLLUTION DISCHARGE ELIMINATION 
PERMITS FOR CAFOS II: REGIONAL ANALYSIS1  
  
Summary  
 In this paper, we apply mathematical programming methods to account 
explicitly for restrictions on land application of nutrients and to analyze the effects on 
measured outcomes of farm management adjustments to the nutrient policy and to 
recent changes in relevant agricultural prices.  In particular, using a set of unique data, 
we assess the effects of new regulations for nutrient management by confined animal 
feeding operations (CAFOs) on (1) farm income, (2) land use, (3) manure and 
fertilizer management and, (4) environmental quality for an important dairy 
production region in New York.  Our mathematical methods also allow us to make 
distinctions between the value of land for production and as a manure disposal site so 
that we can assess the differential effects of the land nutrient application standards on 
the economic value of land.  
 The results indicate that dairy ration adjustments in response to the current 
high prices of traditional feed ingredients lead to increased nitrogen and phosphorus 
content in dairy waste. In addition, crop nutrient applications from manure far exceed 
the critical uptake levels for optimum yield and increase the risks of nutrient loading 
to the environment. We showed in a related paper using representative farm 
programming methods that while the CAFO regulations correct for the identified 
problem, the reductions in nutrient loading risks could be accompanied by significant 
losses to farm income2. Our current application to an important dairy production 
                                                 
1 Enahoro, D., T. M. Schmit and R. N. Boisvert. New York Pollution Discharge Elimination Permits for 
CAFOs, Management Adjustment and the Environment: Regional Analysis. In Preparation. 
2 See farm-level analysis of the implications of CAFO regulations in Chapter 1. 
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region in Western New York further buttresses this point. In addition, we demonstrate 
that farm net revenue is sensitive to the availability of nearby land suitable for manure 
disposal. Further, the new nutrient restrictions require that about half of the manure 
produced on the dairy farms in the region be transported off-site for disposal so that 
crops with higher potential for absorbing field nutrients are more attractive than would 
otherwise be the case. The shadow prices for CAFO land with low soil phosphorus 
rise, reflecting not only its value in crop production but also its value as a site for 
manure disposal. These values reflect what the CAFOs could pay for additional land, 
and this price falls as the distance to the CAFO increases.  
 
Introduction and Research Objectives 
 Regulations on land nutrient application on confined animal feeding operations 
(CAFOs) in New York may exacerbate the pressure on livestock and dairy operating 
margins brought about by the global recession-driven lowered demand for livestock 
and dairy products and high feed ingredient prices. While feed prices fell in 2009 
below the record-high prices of the previous year, they remained well above historic 
levels. To reduce the associated rising expenditures on animal feed, animal feeding 
operators have necessarily made adjustments to their farm and feed management. 
 Dairy producers, for example, have looked to growing, rather than purchasing 
their own feed and have explored the options for including less traditional feed 
ingredients such as distillers dried grains and solubles (DDGS) in their dairy feed 
rations. In Western New York, availability of DDGS and the possibilities of increased 
supplies from an expanding bio-fuels industry have made more attractive the prospects 
for using these low-cost alternatives as feed ration ingredients. Research however 
suggests that inclusion of the less conventional feed ingredients could increase the 
potential for nitrogen and phosphorus loading to the environment (Schmit, et. al., 
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2009). The outlook for using the low-cost feed rations is thus dampened, particularly 
when considered in light of the recent inclination of environmental policy toward 
more stringent regulations on nutrient discharge to the environment by agriculture. 
 The increased attention on agricultural operations follows from increased risks 
to ground and surface water quality in the United States from growing numbers of 
animal feeding operations being concentrated in smaller areas.3  In particular, federal 
and local policies for environmental quality have focused more attention on reducing 
the negative impacts of what are considered the most relevant of the animal feeding 
operations from an environmental pollution perspective, the CAFOs. As such, CAFO 
management decisions on food and grain production and on feed ration composition 
must be evaluated with considerations for their effects on the environment and in light 
of emerging regulations on land nutrient applications. 
 In research related to this paper, we used representative farm programming 
methods to analyze the implications for a New York dairy producer of new CAFO 
regulations on land application of nutrients, measuring the changes to farm income 
and environmental nutrient loading and investigating the prospects for including low-
cost feed ingredients in rations.4 Our results indicated that the representative dairy 
farm needed to transport 40 percent of manure produced on-farm to nearby land for 
disposal. This suggested important implications of the nutrient standards for regional 
environmental quality.  
The current research continues that analysis by investigating the regional 
implications of the new land nutrient application policy. We use mathematical 
programming methods to account for the new restrictions on land application of 
nitrogen (N) and phosphorus (P). The new restrictions are based on comprehensive 
                                                 
3 See Gollehon, et al., 2001, for a detailed discussion of manure nutrient pollution by CAFOs. 
4 See Chapter 1. 
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nutrient management plans (CNMPs) that CAFOs must develop to obtain and 
maintain pollution discharge elimination permits for New York State that the farms 
need to operate. In this paper, we determine in association with the new nutrient 
standards: (1) changes in farm incomes, (2) changes in land use and (3) region-wide 
effects on environmental quality as measured by changes in phosphorus runoff. The 
new nutrient restrictions are specific to CAFOs so that it is entirely possible that 
manure exported off of CAFOs in response to the increased regulations end up on 
nearby farms that are not directly affected by the restrictions, increasing manure 
application on those lands, with regional implications.  By mathematically 
distinguishing the value of land for production from its value as manure disposal site, 
we further assess (4) the differential effects of the land nutrient application standards 
on the economic value of land. Throughout, our analysis is focused on an important 
dairy production region in Western New York. 
 Our research is unique in several regards.  By explicitly modeling the dairy 
operation from a whole-farm nutrient management perspective that is consistent with 
nutrient management restrictions set by the relevant Land Grant University (in this 
case Cornell University), it is one of the first attempts to assess the impact of new 
state-specific nutrient standards. In particular, we model the effects of CNMPs that (1) 
set manure and fertilizer application at rates consistent with realistic crop yield 
objectives, (2) limit nitrogen and phosphorus application where risk of runoff is high 
and (3) prohibit manure or P application where agronomic soil test phosphorus is 
excessive. Since the nutrient standards that we model are only proposed, and not yet in 
effect, our research provides information that is important for the further design, and 
eventual implementation of the policy. 
 Our analysis is made possible through the availability of two unique data sets 
developed for agricultural production regions in New York State: (1) the distribution 
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of cropland on dairy farms according to crop productivity class and (2) multi-year 
summaries of soil nutrient tests. Using these data and results from previous research, 
we are also able to incorporate into our model empirical methods for estimating 
nutrient runoff and leaching that are calibrated specifically for New York State. We go 
on to estimate the effects of the regulations on the distributions of phosphorus and 
nitrogen residuals based on historical weather conditions and are able to interpret the 
results from a safety-first perspective; e.g., assessing the probabilities that these 
residuals will exceed certain critical thresholds with and without the regulations.  
  Using a set of non-linear constraints, we allow for the endogenous 
determination of the nutrient composition of manure from feeding combinations of 
animal rations. Adjustments to the dairy rations that are driven by price concerns 
where there are no nutrient regulations lead to increased nitrogen and phosphorus 
content in manure and to on-farm application of manure nutrients well in excess of the 
soil test levels beyond which no crop yield responses to additional nutrients are 
expected. From our earlier work using farm-level data we found that the regulations 
could correct for this “excess nutrient’ problem, albeit with potential significant 
reductions in net farm income5. In particular, reduced opportunities for manure 
application could increase the costs of off-farm manure disposal.  
 We account for the cost implications of transporting manure to off-farm 
recipients in detail in this extension of the analysis to the dairy producing region. As 
off-farm manure disposal costs increase, available farmland can take on added value 
as a manure disposal site. In particular, unregulated land that can receive additional 
manure increases in economic value relative to CAFO farmland on which nutrient 
application is restricted. By applying a mathematical treatment of the Kuhn-Tucker 
first-order necessary conditions derived from our optimization model to a stylized case 
                                                 
5 See Chapter 1. 
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of the CAFO adjustments and rising costs of off-farm manure disposal, we show how 
the economic value of land changes in response to the land nutrient application policy. 
 What follows, we outline the new nutrient restrictions guiding CAFOs in New 
York State, and first summarize relevant characteristics of the New York dairy 
producing region that is the focus of our analysis. Next, we discuss the basic 
mathematical framework of our model and its empirical application and describe the 
data. We then show how to extend the base model to include the new nutrient 
application standards; to account for changes in the costs of off-site manure disposal; 
and to measure empirically the phosphorus and nitrate loadings associated with the 
dairy management adjustments. The results of the empirical analysis are then 
presented and discussed.  We compare solutions to the programming model for a base 
case with no nutrient standards and a policy scenario in which we simulate the new 
nutrient regulations. Finally, we discuss the implications of our findings and offer 
conclusions that can be drawn from this study. 
 
Land Nutrient Management and CAFO Regulations in New York 
 In general, i.e., from an agronomic standpoint, crop producers may be 
concerned with supplying enough nutrients to meet current crop requirements for 
optimal yield and to raise soil test levels to reduce (future) fertilizer needs. As the soil 
test levels increase however, the risks of exceeding environmental thresholds could 
increase. Environmental thresholds are defined as those levels at which nutrients in 
soils exceed the capacity of the soils for retention and thus increase the potential for 
nutrient loss to ground and surface waters.6  A goal of environmental policy related to 
ground and surface water quality is to limit fertilizer and manure applications that 
increase the risks of soil nutrient runoff and leaching. In New York, as in much of the 
                                                 
6 See Ketterings, et. al., 2005. 
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United States, phosphorus runoff has been identified as an important nutrient loading 
risk and animal feeding operations are important contributors to the runoff.  
 For example, a state-wide multi-year soil survey showed that following a 
steady rise in soil test P levels since the 1980s, up to 47 percent of all soil samples in 
2001 were at or above the critical agronomic soil test P for field crops (Ketterings, et. 
al., 2005). In particular, high levels of soil P were found for samples from the dairy 
producing regions in Western New York.7 With increasing concentrations of animal 
feeding operations in the high dairy producing regions, the federal regulations on land 
nutrient applications and their adaptation in states like New York have been changing 
to more directly address the growing threats of phosphorus losses from agricultural 
field runoff and leaching (see USDA-EPA, 1999 and USDA-NRCS 2003a, for 
example).8  The nutrient management guidelines for New York are developed by 
Cornell University, the Land Grant University for the state.  
 The guidelines on nutrient application on New York CAFOs take into 
consideration the results of soil testing for samples from agricultural lands across the 
state and restrict the application of soil nutrients (particularly N and P) accordingly. 
The CAFOs are required to obtain state pollution discharge elimination system 
(SPDES) permits in order to operate, and one of the conditions for maintaining the 
permit is that the CAFOs develop and implement CNMPs (NYSDEC, 2003). The 
CNMPs in turn are guided by the Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) 
Code 590 standard that emphasizes the reduction of nutrient losses to ground and 
surface water from the over-application of fertilizer and manure and the prevention of 
direct manure losses to streams and lakes (USDA-NRCS, 1999). To standardize the 
                                                 
7 Ketterings, et. al., 2005 reported the highest soil test P levels in the vegetable production regions in 
Long Island and in the vegetable, fruit and dairy producing regions in Western New York. 
8 A 2001 proposal for revision of the Clean Water Act of 1998 increased the number of animal feeding 
operations regulated under the Act, and further recommended that CAFOs with insufficient land be 
required to export excess manure to off-site recipients. 
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assessment of P loss risks from agricultural fields with different sources of nutrient 
loss and runoff and leaching transport factors, many states have developed and/or 
adopted the use of phosphorus and nitrogen loss indexes that are used in conjunction 
with soil test values for field nutrient planning and application policy purposes.  
 In New York, the phosphorus runoff index (PI) and the nitrogen leaching index 
(NLI) are useful in developing the nutrient management guidelines for CAFOs (see 
Ketterings, et al., 2003a and 2003b). On fields where P loss is considered the larger 
nutrient loading threat, a P-based management strategy is followed, and the PI is the 
relevant index.  The NLI is the important index for N-based nutrient management. We 
summarize the application of PI and NLI to nutrient management planning in New 
York in Appendix 1 (see Chapter 1). A nitrogen-based management strategy applies 
manure and commercial fertilizers at rates that supply all of the nitrogen 
recommendation for a crop and account for volatilization losses.  Typically, this 
application regime results in the over application of phosphorus.  P-based nutrient 
management, on the other hand, tends to make the application of nitrogen fertilizers 
necessary (USDA-NRCS. 1999).  
 Our modeling of the nutrient restrictions on N and P for field crops on CAFOs 
in New York follows the Cornell University guidelines (as in Ketterings, et al., 2003a 
and 2003b). Crop nutrient applications are limited to the agronomic uptake levels and 
soil P tests are used as indicators of P loss so that manure and fertilizer P application 
are further restricted on soils with medium to high soil test P. Further, we account for 
nutrient management specific to alfalfa cropping following Ketterings, et al., 2006. 
The relevant nutrient management conditions and allowable application rates are 
summarized in Figure 1.1 (see Chapter 1). 
 Phosphorus-based management is followed on corn and alfalfa land with soil 
(Morgan P) test of 40 lbs/acre and more. These soils are designated as the high soil 
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test P (STP) class. P-based management is similarly followed on a medium (i.e. 9 – 39 
lbs/acre of Morgan P) STP land class. While no manure or P fertilizers can be applied 
on high P soils, phosphorus may be applied on fields with medium STP land and is 
restricted to a proportion of the crop P-removal rates. A third class of land is 
designated the low STP with Morgan P values of less than 9 lbs/acre. This land class 
has the least restrictive nutrient application regime where manure and fertilizer 
applications can meet the entire crop P requirement. When the phosphorus 
management-imposed conditions for manure and fertilizer application are met, a 
nitrogen condition is applied that accounts for the crop differential nitrogen 
requirements and utilization. For acres on which corn is grown, N application should 
not exceed the crop requirement levels necessary for optimum productivity.  
 Alfalfa cropping, on the other hand, can allow for a little more flexibility. 
Alfalfa may not require any manure application as it typically meets its nitrogen 
requirements through N fixation. However, alfalfa has the ability to reduce its N 
fixation activity when other sources of N are readily available so that it can better 
serve as a manure receiving site than corn (see Ketterings, et al, 2006). Manure P 
application can thus be allowed on alfalfa on the low and medium P soils that meet the 
crop phosphorus and nitrogen requirements net of nitrogen fixation. Sustainable 
nutrient management however would not allow for manure spreading on alfalfa grown 
on high STP soils.   
 We apply relevant soil test results for a three-county dairy producing region in 
New York to mathematical programming models that account explicitly for manure 
and fertilizer nitrogen and phosphorus restrictions on CAFOs.  The model is solved for 
both a base case in which no nutrient standards are imposed and a policy case that 
simulates the nutrient standards following land nutrient application guidelines from 
Cornell. The effect of the policy is evident through a comparison of the results. 
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Selected Three-County Dairy Producing Study Region in New York 
 Our study region includes Genesee, Wyoming and Livingston counties. These 
three counties jointly host a little more than a quarter of all dairy farms with 500 or 
more milk cows in New York (USDA, 2009); and the counties constitute a significant 
portion of the Genesee River Watershed.9 With their high concentration of dairy farms 
and geographical proximity and the natural barrier to off-site manure transportation 
created by the Finger Lakes bordering to the east of the region, these three counties are 
ideal for studying the regional implications of manure and fertilizer nutrient 
application restrictions on CAFO land, particularly when accounting for the 
transportation of excess manure to off-farm recipients. In Table 2.1, we summarize 
descriptive data of the three-county study region available from the USDA.  
 
Table 2.1: Selected 2007 data for the three-county study region in New York1 
 
 Genesee Livingston Wyoming
3CR2 
Total 
3CR 
Mean3 
      
Dairy Cows (no.) 21,449 20,408 38,497 80,354 40,177 
Cropland on CAFOs (ac.) 41,889 39,402 76,202 157,493 78,746 
Other Cropland4 (ac.) 90,444 107,351 66,240 264,035 132,018 
Dairy CAFOs (no.) 26 24 61 111 56 
      
Cows/CAFO (no.) 825 850 631 - 724 
Cropland/CAFO (ac./farm) 1,611 1,642 1,249 - 1,419 
Other/CAFO4 (ac./farm) 3,479 4,473 1,086 - 2,379 
CAFOland/Cow (ac./cow) 1.95 1.93 1.98 - 1.96 
Otherland/Cow4 (ac./cow) 4.22 5.26 1.72 - 3.29 
1 Source: USDA. 2007 Census of Agriculture. 
2 3CR is the three-county region. 
3 Region means are weighted averages for the three counties. 
4 Regional cropland that is not controlled by CAFOs. Location is unknown. 
 
                                                 
9 The Genesee River, with its source in Pennsylvania, runs about 157 miles northward mostly through 
New York, from where it drains into Lake Ontario. 
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 Wyoming County has the highest number of large animal feeding operations of 
the three counties, with 27 farms having 500 or more dairy cows and 61 farms with 
200 and more dairy cows.10 Livingston County with the smallest number of large dairy 
establishments has the highest number of dairy cows per farm. The average farm size 
for CAFOs in the three-county region is 724 dairy cows per farm, excluding dry cows 
and replacement heifers.  
 On average, more cropland is controlled per CAFO in Livingston or Genesee 
than in Wyoming County, and the estimated number of harvested acres rented or 
owned in the three-county region is 1,419 acres per CAFO. Cropland not controlled by 
the CAFOs in the region is estimated to be about 2,379 acres for each CAFO, or 
almost 70 percent more than what is available on the CAFO land. At first glance, this 
may suggest that the large animal feeding facilities have sufficient land available for 
off-site manure disposal when field nutrient restrictions prevent them from applying 
all of the manure that their operations produce on land that they directly control. 
However, regional crop land not controlled by the CAFOs is not necessarily available 
for use as manure receiving sites. Location, ease of access, spatial fragmentation of 
crop land and the willingness of crop producers or farmland owners to apply manure 
on their land are only a few factors that could determine availability of non-CAFO 
land for manure imports.11 To analyze the regional implications of the new nutrient 
standards, we apply mathematical programming methods to data for the selected three-
county region in Western New York. 
                                                 
10 By NRCS definition, CAFOs with fewer than 300 dairy cows are small; 300 to 999 are medium and 
1,000 or more are large for regulatory purposes. Small and medium CAFOs are regulated on a case-by-
case basis. However, survey data on farm sizes available from the USDA do not follow this 
categorization. To avoid throwing out useful observations, we include all farms with more than 200 
dairy cows in the USDA data in our definition of regulated CAFOs. 
11 Kaplan, et al., 2004 made alternative assumptions about the willingness of crop producers to accept 
manure as fertilizer substitutes in their analysis of economic and environmental implications of land 
nutrient application constraints. 
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Analytical Framework and Empirical Setting 
 Mathematical programming techniques have been applied to farm planning 
problems since at least the 1950’s with the earlier applications relying almost 
exclusively on linear programming methods (e.g., Waugh 1951, Heady and Candler, 
1958). More recent advances in theory and computational methods have allowed for 
mathematical programming models to relax the assumption of fixed input and output 
prices, accommodate management decisions and model management response to price 
and production risks in farm planning, amongst others  (e.g., McCarl and Spreen 1980; 
Wui and Engle 2004; Boisvert and McCarl 1990).  Programming methods have also 
been used extensively to evaluate new opportunities and challenges facing farm 
operators, including management responses to environmental policy (e.g. Casler and 
Jacobs 1975; Schmit and Knoblauch 1995).  Recent studies have used mathematical 
programming techniques for the assessment of the implications of alternative soil 
nutrient application standards for manure nutrient management; to account for new 
nutrient management costs associated with environmental regulations compliance in 
the formulation of livestock feed; and to analyze the economic and environmental 
implications of federal regulations on land nutrient application (Feinerman, et al., 
2004; Hadrich, et al., 2008;  Kaplan, et al., 2004). 
 Using a regional optimization model, Kaplan, et al. (2004) provided important 
insights into the linkages between land nutrient restrictions and the local economy and 
environment. A constrained partial equilibrium model was used to illustrate the effects 
on sectors of the economy of imposing nutrient standards on the largest of AFOs. 
Results from that study showed a pass-through to local consumers of the costs of 
meeting the land nutrient standards in the form of higher prices. By adopting a nation-
wide approach that considered U.S. farm production regions following USDA 
classification, the study by Kaplan, et al. (2004) accounted for regional differentiation 
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in the policy effects due to differences in CAFO concentration (and manure 
production) and land availability. The regions in the study were of relatively large 
geographic scope, covering 2 to 11 states each.  
 In comparison to Kaplan, et al. (2004), Feinerman, et al., (2004) and Hadrich, 
et al., (2008) applied mathematical programming models to account for nutrient 
standards within the contexts of individual states. Feinerman, et al., (2004) used a 
mathematical programming model to determine the response of manure demand to 
nutrient standards in Virginia then incorporated the identified manure demand 
relationships into a highly stylized spatial equilibrium model to estimate the welfare 
costs of alternative soil N and P application standards on manure application. The 
Feinerman, et al., (2004) study assumed that crop farmers who do not own livestock or 
poultry can choose to use manure (produced by the animal feeding operations) or 
commercial fertilizers to meet their crop nutrient needs. The demand for manure by 
the crop farms was assumed to be relatively elastic and to depend on the relative prices 
of manure and commercial fertilizers; relative costs of spreading manure and 
fertilizers; manure nutrient concentration; and environmental regulations regarding the 
rates and methods of nutrient applications.  Manure prices in turn were composed of 
the purchase prices at the supplier’s gate and the costs of transportation to the recipient 
fields.12  The model further took into account three strategies for manure and fertilizer 
application; two sources of farm manure; three possible scenarios for nutrient 
regulations; and a cropland availability constraint that imposed barriers to manure 
application in the short-term. However, the focus of the study on the short run where 
manure supply is completely inelastic led to the specification of an optimization model 
                                                 
12 Manure suppliers could be regulated CAFOs with insufficient land to spread manure and farm gate 
manure prices include costs for storage and testing.   
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that did not include possibilities for production changes that could influence longer-
term manure production and supply.   
 Hadrich, et al. (2008), on the other hand, allowed for variations in livestock 
production in their development of a representative farm model in Michigan. By 
incorporating manure management costs associated with environmental regulations in 
Michigan into the linear programming formulation of livestock feed rations, they 
demonstrated the possibility of formulating confined animal feed rations to jointly 
minimize feed and net nutrient disposal costs. This approach could account for costs 
of compliance with environmental regulations that may have been previously ignored.
  In contrast to the cited studies, our current application of mathematical 
programming techniques to the assessment of soil nutrient regulations is state-specific, 
takes on a whole-farm management approach that allows for changes in animal and 
crop production and accounts explicitly for nutrient standards and nutrient 
management considerations in the farm manager’s decisions on crop production as 
well as on feeding and other aspects of animal production. We impose NRCS nutrient 
application standards following Ketterings, et al., 2003a and 2003b. Our specification 
of the model for a base and a nutrient policy scenario allows us to isolate the effects of 
the nutrient regulations. We are able to include components in the model that link bio-
energy feed ingredients, feed prices and manure nutrient loadings by using the CPM-
Dairy program.13  We accommodate the possibility for the dairy operation to use 
lower-cost feed alternatives as in Schmit, et al., (2009) so that we can assess the 
whole-farm nutrient management and planning response given DDGS in feed rations. 
 Using techniques developed by Vadas, et al. (2009) and to extend our now 
non-linear programming model, we determine phosphorus loss in runoff to the 
                                                 
13 The CPM-Dairy program software program for formulating and evaluating dairy feed rations was 
jointly developed by Cornell University, the University of Pennsylvania Veterinary College and the 
Miner Institute. 
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environment that is associated with crop fertilization. We use techniques developed in 
Boisvert, et al. (1997) to determine nutrient management-related nitrate runoff and 
leaching. The nutrient loss estimation techniques that we adopt were developed using 
markedly different strategies. Boisvert et al. (1997) derived equations for estimating N 
loading. These equations were estimated from simulated N runoff and leaching data. 
The data were generated for many common New York soils, a variety of weather 
conditions and management strategies using the Ground Water Loading Effects of 
Agricultural Management Systems (GLEAMS). On the other hand, Vadas et al., 
(2009) developed their methods for estimating P loss in runoff from extensive field 
studies and for a variety of soil, fertilizer management and climate conditions. The 
techniques in Vadas et al., (2009) are designed to be compatible with ground water 
transport models such as the Erosion-Productivity Impact Calculator (EPIC). 
 Further, using the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for optimality, we analytically 
determine the differential implications on economic value of land of the new 
restrictions on land nutrient applications and increases in the costs of off-farm manure 
disposal.  
 
The Base Model 
 To assess changes in farm income, nutrient management, land use and land 
value, and environmental quality associated with the combined effects of new nutrient 
standards and changing feed prices for our three-county dairy producing region, we 
develop a base (no policy) mathematical programming model. The model represents 
the aggregate agricultural production of all the CAFOs in the study region. This 
modeling strategy is similar to the strategy in Kaplan et al. (2004), and the much 
earlier work (e.g., Heady and Srivastava, 1975), in which models are constructed for 
agriculture within USDA or other production regions. However, unlike many of these 
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other models designed to study interregional agricultural adjustments to changes in 
national policy, ours is a model concerned with production adjustments on CAFOs 
within the region in response to CAFO nutrient management regulations.  
 The structure of the model is similar to the model in Schmit (1994) and 
Schmit, et al. (2009), and the formulation of the non-linear model is presented in 
Appendix 1.B (Chapter 1), along with the objective function and the 33 distinct sets of 
constraints.  In contrast to that model, however, the one in this paper is designed to 
maximize expected annual revenues over expected variable costs of the CAFO’s 
within the study region. A second distinguishing feature of the model is that the 
constraints for cow numbers, cropland and labor reflect estimates of the totals of these 
various resources currently controlled by the CAFOs in the study region. In so doing, 
we are assured that the production adjustments in response to nutrient policy remain 
consistent with the regional availability of important agricultural resources.  
 Input and output coefficients of the model reflect important production, cost 
and revenue relationships for the dairy CAFO operations. Key features of the model 
are a livestock component that determines production as well as feeding activities and 
a cropping component that assigns acres to various crops, accounts for restrictions on 
crop rotations, and categorizes available cropland by yield capability and agronomic 
soil tests. The soil test classifications have implications for the new nutrient 
restrictions that we discuss below. The livestock and cropping components of the 
model are interrelated in that crops grown on farmland owned or rented by the dairy 
operation can be fed to animals produced on the farm. Further, the animal and crop 
production activities are linked through nutrient management; e.g., levels of nutrients 
produced in manure are affected by the choice of feed rations and manure produced by 
farm animals can in turn supply nutrients to farm-grown crops. The model 
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differentiates between the production of agricultural commodities and their uses.14 
Separate activities are also defined for the purchase of all feed ingredients and for 
major inputs such as labor, fuel and fertilizers. 
 Realistic assumptions are made about the available livestock, land and labor 
resources. The dairy CAFOs in the selected three-county region have about 80,354 
dairy cows and control 157,490 acres (37 percent) of the harvested cropland in the 
region (see Table 2.1). Up to 1,607,080 hours of on-farm labor are estimated to be 
available annually and additional off-farm labor can be obtained at two different wage 
levels. Equations 1.B.8 – 1.B.10 (Appendix 1.B, Chapter 1) sum up the three types of 
labor. Farm labor is used in livestock production and feeding activities as well as in 
crop production, including fertilizer and manure land application.  
 The dairy establishment in our model summarizes the makeup for a typical 
regulated CAFO in the dairy producing region; assuming characteristics similar to 
those of equivalently-sized farms participating in the Cornell Dairy Farm Business 
Summary program (see Knoublauch, et al., 2008).  
 
Livestock Production and Feed Rations 
 The dairy cows in the model are assumed to weigh 1,400 pounds and to 
produce 21,000 pounds of milk per cow per year on average.  Milk cows, dry cows 
and replacement heifers are raised on rations formulated from purchased and farm-
grown feed. While the model is regional in focus, one can conveniently and without 
loss of generality discuss the structure of the model by using an “average” farm 
constructed by dividing the regional resource constraints by the number of CAFOs. 
For this “average” CAFO, the maximum herd size is restricted to 724 lactating cows 
                                                 
14 For example, sale activities are clearly defined for milk, cull cows and cull calves, as are activities for 
the purchase of crops, and the growing and sale of farm-grown crops. 
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and the numbers of dry cows, heifers, cull cows and cull calves are constrained to be 
in appropriate fixed proportions to the number of milking cows (see Equations 1.B.2 – 
1.B.5).  
 We use the CPM-Dairy program to generate alternative dairy rations for 
animal feeding that include the possibilities of feeding DDGS in the total mixed ration 
(TMR). The structure of the model allows us to demonstrate how the composition and 
amounts of final feed rations are affected by relative prices of the component feed 
ingredients. Ten (10) separate dairy cow activities are included in the model that differ 
in terms of the corn or hay-silage base and whether or not DDGS is included as feed 
ingredient. Where DDGS is included, the ration may contain either 10 or 20 percent 
DDGS on a dry matter basis, and a fat content of either 8 or 12 percent.  The dairy 
cow activities are summarized in Table 1.1 (Chapter 1).  
 Separate activities are included for feeding dry cows and raising heifers, 
although these activities allow for more limited feeding options than for the lactating 
cows (shown in Table 1.2, Chapter 1). Further, milk production is not allowed to fall 
relative to the no-DDGS rations, for any of the feeding activities that include the bio-
energy byproducts. The constraint on milk production limits the potential for 
significant increases in P content of the feed rations and manure that could otherwise 
accompany increased availability of DDGS (e.g., Hadrich, et al., 2008). There is 
considerable empirical support for this constraint on the results of the CPM-Dairy 
program (e.g., Schmit, et al., 2009).     
 
Crop Production and Cropland Classifications 
 Alfalfa hay, orchard grass, corn silage and corn for grain can be purchased or 
grown. Crops grown on the farm follow cropping rotations typical of the region. 
Harvested crops are fed to the animals or sold, although corn silage can be grown for 
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on-farm feed but not sold. Equations 1.B.12 – 1.B.15 define the constraints on 
growing, buying and selling of crops and on their use as feed. Restrictions imposed on 
the crop rotations are specified in Equations 1.B.31 –1.B.33. The crop rotations 
influence field crop requirements for nutrients (see Table 1.3). Field crop requirements 
in turn are important for manure management, particularly for the simulation of the 
nutrient policy scenario that we outline later in our discussion. 
 The average CAFO owns or rents 1,419 acres of cropland. Land that is so 
controlled by the CAFO is assigned to three classes based on the soil characteristics 
and corn silage yield potential; i.e., low, medium and high soil capability class, or 4.9, 
5.3 and 5.9 tons of dry matter per acre, respectively. Twenty three percent of the land 
is assumed to be of the lowest quality; medium quality land account for 66 percent of 
the cropland and 11 percent of the land is assumed to be of high quality. Available 
land is also distinguished by soil test phosphorus (STP) status; i.e., agronomic soil 
testing (Morgan) phosphorus levels before manure and fertilizer applications for the 
current cropping season. The soil phosphorus classifications give an indication of 
residual P build-up from previous years. Table 2.2 presents the crop yield capability 
and soil phosphorus level classifications of the regional CAFO land. Sixty percent of 
CAFO cropland is in the medium or high STP category.15 The soil-crop nutrient 
requirements have implications for manure and fertilizer applications on the land.   
 
Field Phosphorus and Nitrogen Management 
Except for starter nitrogen that must come from commercial fertilizer, crop N 
and P requirements on the farm can be met using either of manure or fertilizer. 
Fulfillment of crops’ starter N needs is represented by Equation 1.B.27.   
                                                 
15 The proportions of soils in the crop productivity classifications are based on soil survey data as 
explained in Boisvert et al., 1997. Soil P test distribution follows Rao et al., 2007.  The soil P test 
distributions are assumed constant across the soil productivity classes.  
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Table 2.2: Distribution of land on the CAFOs 
 
  Mean1 (Range) % of Land in Class 
Land (acres) 1,419 100 
   
Productivity  
(tons of corn grain/ac)2   
  Land Class 1  113 23 
  Land Class 2  121 66 
  Land Class 3  135 11 
    
Soil Test P (lbs/ac)3  
  Low 4 (0 – 8) 40 
  Medium 24 (9 – 39) 53 
  High 120 (40 – 200) 7 
    
Hydrologic Groups   
   Hydrologic Group A - 7 
   Hydrologic Group B - 31 
   Hydrologic Group C - 62 
1 Mean values for CAFOs in the selected three-county dairy production regions.  
   Land values from USDA, 2009. Other means are obtained from: 
2 Boisvert, et al., 1997. 
3 Rao, et al., 2007. 
 
Our model endogenizes the rates of manure application, matching the amounts 
of manure nutrients available for crop use with the nutrient requirements of the 
crops.16  Crop requirements not met by manure nutrients can be purchased as 
fertilizers. To match crop requirements with nutrient availability in manure, we 
accumulate the total volume of manure produced from lactating and dry cows and 
heifers on the average CAFO as in Equation 1.B. 20.  The amounts of N and P 
nutrients produced in the manure are similarly accumulated (Equations 1.B.21 – 
1.B.22). Manure that is produced on the farm is spread on crop acres or transported to 
off-farm locations. Equation 1.B.23 takes inventory of manure production, application, 
                                                 
16 In Schmit (1994) and Schmit et al. (2009), average nutrient levels were assumed and manure was 
applied to the fields at predetermined rates of 10 or 20 tons per acre. 
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and transportation to off-farm recipients. Not all of the manure nutrients produced on 
the farm are available for plant uptake and we account for handling, storage and field 
losses in Equations 1.B.25 and 1.B.26. We also account for field differences in the 
soil-crop nutrient needs. Manure nutrient application is such that it could just meet, or 
exceed the nutrient requirements (see Equations 1.B.28 and 1.B.29). 
We model land application of manure and commercial fertilizers under two 
conditions. The first case that we have discussed so far assumes no restrictions on the 
land application of nutrients so that the dairy operation can spread up to 100 percent of 
the manure that is produced on the cropland.  Under the alternative simulations, farm 
nutrient planning follows NRCS guidelines for nutrient application to field crops.   
 
Simulation of the New Nutrient Restrictions 
We assume in the regional dairy model that phosphorus-based nutrient 
management is followed on crop fields for which manure or fertilizer P applications 
imply significant environmental P loading risks. Nitrogen-based management is 
adopted otherwise. STP levels determine the levels of P runoff risks. By assuming 
similarity in important soil characteristics such as the field topography and soil depth, 
we further assume that the differences in potential for P loss to surrounding waters are 
due entirely to differences in how manure and fertilizer nutrients are managed on the 
land classes. We restrict nutrient applications based on the soil P levels of the cropped 
land as shown in Figure 1.1 (Chapter 1). To do this, we adopt relevant means and 
distributions for the STP land classes using soil survey data of field phosphorus levels 
available for our dairy producing region (Rao, et al., 2007).  
Following the survey data, we model 8 percent of the land as high STP so that 
no further P application is allowed on the land. Commercial N fertilizers may be used 
to fulfill N requirements on these fields, up to the agronomic N crop-uptake level. 
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Also, 48 percent of the land is of the medium STP category and allows for only 40 
percent of the crop P requirement to be met from manure and commercial fertilizers.  
The rest of the land has low STP and can receive soil amendments up to its entire P 
needs.  In general, soils with medium or low STP receive manure at the application 
rates at which either of P or N requirements of the crop is fulfilled, whichever is more 
limiting. The nutrient requirement beyond that supplied by manure at this rate is then 
fulfilled using N or P commercial fertilizers, whichever is needed. We apply the 
relevant STP land classifications and nutrient application conditions to the entire 
cropland acres available to the CAFOs in the region, assuming that land quality for the 
three STP land classes follow the distributions reported in Table 2.2.  
  The nutrient policy limits the over-application of manure nutrients so that 
there is an increased need for CAFOs to transport manure to off-site locations. We 
thus extend the regional model to include alternative manure disposal costs. Further, 
we establish analytically the implications of off-site disposal for the shadow value of 
farmland, and these can differ by soil productivity and STP class. We do this through a 
manipulation of the (Kuhn-Tucker) first- order necessary conditions obtained from 
solving the objective and constraint equations for a model optimum.17 As part of the 
analytical results, we show how the economic value of land could respond to the 
nutrient policy and to increased costs of off-farm manure disposal. For example, in the 
base case where no nutrient regulation is in effect, nutrient management may not 
account for soil inherent nutrients and over-application of nutrients results. Land 
values in this case are uniform for all of the soil test land classes given the crop yield 
capability of soils. However, implementation of the new nutrient restrictions forces the 
dairy management to recognize and account for nutrients (e.g., phosphorus) already in 
                                                 
17 The analytical results are reported in Appendix 2. While the results are established for a rather 
stylized version of the model, the analytical results do generalize to the full model. 
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the soil so that land with high soil nutrient (P) content has higher value. Thus, less 
fertilizer (P) needs to be purchased or applied. The new nutrient policy also requires 
that manure produced in excess of what the farm requires for nutrient needs be 
exported to manure receiving locations. The economic value of land would thus be 
higher on the high STP land class (than on medium and low STP land) and this holds 
for as long as the dairy management can ship excess manure off the farm at no 
additional costs. It also holds for off-farm manure disposal costs that are low enough 
they do not off-set the added value to high P land from recognizing the value of P 
already in the soil. As manure disposal costs rise, however, the dairy management 
seeks to ship less manure off the farm to maintain farm incomes. One way to do this is 
to spread more of the manure produced by farm animals on farmland controlled by the 
CAFOs. Consequently, farmland on which more manure can be spread becomes 
increasingly important and valuable. Eventually the value of lower STP soils to the 
dairy operations rises above that of soils with higher levels of P available for crop 
uptake. We observe this as a switch in the (magnitude) order of the shadow prices for 
high versus low (medium) STP land.  
 
Off-Site Manure Disposal Costs  
 Manure produced on the farm and not applied to the fields as crop nutrients is 
disposed of off-site (see Equation 1.B. 23). We impose manure disposal costs to assess 
the implications for the new nutrient restrictions and for dairy CAFOs in the region 
due to restrictions in land manure application. The off-site manure disposal costs 
implicitly represent the distances that dairy operations must travel to find suitable land 
for manure disposal (see Hadrich, et. al, 2008 and Harrigan, 2001). These distances 
could increase substantially for CAFOs in regions with high concentrations of similar 
operations. The net manure disposal cost in our model can account for the distances 
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traveled by CAFOs to spread manure on unregulated land, and is a mark-up on the 
unit cost of spreading manure on fields and the commercial value of the nutrients in 
the manure. The net manure disposal cost per ton is represented mathematically in 
Equation (2.1): 
 
MNMPMSDM VVCCTC       (2.1) 
 
where TC is the net cost per ton of manure disposed. DMC is the unit transport cost and 
is a function the distance covered.18 MSC is the unit cost of spreading manure on the 
field. MPV and MNV are the values of phosphorus and nitrogen in a ton of manure, 
respectively, and are (all other things being equal) equivalent to the market price of 
fertilizer P and N.19  Regulated dairy operations are assumed to bear the direct costs of 
shipping excess manure to off-site locations (i.e., DMC ). It is also reasonable to assume 
that the CAFOs spread the manure on the receiving farmland and incur additional 
costs ( MSC ).
20  
 Further, since manure nutrients are shipped off the farm in our model only in 
response to the new nutrient restrictions prohibiting excess nutrient applications on the 
land, we appropriately assume that nutrients in exported manure are of no direct value 
to the regulated CAFOs. As such, MPV and MNV can assume zero value in which 
case ,TC  the net cost to the CAFOs per unit of manure disposed, is strictly positive. 
However, the value of the nutrients in the (CAFOs’) shipped-off manure may be 
                                                 
18 The determinants of CDM could include the volume of manure shipped off-farm and the technology 
used to ship the manure (e.g. Harrigan, 2001). The exact relationship is not shown here. 
19 Manure nutrients in our model are considered substitutes for fertilizers and do not take on (lose) 
additional value over fertilizer market prices. However, P and N occur together so that manure P (N) 
may be needed by crops but can not be used due to the nutrient restrictions binding on N (P). In this 
case P (N) in manure could take on a value less than the market price for P (N) fertilizer.  
20 From an efficiency perspective, it is unlikely that CAFOs would off-load manure on receiving farms 
to have them re-load the manure onto other spreaders for field application. 
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evident for “importing” crop farms such that the CAFOs can receive payment for the 
manure. In this case, the dairy operators may negotiate to spread manure on disposal 
sites in return for some payment for the manure nutrients. Positive values for MPV and 
MNV then offset all or part of ,MSC the costs of spreading manure on the land. There is 
a dampening effect on the overall cost of off-farm manure disposal. In our model, we 
assume a single value for the unit cost of off-site manure disposal that encompasses 
manure volumes, distances covered to find suitable land, expenditures for spreading 
manure on receiving land not controlled by CAFOs, and possible payments received 
by the CAFOs for N and P in manure exports (as in Equation (2.1)). Our abstraction 
from the complexities is without loss of generality. We are still able to isolate the 
effects of a cost constraint to regulated animal feeding operations in high dairy 
producing regions of transporting excess manure to off-site fields to which manure 
nutrients can be applied given the new regulations. We investigate the implications for 
the CAFOs of the nutrient standards by setting the aggregated off-site manure disposal 
cost at a reasonably low value. By parametrically increasing this value, it is possible to 
observe the critical points at which current farm operations must change with rising 
manure disposal costs for the farm operations to remain optimal.  
 The dairy management adjustments to the new nutrient restrictions and to cost 
constraints on manure disposal also have important effects on environmental nutrient 
loading. We measure these effects as P loss in runoff. The methods that we employ in 
our current analysis are outlined below. 
 
Environmental Nutrient Loading 
 Given the growing focus on P loading risks from agricultural operations in 
high concentration dairy producing areas and recent advances in the development of 
techniques useful for analyzing these risks, we necessarily base our environmental 
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analysis for the regional animal feeding operation on the assessment of P loss in 
runoff. We, however, are also able to include in our analysis an assessment of the 
potential for N loading associated with the farm management adjustments. This is 
made possible by the availability of derived equations and data for estimating N runoff 
and leaching specific for soils in our agricultural production region (Boisvert, et. al, 
1997). We examine the effects on P and N loading in our model using two distinct 
techniques for determining the distributions of phosphorus and nitrogen residuals from 
crop land.  
 To quantify the amounts of P lost to the environment due to farm nutrient 
management practices, we follow methods developed very recently in Vadas et al., 
(2009). According to Vadas et al., (2009), these modified methods that can reliably 
quantify field-level losses of P in runoff from surface-applied manure and fertilizer for 
a variety of soil types, crop and fertilizer management patterns, and geo-climatic 
conditions are compatible with and attempt to update the procedure used for ground 
water quality assessment models such as the Erosion-Productivity Impact Calculator 
(EPIC) model. In contrast, our estimates of nitrate loading make use of derived 
equations from Boisvert, et al., (1997) that relate nitrate loading from corn production 
to soil characteristics, weather, crop rotations and fertilizer application methods using 
nitrate runoff and leachate data generated from GLEAMS for specific New York soils. 
 We incorporate solutions to our nonlinear programming model into the 
abstractions of the known relationships between nutrient application, land vegetative 
cover and soil characteristics, weather, and nutrient loading. The application rates of 
manure and fertilizer phosphorus and nitrogen reflect the relevant dairy operators’ 
decisions on cropping and nutrient management. Changes in these rates and in the 
patterns of crop production reflect the farm management responses to changing input 
and output prices, and to restrictions on land nutrient application. Land nutrient 
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application rates differ in our model by the crops grown on CAFO land (i.e., corn 
grain, corn silage, alfalfa or orchard grass); the position of the current (corn) crop in 
the rotation (i.e., whether corn follows other corn, alfalfa or orchard grass in 
rotations); classification of the land based on crop productivity (i.e., low; medium, or 
high); and levels of STP (i.e., low; medium, or high). We estimate P and N runoff and 
leaching for corn fields only, thereby placing a more conservative limit on our total 
estimates (i.e., they do not include loadings from alfalfa or orchard grass).21 
 
Phosphorus Runoff 
 Many studies have attempted to assess field level losses of phosphorus from 
agricultural land based on soil characteristics and applied manure, compost and 
fertilizers (see for example, Davis, et al., 2005; Sharpley and Moyer, 2000; Sharpley, 
et al., 2001; and Vadas, et al., 2008). The more recent studies make use of some 
notion of P runoff indexes that account for differences in nutrient management 
practices, soil characteristics and geographical and agro-climatic conditions, and rank 
the potential for P loss from agricultural fields.  Sharpley, et al., (2003) for example, 
reports that 47 states had used a PI approach by 2003 and most had adapted the PI to 
local conditions and policy. A drawback to P indexes however is that their use mostly 
does not allow for explicitly quantifying P loss thereby posing a challenge to the 
planning of P loss reduction for agricultural fields. Process-based simulation models 
address these concerns in that they can quantify field-level losses of P in runoff but are 
considered difficult to use for routine management purposes and require excessive 
amounts of field-specific data (Vadas, et al., 2009)  
                                                 
21 The methods in Boisvert et al. (1997) that we follow for estimating nitrate loadings do not account 
for runoff and leaching from alfalfa fields. Since no fertilizer N is added, and nitrogen-fixation further 
reduces N that is available for runoff from alfalfa, this omission may not be of serious consequence.  
Further, P loss may not be as important on alfalfa (see e.g., Ketterings et al., 2006). 
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 New techniques developed by Vadas, et al., (2009) offer an improvement on 
the indexation methods without requiring the expertise or additional data associated 
with the process-based models.  Their methods were validated against data from 
several independent published field studies and are useful for predicting annual 
dissolved P in runoff from surface-applied manure and fertilizers. We follow their 
general method in our estimation of phosphorus loss in runoff but the focus of our 
study is on the marginal changes in nutrient loadings attributable to differences only in 
field nutrient management in response to agricultural input and output prices and to 
CAFO regulations. Thus, we can ignore without consequence, the determination of P 
runoff losses that are a function of the soil characteristics or erosion factors.22  We 
thus restrict our adoption of the models by Vadas, et al., (2009) to the estimation of P 
loss in runoff from manure and fertilizers.  
 We incorporate our solutions from the nonlinear programming model that 
represent the optimal nutrient management decisions of the CAFO into the 
relationships between land nutrient application, weather incidences and environmental 
loading. We make use of available data on soil characteristics and weather events for 
our selected three-county region in New York.  
 
Estimation of P Runoff from Manure 
 For our modeling purposes, dissolved P in runoff from applied manure is 
estimated as in equation (2.2): 
 
 PPTROPDFPRROP manmanman  4.0     (2.2) 
 
                                                 
22 It is reasonable to assume that the land nutrient management factors are the only relevant variables 
from the no-policy to the nutrient regulations scenario. Soil characteristics such as initial soil nutrient 
status and topography are constant.  
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where ROPman is the amount of dissolved phosphorus lost in runoff from manure in a 
rainstorm event (lbs/ac.); PRman is P released from applied manure (lbs/ac.) and is the 
amount of dissolved P leached out of manure particles by precipitation during an 
event; PDFman is a factor for manure application that distributes released P between 
runoff and infiltration, and it ranges between 0.0 and 1.0; RO is the precipitation 
runoff (in.) from the relevant storm incidence; and PPT is the measured amount of 
precipitation from the storm event (in.). PRman is further defined as P available for 
runoff from the applied manure in water extractable phosphorus (WEP) and non-WEP 
forms. All P that is in non-WEP form at the time of manure application is unavailable 
for runoff at that time. According to Vadas, et al. (2009), 40 percent of applied manure 
WEP is available for direct loss to runoff from applied liquid manures and 10 percent 
of non-WEP becomes mineralized and available through the year.  In our model, the 
estimates of total P produced in manure for the various fed rations come from the 
CPM-Dairy program output and are for all manure P that is available for plant uptake. 
The data do not distinguish manure WEP from non-WEP and we assume in our model 
that 40 percent of total manure P is available for direct runoff in a storm event.  
 The manure P distribution factor is determined as follows in equation (2.3): 
 
  225.0PPTROPDFman        (2.3) 
 
where PDFman is the manure distribution factor and RO and PPT are the runoff and 
precipitation variables, respectively, as defined above in equation (2.2).  We adopt the 
curve number method developed by the Natural Resources Conservation Service 
(NRCS) to predict RO, the amount of precipitation runoff from fields (NRCS, 2003b).  
The curve number method uses empirically-determined mathematical relationships 
and appropriate values read off a curve number chart in the prediction of runoff.  Its 
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suitability for use in models that estimate P-runoff from variable source areas has been 
questioned (see Easton, et al., 2007). Notwithstanding, the results of our study do not 
account for spatial distribution of P runoff within the context of the cropland available 
to the dairy farm, thus making the curve number approach suitable for our purpose.   
 Our estimation of the field runoff from precipitation follows equation (2.4): 
 
   SPPTSPPTRO  8.02.0 2     (2.4) 
 
where RO is the depth of runoff from the cornfields (in.) and is measured as rainfall in 
excess of the soil’s capacity for infiltration. It depends on the intensity of rainfall as 
well as on such field characteristics as land use type, vegetative cover, and soil 
hydrologic group. PPT is the observed depth of rainfall for a single storm incidence in 
inches as earlier defined; and S is the depth (inches), of effective available storage on 
the fields.  
 Further, S is determined following equation (2.5):  
 
  101000  CNS        (2.5) 
 
where S is the effective storage capacity of the field and CN is the curve number. The 
CN is read off the appropriate NRCS charts (NRCS, 2003b). It varies by soil 
hydrologic group, as well as by land use type. The latter distinction does not occur in 
our model as all of the fields for which we calculate P runoff loss are agricultural plots 
with row (corn) crops. However, following available soil survey data for the New 
York agricultural production region that our representative farm model captures, we 
identify soil hydrologic groups A, B, and C and the proportions of croplands on the 
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representative farm that belong to each of these groups (see Table 4 in Boisvert, et. al., 
1997). Our estimation of the P runoff thus accounts for the soil hydrologic groups. 
 
Estimation of P Runoff from Commercial Fertilizers 
 The estimation of phosphorus runoff from fertilizers applied is similar to that 
for P loss from manure in equations (2.2) through (2.5), with some modifications. 
Estimation of the amount of dissolved P in runoff from applied fertilizers follows 
equation (2.6): 
 
 PPTROPDFPRROP ferferfer       (2.6) 
 
where ROPfer is the amount of dissolved phosphorus lost in runoff from fertilizer in a 
rainstorm event (lbs/ac.); PRfer is P released from applied fertilizer (lbs/ac.) and is the 
amount of dissolved P leached out of fertilizer by precipitation during an event. It 
includes all of the P applied in fertilizer form. PDFfer is a fertilizer distribution factor 
which estimation is defined shortly; RO and PPT are runoff and precipitation (in.) as 
defined above.  
 The fertilizer P distribution factor is determined as in equation (2.7): 
 
  PPTROPDFfer  4.3exp034.0     (2.7) 
 
where PDFfer is the fertilizer distribution factor and lies between 0.0 and 1.0; and RO 
and PPT are the runoff and precipitation variables as defined. RO is as determined in 
equation (2.4).  
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Incorporating P Runoff into the NLP Model 
 Solutions to our nonlinear programming (NLP) model are substituted into the 
equations for estimating P loss in runoff as values for the amount of P available for 
release from applied manure and fertilizers (i.e. PRman and PRfer in the P runoff 
equations).  Since fertilizer and manure application rates potentially differ by cropping 
activity (i.e., by land capability class, crops grown, position of cropping in rotations 
and in the CAFO regulations case, restrictions on land nutrient application), we 
necessarily apply equations (2.2) through (2.7) to each cropping activity that comes 
into the NLP solution. Further, we evaluate the equations for each of three particular 
measures of rainfall in any year and for 30 years of weather observations. The total P 
runoff for any cropping activity in any given year is calculated as the sum of  residual 
P associated with manure and with fertilizer application and accumulates P lost to 
runoff through the storm incidences occurring in that year.  
 Total annual P runoff for individual cropping activities cumulatively sum up 
the runoff P associated with each of the storm events. This is such that P leached out 
of applied manure or fertilizer in a first (second) storm incidence is no longer available 
for loss through runoff during a second (third) storm event. In particular, equations 
(2.2) and (2.6) can be re-written as in equations (2.8) and (2.9): 
 
 PPTROPDFPRPRROP mantmantmantman   )(4.0 1   (2.8) 
 
   PPTROPDFPRPRROP fertfertfertfer  1    (2.9) 
 
where ROPman, ROPfer, PRman, PRfer, PDFman, PDFfer, RO and PPT are defined as in 
equations (2.2) through (2.7). The superscript t represents the three rainfall 
observations that are relevant to our estimation [i.e., t = 1, 2 and 3 are measures of 
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rainfall observed within the 14 days after planting, at the time of fertilizer application, 
and at the time of harvest, respectively (in.)].  
 We determine the cumulative sum of P runoff for a single cropping activity, 
from all weather incidences within the year or season as in Equation (2.10): 
 
   3 13 1 t tjfert tjmanj ROPROPPRO   j= 1,…, J  (2.10) 
 
where PROj  is the amount of dissolved phosphorus lost in runoff (lbs/ac.) from 
manure and/or fertilizer application associated with cropping activity j over all storm 
events.  
 Total P runoff for all of the grown corn acres is then determined as: 
 
    Jj jj AcPROTPRO 1       (2.11) 
 
where TRPO is the amount of P runoff from manure and fertilizer application on all 
cropped corn acres (lbs) and Acj is the relevant number of crop acres (ac.). 
 
Nitrate Runoff and Leaching 
To determine the effects of new nutrient restrictions on nitrogen loading on our 
NY CAFO region, we predict potential levels of N runoff and leaching associated with 
the changes in land application of manure and fertilizer on corn acres. To do this, we 
make use of empirical techniques developed in Boisvert, et al. (1997).  In that work, 
estimates of N runoff and leachate were obtained for different length corn rotations 
and fertilizer application rates using GLEAMS for 105 New York soils. The resulting 
data were then used to estimate equations relating nitrate runoff and leaching from 
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corn production to soil characteristics, weather, rotations and fertilizer application, in 
translog functional form. The nutrient loading function is stated in its general form as: 
 
  
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where Y is either nitrate runoff or leaching; d, e and f are the relevant parameters of the 
equation, Dh are dummy variables that take on the value of one if a soil is in 
hydrologic group h and zero otherwise; and Wk is the kth of G variables representing 
soil characteristics, cropping practices and weather factors. The set of recursive 
equations for estimating nitrate runoff and leaching are presented in detail in 
Appendix 1 (Chapter 1). Nitrate runoff appears as an explanatory variable in the 
leaching equations to account for the fact that increased surface runoff leaves less N to 
leach from the soil. Dummy variables account for differences in the hydrologic groups 
of the soils A, B and C. Soils in group C have potential for higher runoff as they are 
heavier and have greater slope.  
 In evaluating programming model solutions, we allow to change in the nitrate 
loading equations only the values for those variables that are directly related to soil 
nutrient management; i.e., manure and fertilizer application.  The means and 
regression coefficients for all other variables are assumed constant. Field 
characteristics such as the slope, soil horizon depth, N mineralization rates, organic 
matter content and erodibility are assumed to take on the mean values for the region 
and do not change with cropping patterns. We allow for the effects of variation in 
weather by evaluating the regression equations for a sample of historical weather 
observations. We keep the nutrient management variables constant for any single 
weather observation, thereby restricting variations in weather across the fields. Our 
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sample of weather observations consists of actual weather data for New York State 
counties (Boisvert, et al., 1997).  
  
Empirical Results 
The Base Model 
 Feed prices experienced by dairy farmers in the Northeast reached a decade-
long high in 2008 (NASS, 1991-2009). While the prices moderated somewhat in the 
following year, feed costs remain considerably above historical levels. To account for 
the most recent general elevation in feed prices while basing our analysis on a price set 
that may be more sustainable into the near future we make use of the most recent 
available 5-year average prices (i.e. 2005-2009) as the relevant starting coefficients.  
At the 5-year average prices for production input and output; it is optimum for the 
regional model farm to raise the maximum of the 724 cows and 564 replacement 
heifers allowed. The milking cows are fed a corn silage-base ration that contains 10 
percent DDGS [on a dry matter (DM) basis] with an 8 percent fat content. Dry cows 
are similarly fed a ration with 10 percent DDGS (8 percent fat) while heifers are fed a 
ration with 13 percent dry matter DDGS (8 percent fat). 
 Corn (grain and silage) and alfalfa are grown, with half of the available CAFO 
acres devoted to each crop. Orchard grass is not grown on the farm but is purchased 
for inclusion in the total mixed ration fed. Although corn is grown, some additional 
corn grain is purchased to supplement that fed to the animals. Alfalfa grown on the 
farm is both fed to the farm animals and sold.  
 All manure produced by the farm animals is applied to the land as nutrients. 
The crop nitrogen requirements are met so that no nitrogen fertilizer is purchased 
beyond that which is needed as starter side-dress N. Also, no phosphorus fertilizers are 
purchased. Revenues and costs associated with the farm animal and crop production 
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(including nutrient management) and feeding and crop sales decisions are presented in 
Table 2.3.  To ease side-by-side comparisons of the base and policy scenarios, we 
include in Table 2.3 solutions to a relevant nutrient restrictions scenario that we 
discuss in a later section.  
  
Production Costs and Revenues  
 In Table 2.3 we summarize the major revenues and costs associated with the 
base simulation of the regional dairy farm management decisions. No nutrient 
standards are in effect for this simulation. The farm receives $3,752 per cow in total 
receipts from crop, livestock and milk sales (less payment made for milk marketing). 
Milk sales are expectedly the biggest income source at 87 percent of all farm proceeds. 
Up to 69 percent of the gross farm revenue is expended as production costs, with the 
largest proportion of the farm budget going to the purchases of feed (i.e., $1,046 per 
cow). Manure and nutrient management costs are only a fraction of the total 
production outlay. 23  As we show later, nutrient management is a more important cost 
for the model simulations that include restrictions on land nutrient application. Field 
manure applications make up about three-quarters of the manure and fertilizer-related 
costs for the farm in the base scenario.  
 No fertilizer N (excluding starter N) or P is purchased and manure is not 
shipped off to land not controlled by CAFOs so that the off-farm manure 
transportation costs are not important. Alternative DDGS costs are however relevant 
for the base model solutions. 
   
                                                 
23 Manure and nutrient management costs include the cost of spreading manure on land, purchasing and 
spreading fertilizers; and in the policy case, disposal of excess manure off-site.  
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Table 2.3: Net annual revenues, receipts and costs for CAFOs in the three- 
county region: Base and Policy scenarios 
 
 Base Policy Percent 
 Solution Solution Change6 
 
(No Policy) 
 
(Nutrient 
Standards)  
Net annual revenue  1,153 1,104 (4.44) 
Total receipts  3,752 3,752 0.00 
    Milk 3,279 3,279 0.00 
    Crop sales 200 200 0.00 
    Livestock sales 273 273 0.00 
Total Costs 2,599 2,648 1.85 
    Feed 1,046 1,046 0.00 
    Labor 589 573 (2.79) 
    Livestock production1 535 535 0.00 
    Crop production2 270 270 0.00 
    Other production costs3 112 112 0.00 
    Nutrient management 47 112 58.04 
        Manure spreading    35 16 (118.75) 
        Offsite disposal4 0 64 - 
        P fertilizer purchase 0 9 - 
        N fertilizer purchase 12 12 0.00 
        K fertilizer purchase5 0 11 - 
1 Less labor and feed. Includes utilities, supplies, repairs and maintenance. 
2 Less labor and crop fertilization costs. Includes custom lime, seeds, herbicides and soil testing. 
3 Includes purchases of gasoline and diesel fuel for on-farm use. 
4  Off-site manure disposal cost is $4/ton. 
5 The model assumes that up to 4 lbs/ac of potassium is available in manure. Crops’ demand in 
   excess of K available in manure is purchased. 
6 Percent changes in values from base to no-policy scenarios; negative values in parenthesis. 
 
Effects of DDGS Prices 
 We report relevant programming solutions for given relative prices of DDGS 
in Table 2.4. The prices of DDGS are reported in relation to average corn prices for 
year 2008 (i.e. $234.7/ton for corn grain). The relevant DDGS-to-corn price ratios that 
we examine range from 0.18 to 1.60. Five of the solution sets that we report are the 
programming solutions obtained when the optimal dairy management solution changes 
in response to the change in DDGS prices. The other two are solution sets at 2008 and 
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5-year average DDGS prices, respectively (i.e. DDGS-to-corn price ratios of 0.60-to-1 
and 0.49-to-1, respectively), that we report to provide context to the discussions of the 
nonlinear programming solutions (see Table 2.4). 
 As DDGS prices are allowed to change relative to other feed prices, the 
combined demand for (8 and 12% fat-) DDGS also changes. The optimal numbers of 
animals do not change as the relative prices and utilization of other feed ingredients to 
DDGS changes, although the amounts fed of the bio-fuel byproducts vary.  As 
expected, a greater proportion of the animals are fed with rations that include DDGS 
as its relative price falls. For example, while no DDGS is fed when the DDGS-to-corn 
price ratio is 1.60-to-1, 100 percent of the animals are fed some DDGS in rations when 
the price ratio is reduced to 0.55:1 and lower. However, as more DDGS is fed, N and 
P levels are increased in the rations fed and the amounts of nitrogen and phosphorus 
available in the manure increase.  
 As shown in Table 2.4, 71 pounds of manure phosphorus are produced per cow 
per year when no DDGS is fed, compared to 84 pounds of P produced per cow when 
the DDGS-to-corn price ratio is 0.18:1. In the case of nitrogen, the relevant numbers 
are 179 and 202 pounds per cow per year, respectively. The increased availability 
(reduced relative prices) of lower cost feed ingredients lead to their expanded 
inclusion in the TMR and to increased cost savings where there are no restrictions to 
land manure application. However, higher levels of phosphorus and nitrates in the 
manure raise the risks of nutrient loss in runoff to the environment. According to our 
model, field P is applied on corn at 40 pounds/acre when the DDGS-to-corn ratio is 
1:60: 1. Phosphorus loss in runoff from corn fields is 5.9 pounds/acre on average at 
this price level. At the 0.60:1 price ratio, 49 pounds per acre of P is applied on corn 
and average P loading to the environment from corn fields increases to 7.2 pounds per 
acre.  
 Table 2.4: Feeding, nutrient management and environmental loading with alternative DDGS prices for 
 CAFOs in the three-county region: Base scenario  
 
Price ratio1 1.60 1.56 1.19 0.60 0.55 0.49 0.18
Net revenue ($/cow) 1,068 1,069 1,080 1,130 1,137 1,153 1,244
Rations fed2 (% cows):        
CS 100 100 100 100 0 0 0
CS1210 0 0 0 0 100 100 2
ALF0820 0 0 0 0 0 0 98
DC 100 0 0 0 0 0 0
DC8 0 100 100 100 100 100 100
Hef 100 100 0 0 0 0 0
Hef8 0 0 100 100 100 100 100
Manure produced (tons/cow) 29.2 29.2 29.2 29.2 29.3 29.3 29.3
    P in manure (lbs/cow/yr) 71 73 77 77 77 77 84
    N in manure (lbs/cow/yr) 179 177 177 177 183 183 202
P application on corn (lbs/ac.) 40 44 40 49 49 49 42
    Manure P as % total P applied 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
P runoff loss from corn (lbs/ac.): 
    Mean       5.9 6.5 5.9 7.2 7.2 7.2 6.0
    Maximum 13.4 14.9 13.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 13.6
    Std Deviation 4.2 4.7 4.2 5.1 5.1 5.1 4.2
1 Ratio of the price of DDGS to the price of corn grain on a per ton basis (dry matter). To compute the DDGS price, multiply ratio  
   by $234.7/ton. The price ratio of DDGS to corn in 2008 is 0.60:1 while the price ratio of DDGS for the 5-year period average  
   (2005-2009) is 0.49:1. 
2 Ration headings are formatted by type of DDGS fed. DDGS were included in dry cows’ rations at approx. 13% of total dry  
   matter, heifers rations included DDGS at 10% of total dry matter, e.g., DC12 = dry cow ration with 12% fat  DDGS, and  
   RH8 = replacement heifer ration with 8% fat DDGS. DDGS are not fed for CS (corn silage), DC and Hef rations. 
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 Results such as these indicate limited potential for DDGS in CAFO livestock 
rations when environmental concerns are considered. We discuss the environmental 
implications of the policy in more detail in a later section. 
 
The Policy Scenario 
 We also use 5-year average prices (i.e. 2005-2009) as the relevant starting 
prices for the model simulating new restrictions on field nutrient application. At this 
price level, the results on rations fed and crops grown are the same as in the base case.  
Orchard grass is not grown on the farm, but is purchased for inclusion in the total 
mixed ration fed. Corn and alfalfa are each grown on about 50 percent of the available 
CAFO acres.24  Additional corn is purchased to supplement animal feed and alfalfa 
grown on the farm is both fed to the farm animals and sold.  
 Importantly, we find that the constraints on field N or P applications from 
manure are binding so that only 45 percent of the manure produced by the farm 
animals is applied to the land as nutrients. The remainder of the produced manure 
must be disposed of off-farm. P (N) fertilizers are then purchased to make up for any 
shortfalls in meeting the crop P (N) needs. In our model, nitrogen fertilizer purchases 
over starter N are minimal at an average of one-tenth of a pound per acre.  The 
purchase of phosphorus fertilizers however increases from zero in the base scenario to 
12 pounds per acre on average with simulation of the policy.  
 The costs and incomes associated with the farm management in the nutrient 
policy scenario are shown in Table 2.3. Revenues accruing to the farm from crop, 
livestock and milk sales do not vary from the base case. Production costs, however, go 
up as costs are incurred for additional fertilizer purchases and for off-farm manure 
                                                 
24 We show in a later section that this distribution of the land between the crops would change as it 
becomes costlier to transport excess manure off the farm.   
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disposal so that expected net income is reduced. Our simulations result in fertilizer P 
purchases of $9 per cow on average per year, while manure disposal adds another $64 
per cow per year in costs.  
 The additional nutrient management costs are however accompanied by cost 
reductions elsewhere.  The on-farm labor needs for manure application dampen, 
reducing the total expenditures for farm labor.25  Non-labor costs associated with 
manure spreading are also reduced. 
 Our analysis indicates that the constraints on land application of N and P 
seriously limit on-farm field application of manure produced by the farm animals 
when N or P content in the manure is high.  Further, although the inclusion of DDGS 
in the feed rations increases the levels of N and P in manure in our model, we find that 
the restrictions on land manure application are not sufficient to prevent the increased 
use of DDGS in feed rations when the relative price of DDGS falls. In particular, the 
feeding regime for the dairy cows and heifers remains the same from the no-policy to 
the policy scenarios. However, more of the manure produced on the farm need be 
shipped off the farm to meet with the new regulations so that net farm incomes fall 
with rising costs of off-farm manure disposal. We report the programming solutions 
for the base and policy scenarios for a given set of feed prices and estimates of the unit 
costs of off-site manure disposal in Table 2.5.  
 
Effects of Manure Disposal Costs 
 The restrictions on land nutrient applications calls for off-site transportation of 
manure produced in excess of optimal levels necessary to meet crop needs. We 
analyzed dairy management adjustments over a range of manure disposal costs.  
                                                 
25 The model does not directly account for farm labor that may be needed to spread manure on off-farm 
or manure disposal sites. The additional labor costs are instead assumed (implicitly) to be a component 
of the aggregate off-farm manure disposal costs. 
 Table 2.5: Manure and fertilizer management and environmental loading with alternative costs for off-site manure  
disposal in the three-county region: Base and Policy scenarios 
 
 
Disposal Costs $/ton 
Base 
Scenario 2 41 6 8 10 12 14 16 
Net revenue ($/cow) 1,153 1,137 1,104 1,073 1,041 1,011 982 952 923 
Manure produced          
 (tons/cow) 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Disposed off-farm (%) 0 55 55 55 52 52 50 50 50 
Nutrient management on corn: 
P application2 (lbs/ac.) 49 32 32 32 26 26 15 15 15 
  Manure P (%) 100 63 64 64 71 71 90 90 90 
N application2 (lbs/ac.) 136 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 
  Manure N (%) 85 70 70 70 63 63 46 46 46 
Field P loss in runoff from corn (lbs/ac.) 
   Mean 7.2 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.0 3.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
   Minimum 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
   Maximum 16.4 9.1 9.1 9.1 7.6 7.6 4.8 4.8 4.8 
   Std. Deviation 5.1 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.2 2.2 1.5 1.5 1.5 
Field N loss in runoff from corn (lbs/ac.) 
  Mean 8.6 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 
  Minimum 3.5 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 
  Maximum 19.9 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.4 9.4 9.4 
  Std. Deviation 4.1 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.8 
1 The relevant policy scenario for comparison with the base case is for off-site manure disposal cost of $4/ton.  
2 Nutrient applications on corn acres. N applications include starter nitrogen.  
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 As this management strategy is unlikely to be observed in practice, we restrict 
the presentation of the model solutions to the range of off-site manure disposal costs 
within which the animal feeding establishments maintain current levels of operation.26 
Manure and fertilizer application in the regional dairy model are compared for 8 
policy scenarios that represent alternative costs for off-site manure disposal (see Table 
2.5). We also include the base policy solutions in the table for comparison. Manure 
transportation costs start out at $2 per ton (i.e., 14 miles roundtrip if we assume 
$0.14/ton-mile) and go up to $16 per ton (i.e., 114 miles roundtrip).27 
 By way of comparison, the travel distances implied by our calculations are less 
than the maximum allowed distances (170 miles) for which manure-exporting farms 
participating in a poultry litter transportation program modeled for Virginia could 
receive subsidies (Pelletier, et. al., 2001). The relevant manure disposal cost for direct 
comparison with the base case in our model is $4 per ton.28 
 As shown in Figure 2.1, net incomes drop as the manure disposal costs 
increase.  The expected net revenue is $1,137 per cow when manure disposal cost is 
$2 per ton and $923 per cow when the unit cost of off-farm manure disposal is $16. 
This represents an 11 percent drop in expected net farm incomes over the relevant 
range of manure disposal costs. To mitigate the effects of the increasing costs and 
associated losses to net farm income, less of the manure produced is taken off the farm 
as the off-farm manure transportation cost (distance) is increased (see Table 2.5). 
  
                                                 
26 Unlike the results in Hadrich, et. al., (2008) our model solutions did not include the reduction of 
DDGS in feed as a CAFO response to high manure disposal costs. Relatively lower P concentrations in 
DDGS in our model (i.e., than was allowed in Hadrich, et. al, 2008) drove this result. P levels in our 
formulation of DDGS rations using CPM-dairy program were constrained to maintain milk production 
levels and accommodate animal nutrient considerations.  
27 Per ton-mile estimates for dairy manure transportation calculated using Pelletier, et al. (2001); 
Feinerman, et al. (2004) and USDA indices of agricultural prices paid (NASS).  
28 In comparison, calculations we make based on other authors’ estimates place manure disposal costs at 
$2.2/ton (Harrigan, 2001) and between $2.9 and $4.4/ton (Hadrich, et al., 2008). However, the Hadrich, 
et al., (2008) estimates are for travel distances not greater than 1 mile.  
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Figure 2.1. Net returns for alternative manure disposal costs 
 
 When the off-site manure disposal cost goes up from $2 per ton to $16 per ton, 
off-farm manure disposal drops from 55 percent of the volume of manure produced to 
50 percent. Meanwhile, phosphorus application on corn is reduced on average by 53 
percent over the range of manure disposal costs that we examine. As we show in the 
next section, nutrient management and land use adjustments on the dairy CAFOs 
underlie the changes observed in manure and P applications.  
 
Effects on Cropland Use  
Manure application may be more flexible on cropland growing alfalfa than on 
corn. We find in our model that the dairy management takes advantage of this 
flexibility, increasingly growing alfalfa on the less regulated land to avoid higher costs 
of transporting manure off the farm. The land use adjustments to increasing manure 
disposal costs under the nutrients policy scenario are shown in Table 2.6. More land is 
devoted to alfalfa as the management of excess manure nutrients becomes more costly. 
Specifically, 709 acres are devoted to each of corn and alfalfa at a $2 per ton off-site 
manure disposal cost.  
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 Table 2.6: Land use by soil distribution for alternative manure disposal costs: Base and Policy Scenarios 
 
MDC1  
Base 
Scenario 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 
Total acres cropped 
Corn 709 709 709 709 565 565 565 565 565 
Alfalfa 709 709 709 709 853 853 853 853 853 
Cropped acres by soil quality2: 
Corn Land 1 163 163 163 163 163 163 163 163 163 
Corn Land 2 468 468 468 468 324 324 324 324 324 
Corn Land 3 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 
Alf Land 1 163 163 163 163 163 163 163 163 163 
Alf Land 2 468 468 468 468 612 612 612 612 612 
Alf Land 3 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 
Cropped acres by agronomic soil test P (STP) levels3: 
Corn4:          
High STP 50 92 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 
Medium STP 376 85 74 74 160 160 404 404 404 
Low STP 283 532 532 532 302 302 59 59 59 
Alfalfa4:          
High STP 50 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Medium STP 376 662 674 674 587 587 344 344 344 
Low STP 283 36 36 36 266 266 509 509 509 
1 MDC is manure disposal cost in $/ton. The relevant policy scenario for comparison is that for $4/ton off-site manure disposal cost. 
2 Land classes 1, 2, and 3 are low, medium and high corn silage yield potential, respectively (i.e. 4.9, 5.3 and 5.9 tons/acre respectively). 
3 Low STP soils have less than 9 lbs/acre, medium P soils have 9 – 39 lbs/ac and high P soils have more than 40 lbs/acre of soil Morgan P 
4 Since P is not restricted, STP distinctions are not relevant for the base case. Cropped acreages reported follow the soil distributions. 
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However, upwards of $8 per ton, only 40 percent of the land is left in corn and 
alfalfa cropping increases to 853 acres. To achieve this change in land use, the 
medium quality (i.e., based on soil corn silage yield potential) and low P (i.e., based 
on soil agronomic P testing) lands are switched from corn to alfalfa (see Table 2.6). 
Since they can receive more manure or fertilizer P according to the regulations, the 
low P soils become more important for spreading manure than for grain production as 
manure disposal costs rise.29  Further, more alfalfa is grown on the low P soils as 
alfalfa has higher potential for receiving the manure produced on-farm. At $2 per ton 
for manure disposal, corn (alfalfa) is grown on 523 acres (36 acres) of the low STP 
soils. As the manure disposal costs increase to $12 per ton however, corn (alfalfa) 
growing is reduced (increased) on the low P soils to 59 (509) acres.  
 
Effects on Field Applications of Manure and Fertilizer  
We find that while manure nutrients are applied to all of the corn acres in the 
base case, 76 percent of corn land receives manure under new nutrient regulatory 
conditions.30  Minimal use of nitrogen fertilizers (beyond starter N) is reflected for our 
model in that zero and 2 percent of the corn land receive commercial N fertilizer under 
the base and policy scenarios, respectively.  No fertilizer P or N is purchased for use 
on alfalfa. However, at least some manure is applied on 100 percent of land growing 
alfalfa under both scenarios (see Table 2.7).  
The optimal field manure application rate in the base case is 18.6 tons per acre 
on average for corn and 11.4 tons per acre on average for alfalfa. In the model 
simulation of the nutrient restrictions, the average manure application rates fall to 7.6 
                                                 
29 After accounting for P inherent in the soil, low P soils require on average, 40 lbs/ac. of manure or 
fertilizer P for corn production, and 30 lbs/ac. for alfalfa; Medium P soils require 15lbs/ac. on average 
for corn and alfalfa; while high P soils have no additional P requirements.  
30 The relevant solution set for the base case uses 5-year average prices for DDGS. The relevant policy 
simulation assumes $4/ton for off-site manure disposal costs. 
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tons per acre on corn and 6.0 tons per acre on alfalfa. Manure P and N application are 
reduced on corn and alfalfa fields. While fertilizer P applications increase on corn with 
the policy, the sum of all P applied is reduced. Total field applications of manure and 
fertilizer nitrogen and phosphorus are thus reduced with the simulation of the new 
nutrient standards.    
 
Table 2.7: Manure and nutrient management on corn and alfalfa: Base and  
Policy scenarios 
 
 
 
Base Solution 
(No Policy) 
Policy Solution 
(Nutrient 
Standards)1 
Manure and fertilizer applications (Percent of acres covered): 
Corn grain and silage:     
    Manure  100 76 
    Fertilizer P 0 2 
    Fertilizer N 0 85 
Alfalfa hay: 
    Manure  100 100 
    Fertilizer P 0 0 
    Fertilizer N 0 0 
 
Manure and fertilizer applications (per acre): 
Corn grain and silage:   
    Manure (tons) 18.6 7.6 
    P as manure (lbs) 49 20 
    P as fertilizer (lbs) 0 12 
    N as manure (lbs) 116 47 
    N as fertilizer2 (lbs) 20 20 
Alfalfa hay:   
    Manure (tons) 11.37 6.0 
    P as manure (lbs) 30 16 
    P as fertilizer (lbs) 0 0 
    N as manure (lbs) 71 37 
    N as fertilizer1 (lbs) 0 0 
1 The relevant policy scenario for comparison with the base case is the model simulation for  
   off-site manure disposal cost of $4/ton. 
2 Includes purchase of 20 lbs/ac of pre-sidedress nitrogen. 
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Shadow Prices of Land  
 The crop production and nutrient management adjustments to the new nutrient 
standards have important implications for land economic value and from a nutrient 
loading perspective. As demonstrated using mathematical equations and a stylized 
example (in Appendix 2), crop land on CAFOs have value both for crop production 
and as manure receiving sites. We find in our policy model that the value of the 
unrestricted land controlled by CAFOs rises relative to the other land classifications as 
the costs of off-site manure disposal increases (Figure 2.2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Shadow value of land under nutrient policy 
 
 At minimal manure disposal costs (i.e. zero to $2/ton), the value of land for 
cropping is the dominant land value component so that soils with higher P content are 
more attractive from a crop production stand point. As the manure disposal costs 
increase, however, the value of being able to apply manure nutrients on the land 
becomes more important. Low soil P land is as valuable as medium soil P land at $2 
per ton manure disposal costs and surpasses all other groups at off-farm manure 
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shipping costs beyond $4 per ton. As the manure disposal costs increases, the marginal 
value of low P soils increase relative to medium and high STP land. 
 
Field Loss of Nutrients in Runoff 
Environmental standards could specify target levels of pollution that relevant 
polluters receive disincentives for exceeding (e.g., graduated taxes), or maximum 
allowable levels above which offenders pay fixed penalties (Bunn, 1999). When 
applied to environmental policy regarding agricultural production, structuring the 
environmental restrictions in this manner would encourage agricultural producers 
whose operations have significant impacts on environmental quality to take the 
environmental pollution outcome into consideration in their production and other farm 
management decisions. From a modeling perspective, environmental regulations that 
so specify target or threshold levels of pollution necessitate or allow for the explicit 
inclusion in the mathematical programming models of the decision-maker, safety-first 
constraints to production (see for example, Qui, et al., 2001).  
The CAFO regulations on environmental pollution in New York that we 
analyze, rather than specify threshold levels on nutrient loading from dairy operations, 
are designed to directly regulate the land application of nutrients, thus reducing the 
environmental risks from the source. As such, animal feeding operations need not 
consider final (environmental quality) outcomes of their activities in their management 
decisions and programming models of the decision-making entity need not explicitly 
include production effects on nutrient loading. Instead, P and N runoff loss associated 
with farm animal and crop production can be conveniently assessed ex-post.  
Our work uses historical data on weather for the dairy producing regions for 
the ex-post analysis of production effects on environmental quality. By linking the 
differential levels of manure and fertilizer applications associated with the relevant 
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base and policy scenarios to actual weather data, we obtain for a 30-year period, 
empirical distributions of P and N loading for the three-county region. For the base 
(policy) scenario, observed variations in P and N losses for the 30 weather data points 
are due strictly to differences in weather. Given the empirical distributions, we can 
isolate potential effects of the policy by comparing simple statistics of the 
distributions; e.g., the means and standard deviations, for the base versus the policy 
simulations. We include this approach in our analysis of the results.  
The estimates of average rates of P and N field losses are important for 
providing general approximations of the nutrient loading levels associated with 
production in the region and the extent to which the new nutrient policy would reduce 
these estimations.31  We find that the mean rate of P loss in runoff from the corn fields 
for our sample of 30 weather observations is 7.2 pounds per acre in the base case, and 
3.4 pounds per acre under the nutrient regulations. This represents a policy-induced 
reduction in average P loading per acre of 53 percent. P runoff associated with the 
highest amount of rainfall in the sample is 16.43 pounds per acre in the base case, with 
simulation of the nutrient policy reducing this measure of P loading by 43 percent. In 
the case of nitrogen loss to the environment the average nitrate loading rate is 8.6 
pounds per acre for the base scenario and 4.5 pounds per acre under the policy 
simulation.   
However, the estimates of nutrient loading that are more important from an 
environmental quality perspective are the nutrient losses associated with severe 
weather incidences. A safety-first component is included in our ex-post analysis of the 
implications of CAFO regulations for environmental quality. It is useful for assessing 
                                                 
31 Recall that we focus on the marginal changes in P and N runoff, ignoring nutrient losses not directly 
attributed to fertilizer and manure applications so that our P and N runoff estimates are conservative. 
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the extent to which the new nutrient restrictions can limit extreme cases of P and N 
loading. 
 
A Safety-First Approach to Nutrient Loading  
 The effect of the new nutrient policy on reducing nutrient loading to the 
environment can be determined by examining P runoff and N runoff and leaching 
losses associated with (known) probabilities of extreme weather. The safety-first 
approach that we adopt is outlined formally for P and N loss in runoff: 
 
  WPP WRO Pr        (2.13) 
 
  WNN WRO Pr        (2.14) 
 
where the expressions in Equations (2.13) and (2.14) denote that the probability that 
some P (N) runoff (and leaching) relationship holds is not greater than an 
exogenously-determined level (W). ROP  ( RON ) is the average annual loss of P (N) in 
runoff (and leaching) from all corn fields in pounds per acre. W is the probability of 
extreme storms occurring and ranges between zero and one. This value can be set by 
the regulatory entity for reasonable assumptions of what constitute severe precipitation 
incidences and to reflect historical weather in the region. WP ( WN ) is obtained from P 
(N) loading estimations for the sample of 30 weather observations and is the average P 
(N) loss in runoff (and leaching) from all cornfields that corresponds to W. For the 
purpose of assessing environmental regulation, WP ( WN ) would indicate the lower 
limit on the amount of P (N) runoff that occurs for a set level of probability. An 
efficient environmental quality policy should dampen this value by a significant 
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amount. Levels of WP ( WN ) are compared in our analysis for the base and policy 
scenarios.32  
 Our analysis involves comparing the P (N) distributions for the base and policy 
scenarios by plotting the estimates of P (N) loss in runoff associated with the model 
simulations against the probabilities of their occurrence given the sample of weather 
data. The cumulative probability for all the data observations is one. Before the 
distributions are plotted, the estimates of P runoff are ranked (given weather 
incidences) from low to high for the base and the policy scenarios as in Figure 2.3. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3. Phosphorus loss in runoff from corn fields 
 
 Similarly, cumulative distributions of nitrate runoff and leaching are plotted for 
the base and nutrient regulations scenarios as in Figure 2.4. Environmental quality 
improvement following regulations on land nutrient applications is evident for our 
analysis by the distribution of P (N) runoff for the policy case lying below that for the 
base case throughout; i.e., the P (N) estimates of runoff (and leaching) associated with 
the ranked weather observations are always lower in the policy than in the base case. 
                                                 
32 The relevant policy scenario for comparison is $4/ton off-site manure disposal cost. 
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 To introduce a safety-first interpretation to the model results, we assume an 
arbitrary cut-off of 10 percent for the probability of extreme weather occurring; i.e., W 
is 0.10 in Equations (2.13) and (2.14).  In Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.4, this point is 0.90 
on the horizontal axis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4. Nitrate loss in runoff and leaching from corn fields 
   
 Reading (off the vertical axes) the nutrient loading estimates that correspond to 
this point for the base and policy runoff distributions gives us the lower limits on the 
amounts of nutrient runoff losses that could only occur with a 10 percent probability 
(i.e., 1.0| WPW ). Given this interpretation, the limit on P runoff that is exceeded not 
more than 10 percent of the time (in the base case) is 12.9 pounds per acre. The 
analogous threshold runoff for the nutrients standards scenario is 6.6 pounds of 
phosphorus per acre.  While the results suggest that the new nutrient restrictions 
reduce P loading on average, they also indicate that significant risks of P runoff could 
remain during severe storm events. Restricting land nutrient applications to the 
agronomic soil uptake rates also leads to reduced amounts of nitrate loss in runoff and 
leaching. As deduced from Figure 2.4, the level of nitrate loading that is exceeded not 
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more than 10 percent of the time (according to our sample of weather data) is 13.6 
pounds per acre in the base case, and 7.1 pounds N per acre under the policy 
simulation. However, as with P loading, these results may indicate that there still 
remain significant risks of nitrate loss to the environment when severe storms occur. 
 
Long-run Effects of Nutrient Restrictions Policy 
 Our analysis does not account for the long-run effects of the new nutrient 
applications on regional land and environmental quality. However, we can offer some 
comments on the likely implications given the current results.  
 As CAFOs follow the nutrient restrictions policy, fewer nutrients are applied in 
excess of the soil-crop nutrient requirements. It is reasonable to expect that soil P 
levels would be reduced on average in the long run, particularly for high P soils where 
additional P applications are not allowed under the regulations on land nutrient 
applications. The distributions of regional land over the three STP classes could thus 
change over time, with much of the (currently) high STP land becoming re-
categorized as of lower soil P status. On the other hand, successive additions of 
manure and or fertilizers to lower P soils could raise the P levels on those soils so that 
all soils converge over time. This scenario could have a number of implications.  
 First, the most important gains for surface and ground water quality (from the 
policy) could occur in the short run. Since P levels are markedly reduced with the 
onset of the policy, future improvements in environmental quality are likely to be 
more modest. Second, as P levels are reduced on higher P soils, and lower P soils lose 
their enhanced values as manure disposal sites, land internal values should converge 
(to medium or average soil P levels) for croplands of the various soil test categories.    
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Conclusions 
 Regional mathematical programming models were developed to assess the 
implications of new nutrient standards for land nutrient application on confined animal 
feeding operations (CAFOs) in New York. We explicitly accounted for CAFO 
regulations on field manure and fertilizer applications to analyze the effects on 
measured outcomes of the farm management adjustments to the new nutrient policy 
and to recent changes in relevant agricultural prices.  Our mathematical programming 
methods and the availability of a set of unique data allowed us to assess the policy 
effects on farm income, land use, manure and fertilizer management, and 
environmental quality for a three-county dairy production region in New York. Our 
mathematical methods also allowed for the assessment of the differential effects on 
internal land values, of the new CAFO nutrient restrictions and alternative manure 
disposal costs. In particular, we used a mathematical treatment of the Kuhn-Tucker 
conditions derived from the dairy CAFO optimization problem and a stylized case of 
the model solutions to determine how land economic values differed given crop 
production and manure-application potential. 
 In response to high prices of traditional feed ingredients, our model solutions 
indicated the potential for inclusion of unconventional feed ingredients such as 
distillers dried grains and solubles (DDGS) in livestock rations. From our model 
results, these ration adjustments on regulated dairy CAFOs increased the levels of 
nitrogen and phosphorus in the dairy waste, and where manure was applied on fields 
as crop nutrients, nutrient applications exceeded levels required for optimum crop 
yield, increasing the risks of environmental nutrient loading. Given our modeling of 
the new policy and our initial assumptions on resources available to CAFOs in the 
dairy producing region, our results further indicated that the land nutrient regulations 
mitigate the excess nutrient problem. However, while the new regulations reduced 
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nutrient loadings on average, there were indications that significant risks of nutrient 
loss to the environment could remain for severe weather incidences. Our results also 
indicated some losses in farm income for regulated CAFOs. 
 The new nutrient restrictions required that more than half of the manure 
produced on CAFOs in the dairy-producing region was transported off-site for 
disposal. Since off-farm manure disposal costs and the overall dairy operating costs 
are expected to rise as the CAFOs travel longer distances to find manure-receiving 
locations, net farm income was sensitive to the implied assumptions on the availability 
of nearby land suitable for manure disposal. To mitigate the income losses from higher 
off-site manure disposal costs, the dairy management took advantage of flexibilities in 
the nutrients regulation by growing more alfalfa than corn on soils that could receive 
more manure under the regulation. Alfalfa provided more conducive conditions for 
spreading manure because of its inherent agronomic characteristics. Alfalfa thus 
increased in field crop value when the dairy farm management faced the stricter 
regulations on manure application and higher costs for transporting excess manure off 
the farm.  
 Our analysis of the land shadow values demonstrated that crop land on 
regulated CAFOs had differential value as crop production and manure-receiving sites, 
with croplands with lower levels of agronomic soil test phosphorus (STP) taking on 
enhanced value for manure disposal. The effect of the nutrient policy on CAFO land 
was more pronounced as the costs of off-site manure disposal costs increased. In 
particular, as the manure disposal costs increased, the shadow prices of the low STP 
soils (that allowed for substantial manure application) controlled by CAFOs increased 
significantly in relation to land on which no or minimal P applications were allowed.   
 Overall, results from our analysis - the sensitivity of CAFO incomes to manure 
disposal costs in particular - could indicate that greater oversight may be required for 
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environmental quality gains to be realized from the new field nutrient regulations for 
concentrated animal feeding operations.  
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APPENDIX 2.A 
ANALYSIS OF LAND INTERNAL VALUE:  
THE STYLIZED NON LINEAR PROGRAMMING MODEL 
 
 The new policy on field nutrient application influences regulated CAFOs in 
two major ways: 1) the dairy operators are forced to recognize nutrients inherent to the 
soil in their fertilizer and manure management decisions and 2) they must dispose off-
farm of manure produced by the farm animals in excess of the soils’ capacity to 
receive manure nutrients. Effects that the land nutrient restrictions and the costs of off-
site disposal of manure have on land economic values are thus an important 
consideration for the dairy producing region. To investigate the land value effects, we 
set up a stylized version of the optimization model that includes only those elements 
of the non-linear programming model that have direct bearing on the shadow prices of 
land. The presentation of the stylized nonlinear programming model and mathematical 
treatment of the first order conditions to derive land shadow prices follow. 
  
Model notation and variables definition 
Parameters: 
PW = Price per cwt of milk 
PC = Price per ton to sell corn 
PA = Price per ton to sell alfalfa 
CXj = Total variable cost for raising cows, except cost of feed for cow on ration j 
CF = Cost per ton of feed ingredient, other than corn and alfalfa hay 
CN = Cost per unit (lb) of fertilizer N purchased 
CP = Cost per unit (lb) of fertilizer P purchased 
CCi = Production cost per acre of corn on soil i, except fertilizers 
CAi = Production cost per acre of alfalfa on soil i, except fertilizers 
CSM = Cost per ton to spread manure on fields 
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CDM = Cost per ton to dispose of manure off-site 
C~ C = Cost per ton of purchased corn 
C~ A = Cost per ton of purchased alfalfa 
YXj = Milk production for cow on ration j, in cwt 
YCi = Tons of corn produced per acre of land i in corn 
YAi = Tons of alfalfa produced per acre of land i in alfalfa 
aCj = Tons of corn used for ration j 
aAj = Tons of alfalfa used for ration j 
aFj = Tons of other feed used for ration j 
Mj = Tons of manure from cow fed ration j 
Nj = Pounds of N in manure from cow fed ration j 
Pj = Pounds of P in manure from cow fed ration j 
Ci = Pounds of N required per acre for corn on land i 
Ai = Pounds of N required per acre for alfalfa on land i 
Ci = Pounds of P required per acre for corn on land i 
Ai = Pounds of P required per acre for alfalfa on land i 
 
Variables: 
Xj = Number of cows on ration j 
F = Tons of other feed purchased 
BNCi = Pounds of N purchased for corn on land i 
BNAi = Pounds of N purchased for alfalfa on land i 
BPCi = Pounds of N purchased for corn on land i 
BPAi = Pounds of N purchased for alfalfa on land i 
ACi = Acres of land i in corn 
AAi = Acres of land i in alfalfa 
SMCi = Tons of manure spread on corn on land i 
SMAi = Tons of manure spread on alfalfa on land i 
SC = Tons of corn sold 
SA = Tons of alfalfa sold 
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BC = Tons of corn purchased 
BA = Tons of alfalfa purchased 
M = Total tons of manure produced 
DM = Tons of manure disposed off-site 
NM = Total pounds of N in manure produced 
PM = Total pounds of P in manure produced 
 
The optimization problem 
       3 13 12 1 i Aii CiNFjj XjXjW BNBNCFCXCYPMax  
     3 13 13 13 1 i AiAii CiCii Aii CiP ACACBPBPC    AACCDMi Aii CiSM SPSPDMCSMSMC    3 13 1  
AACC BCBC ~~   
0
,,,,,,
,,,,,,,,,,, 



MMACAC
AiCiAiCiAiCiAiCi
PNMBBSS
DMSMSMAABPBPBNBNFXj
 
j = 1, 2         (I.1) 
 
such that: 
Corn grain in ration, production, selling, and buying: 
03
12211
   CCi CiCiCC BSAYXaXa       (I.2)  
Alfalfa in ration, production, selling, and buying: 
03
12211
   AAi AiAiAA BSAYXaXa      (I.3) 
Other feeds in ration, and buying: 
02211  FXaXa FF        (I.4) 
Manure production: 
 02211  MXMXM        (I.5) 
N and P production in manure: 
 02211  MNXNXN        (I.6) 
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 02211  MPXPXP        (I.7) 
N and P application on corn:  
 0 CiNCiCiCi SMBNA      (i= 1, 2, 3)  (I.8) 
0 CiPCiCiCi SMBPA      (i= 1, 2, 3)  (I.9) 
N and P application on alfalfa: 
0 AiNAiAiAi SMBNA      (i= 1, 2, 3)  (I.10) 
0 AiPAiAiAi SMBPA      (i= 1, 2, 3)  (I.11) 
Manure inventory: 
03
1
3
1
  MDMSMSM i Aii Ci      (I.12) 
Land:  
iAiAi LAA        (i= 1, 2, 3)  (I.13) 
Dairy cow inventory: 
HXX  21          (I.14) 
 
where: 
MNmN   
MN PP   
 
The Lagrangian 
        3 13 12 1 i Aii CiNFj jXjXjW BNBNCFCXCYPL  
     3 13 13 13 1 i AiAii CiCii Aii CiP ACACBPBPC    AACCDMi Aii CiSM SPSPDMCSMSMC    3 13 1  
   CCi CiCiCCCAACC BSAYXaXaBCBC   3 122110~~   
     22113 122110 XaXaFBSAYXaXa FFFAAi AiAiAAA      
     MNMM NXNXNMXMXM  22112211 00   
     CiNCiCiCiNCiMPM SMBNAPXPXP   00 2211  
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     AiNAiAiAiNAiCiPCiCiCiPCi SMBNASMBPA   00  
  AiPAiAiAiPAi SMBPA   0    
     AiAiiLii Aii CiMSD AALMDMSMSM     3 13 10  
  21 XXHH           (I.15) 
 
where: 
MNmN  ; MN PP   
 
General representation of the (Kuhn-Tucker) first-order necessary conditions33  
0L ; 0L         (I.16) 
0  L ; 0  L         (I.17) 
0 ; 0          (I.18) 
 
where   LL  for  ,  
 = Variable 
 = Lagrangian multiplier associated with constraint 
 
The first order conditions I: 0L  
           11111111 : NMaaaCYPL NMMFFAaCCXXWX    
      011  HPM P       (I.19) 
           22222222 : NMaaaCYPL NMMFFAaCCXXWX    
      012  HPM P       (I.20) 
0:  FFF CL          (I.21) 
0:  CSCSC PL          (I.22) 
0:  ASASA PL          (I.23) 
                                                 
33 H.W. Kuhn and A.W. Tucker, 1951. 
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0~:  CCBC CL          (I.24) 
0~:  AABA CL          (I.25) 
AiMi PAiAiMi NAiMM
SMMPSMMNL    23 123 1:   
023
1
23
1
   CiMi PCiCiMi NCi SMMPSMMN    (I.26) 
011: 3
1
3
1
   i AiNAii CiNCiNMNM SMMSMML    (I.27) 
011: 3
1
3
1
   i AiPAii CiPCiPMPM SMMSMML    (I.28) 
0:  NCiNBNCi CL      (i = 1, 2, 3)  (I.29) 
0:  NAiNBNAi CL      (i = 1, 2, 3)  (I.30) 
0:  PCiPBPCi CL       (i = 1, 2, 3)  (I.31) 
0:  PAiPBPAi CL       (i = 1, 2, 3)  (I.32) 
0:  LiCiPCiCiNCiCiCCiACi YCL   (i = 1, 2, 3)  (I.33) 
0:  LiAiPAiAiNAiAiAAiAAi YCL   (i = 1, 2, 3)  (I.34) 
0:  MSDPPCiNNCiSMSMCi CL    (i = 1, 2, 3)  (I.35) 
0:  MSDPPAiNNAiSMSMAi CL    (i = 1, 2, 3)  (I.36) 
0:  MSDDMDM CL         (I.37) 
 
The first order conditions II: 0L  
CCCi CiCiC
SXaXaAYL   22113 1:        (I.38) 
AAAi AiAiA
SXaXaAYL   22113 1:      (I.39) 
2211: XaXaFL FFF         (I.40) 
2211: XMXMML M         (I.41) 
MNM NXNXNL  2211:        (I.42) 
MPM PXPXPL  2211:        (I.43) 
CiNCiCiCiNNCi ABNSML  :    (i=1, 2, 3)  (I.44) 
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AiNAiAiAiNNAi ABNSML  :    (i=1, 2, 3)  (I.45) 
CiPCiCiCiPPCi ABPSML  :    (i=1, 2, 3)  (I.46) 
AiPAiAiAiPPAi ABPSML  :    (i=1, 2, 3)  (I.47) 
DMSMSMML Aii CiMSD   3 1:      (I.48) 
AiCiiLi AALL :      (i=1, 2, 3)  (I.49) 
21: XXHL H          (I.50) 
 
The first order conditions III (complementary slackness): 0 XL  
0  for all  
          111111111 : MaaaCYPXLX MFFAaCCXXWX     
     011  HPMNM PN        (I.51) 
          222222222 : MaaaCYPXLX MFFAaCCXXWX    
     022  HPMNM PN        (I.52) 
  0:  FFF CFLF         (I.53) 
  0:  CSCCSCC PSLS         (I.54) 
  0:  ASAASAA PSLS         (I.55) 
  0~:  CCCBCC CBLB         (I.56) 
  0~:  AAABAA CBLB         (I.57) 
 AiMi PAiAiMi NAiMSDM SMMPSMMNMLM    23 123 1:   
 023
1
23
1
   CiMi PCiCiMi NCi SMMPSMMN    (I.58) 
  011: 3
1
3
1
   i AiNAii CiNCiNMMNMM SMMSMMNLN   
          (I.59)   011: 3
1
3
1
   i AiPAii CiPCiPMMPMM SMMSMMPLP    
          (I.60) 
  0:  NCiNCiBNCiCi CBNLBN     (i = 1, 2, 3)   (I.61) 
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  0:  NAiNAiBNAiAi CBNLBN     (i = 1, 2, 3)  (I.62) 
  0:  PCiPCiBPCiCi CBPLBP     (i = 1, 2, 3)  (I.63) 
  0:  PAiPAiBPAiAi CBPLBP     (i = 1, 2, 3)  (I.64) 
  0:  LiCiPCiCiNCiCiCiCCiACiCi CYALA   (i = 1, 2, 3) (I.65) 
  0:  LiAiPAiAiNAiAiAiAAiAAiAi CYALA   (i = 1, 2, 3) (I.66) 
  0:  MSDPPCiNNCiSMCiSMCiCi CSMLSM   (i = 1, 2, 3) (I.67) 
  0:  MSDPPAiNNAiSMAiSMAiAi CSMLSM   (i = 1, 2, 3) (I.68) 
  0:  MSDDMDM CDMLDM        (I.69) 
 
The first order conditions IV (complementary slackness): 0  L  
0  for all  
 CCCCi CiCiCCC BSXaXaAYL    22113 1:      (I.70)  AAAAi AiAiAAA BSXaXaAYL    22113 1:      (I.71) 
 2211: XaXaFL FFFFF          (I.72) 
 MXMXML MM  2211:       (I.73) 
 MNMNMNM NXNXNL  2211:        (I.74) 
 MPMPMPM PXPXPL  2211:         (I.75) 
 CiCiCiCiNNCiNCiNCi ABNSML    :      (I.76) 
 AiAiAiAiNNAiNAiNAi ABNSML    :      (I.77) 
 CiCiCiCiPPCiPCiPCi ABPSML    :      (I.78) 
 AiAiAiAiPPAiPAiPAi ABPSML    :      (I.79) 
     AiAiiLii Aii CiMSDMSDMSD AALMDMSMSML      3 13 10:  
          (I.80) 
 21: XXHL HHH          (I.81) 
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APPENDIX 2.B 
ANALYSIS OF LAND SHADOW VALUE 
 
 To analyze how the new nutrient regulations for CAFOs influence the 
economic value of crop land, the Kuhn-Tucker necessary conditions (for an optimum 
solution) are examined in detail. In general, crop production and nutrient management 
activities on corn and alfalfa drive land internal values. The case is examined (without 
loss in generality) for land in crop production. A similar treatment of the first order 
conditions can be done for alfalfa. Kuhn-Tucker necessary conditions from the 
previous section (appendix) relevant to the analysis of land shadow prices are restated: 
 
0:  LiCiPCiCiNCiCiCCiACi YCL   (i = 1, 2, 3)  (II.1) 
0:  MSDPPCiNNCiSMSMCi CL    (i = 1, 2, 3)  (II.2) 
0:  PCiPBPCi CL       (i = 1, 2, 3)  (II.3) 
0:  NCiNBNCi CL      (i = 1, 2, 3)  (II.4) 
0:  MSDDMDM CL         (II.5) 
 
where equations (II.1) through (II.4) are first-order equations associated with crop 
production and manure and fertilizer N application on corn, for three classes of soils 
based on soil P test values. The shadow price for land appears as a variable in equation 
(II.1) while equation (II.2) considers manure spreading on corn. Equations (II.3) and 
(II.4) account for the shadow values of P and N applied on corn. Equation (II.5) is a 
necessary condition determining the economic cost of off-farm manure disposal for 
the dairy CAFOs. To see how the land shadow prices are affected by the nutrient 
restrictions we must rearrange the equations and make some assumptions about the 
nature of the optimal solutions. 
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 Re-arranging equation (II.1) gives: 
 
CiPCiCiNCiCiCiCLi CY      (i = 1, 2, 3)  (II.6) 
 
where ,Li ,C ,CiY ,CiC ,NCi ,Ci PCi and Ci are as defined in appendix 2.I. Corn is 
grown on land i (for i= 1, 2, 3). For positive value of the acreage of land i in corn, i.e., 
ACi, equation (II.6) holds with equality by the first-order necessary conditions for an 
optimal solution (see equation I.65 in appendix 2.I).  
 The manure spreading expression (i.e. equation II.2) is re-arranged so that:  
 
MSDSMPPCiNNCi C      (i = 1, 2, 3)  (II.7) 
 
where the terms in equation (7) are as defined in the appendix (2.I). For SMCi that is 
strictly positive (i = 1,2,3), i.e., when manure is spread on corn on land i, the 
necessary conditions in the equation hold with equality (see equation I.67).  
 Our analysis of land shadow value focuses on the relative values of the high 
and low soil P land classifications. For convenience however, we include equations for 
the medium soil test P category. 
 
General Assumptions 
 The relevant expressions of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions can be set up for the 
base (no-policy) and nutrients restrictions policy scenarios. In both cases, we assume 
that corn is grown on the land soil test P (STP) classes so that equation (II.6) holds 
with equality. Further, the stylized examples do not account for land types due to 
differences in soil capabilities (i.e. corn yield) so that ,CiY the corn yield per acre is 
constant for all i (i.e., CCi YY   for i=1, 2, 3). Similarly, the costs of crop production 
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are assumed uniform for corn land of all soil test types in the base and policy 
scenarios, (i.e., CCi CC   for i=1, 2, 3).  
 
Base Case: 
 In the model simulation with no restrictions on nutrient applications, over-
application of manure nutrients is allowed and manure is spread on all the soil test 
types (i.e., equation II.7 holds with equality). Supplemental fertilizer applications are 
further determined by the crop nutrient uptake levels and do not account for nutrients 
inherent in soil. Since the nutrient applications do not account for soil inherent 
nutrients, the terms representing nitrogen requirements on low, medium and high STP 
soils in the first order equations are assumed equivalent (i.e., CCi    for i=1, 2, 3). 
Phosphorus requirements are similarly assumed equivalent for the soil test types (i.e., 
CCi    for i=1, 2, 3).  
 Assume that i represents high, medium and low soil test P land, respectively 
(for i = 1, 2, and 3), then for the general assumptions stated in the section above and 
in the no- policy case, equation (II.6) can be re-written for corn land as34: 
 
CPCCNCCCCL CY  1       (II.8) 
CPCCNCCCCL CY  2        (II.9) 
CPCCNCCCCL CY  3        (II.10) 
 
where ,1L  2L and 3L are the shadow prices of land on high, medium and low soil 
test P land, respectively.  
 By equations (II.8) through (II.10), the following holds: 
                                                 
34 By equations (II.4) and (II.5) and the equality assumption on Equation (II.6) for all soil P types, 
NCNCNCNC   321 and PCPCPCPC   321 hold in the no-policy scenario. 
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321 LLL           (II.11) 
 
Clearly, land internal values are equivalent for the soil test P classifications in the base 
scenario. 
 
Nutrients Restrictions Policy and Manure Disposal Costs 
 Under the new nutrient standards, manure and fertilizer nutrients are applied 
on farm land only up to the P and N requirements of the crop-soil combinations. 
Manure over-application is not allowed so that manure is not spread on the high P land 
(i.e., equation (II.7) holds with equality for the medium and low soil P classes only). 
Further, nutrient requirement levels are set at the agronomic uptake levels of the crops 
and account for the soil inherent nutrient (i.e., soil test P status). As in the base case 
and to restrict the analysis to the direct effects of policy on the values of the variable 
P-status land, the crop nitrogen requirements are assumed equivalent on high, medium 
and low STP soils (i.e., CCi    for i=1,2,3). No manure or fertilizer P is applied on 
high P soils. Consequently, Ci  in equation (II.6) is set equal to zero for the high soil 
P class.   
 The phosphorus requirement on land designated medium STP is by definition a 
fraction of the P requirement on low STP soils. This is represented as:  
 
32 CCC         10  C    (II.12) 
 
where 2C  and 3C denote P nutrient requirements for corn on medium and low STP 
soils, respectively, and 3C  is a higher value than 2C by definition. 
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 Given the general assumptions in the earlier section and the stylized 
assumptions under the policy scenario, equation (II.6) can be re-written for the policy 
scenario as: 
 
CNCCCCL CY  11          (II.13) 
3222 CCPCCNCCCCL CY         (II.14) 
3333 CPCCNCCCCL CY           (II.15) 
 
where ,1L  2L and 3L are the shadow prices of land on high, medium and low soil 
test P land, respectively. We can say something about the (magnitude) order of the 
land shadow values under the policy scenario for additional information on NCi and 
PCi for all i.  
 For the simple case where NCi is equivalent to NC for all i and 
PCi equals PC for all i (as in the base case), the following relationship holds: 
 
321 LLL           (II.16) 
 
where ,1L  2L and 3L are as defined earlier and equation (II.16) denotes that high P 
land has an internal value higher than that of the medium P land. In turn, the shadow 
price of the medium P land is greater than that of the low P land. Equation (II.16) 
holds given the relationship between soil P requirements on medium and low P land 
(i.e., equation (II.12)) and the assumption that P requirements on these land types are 
strictly positive (i.e., 02 C and 03 C ).  
 Next, we examine the relative magnitudes of the land shadow values when 
NCi and PCi are not equivalent for all i. In particular, we examine relevant Kuhn-
Tucker (first-order optimality) conditions to show that for a stylized set of solutions 
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for the nutrient policy scenario, it holds that the land internal value is greater for the 
high P soils (than on low P soils) for some range of manure disposal costs while it is 
lower for an alternative set of off-site manure disposal costs.  
 
Switch in the Order (Magnitude) of Land Shadow Values 
 For a stylized case of the new nutrients policy, we assume that fertilizer P is 
purchased as supplement for manure P on the medium and low P soils35. The 
implication of this assumption for the Kuhn-Tucker (first-order) conditions is that 
equation (II.3) holds with equality for the land with medium and low P soils36. 
Further, manure application on the medium and low P soils (and not on the high P 
land) allows for equation (II.3) to be re-written for land of soil test type i (for i=1, 2, 
3) as:  
 
  NPPCMSDSMNC C  /111        (II.17) 
  NPPCMSDSMNC C  /122        (II.18) 
  NPPCMSDSMNC C  /133       (II.19) 
 
where 1NC , 2NC and 3NC denote the value of N applied on high, medium and low P 
land, respectively.  
 Substitute the expressions in equations (II.18) and (II.19) into the land value 
equations in (II.14) and (II.15) and recall the equality assumption on equation (II.3) so 
that the value of P on corn is equivalent on medium and low P soils. Further, assume 
the case in which excess manure is shipped from the CAFOs to off-site recipients and 
                                                 
35 This solution is consistent with our modeling solutions of the parametric analysis of (the implications 
of) manure disposal costs for CAFOs in the selected three-county dairy industry. 
36 A further implication is that PCPCPC   32 holds. 
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substitute the (negative of) DMC , the cost of off-site manure disposal for the shadow 
price on manure disposal ( MSD ), as in equation (5).  
 Equations (II.13) through (II.15) can now be re-written as: 
 
CNCCCCL CY  11          (II.20) 
  32 /1 CCPCCNPPCDMSMCCCL CCCY     (II.21) 
  33 /1 CPCCNPPCDMSMCCCL CCCY     (II.22) 
 
where the sign on the off-site manure disposal cost variable, (i.e., DMC , in equations 
II.21 and II.22) indicates that the land shadow values on medium and low P land 
increase as the unit cost of off-site manure disposal rises. The size of the manure 
disposal cost relative to the cost of spreading manure ( SMC ) is also important.  
 Assume a low cost for off-site manure disposal ( DMC ) so that the relevant 
expression in equations (21) and (22) is zero or negative (i.e., 
  0 PPCDMSM CC  ). This holds (for e.g.) when the unit cost of spreading 
manure on farmland exceeds the off-site manure disposal cost. Then by equations 
(II.20) and (II.22) and recalling (   NPPCMSDSMNC C  /111  ), it holds that: 
 
31 LL            (II.23) 
 
where the expression in equation (II.23) denotes higher shadow price for land of high 
soil P category (i.e., 1L ). This is the case because a higher (positive) sum is 
subtracted from 3L  (i.e., from CCC CY   in equation (II.22)) than from 1L  (i.e., from 
CCC CY   in equation (II.20)). 
 Next, assume alternative costs of off-site manure disposal so that the value of 
DMC  rises in the equations and the relevant expression in equations (II.21) and (II.22) 
  142
is positive (i.e.,   0 PPCDMSM CC  ). Note that while this (now) positive term 
increases the overall value of Li for all soil test types (i.e., for i=1, 2, 3), the negative 
values on the last terms (on the right hand side) in equations (II.21) and (II.22) 
dampen the positive effects on the land shadow value.  
 However, a large enough increase in DMC , the cost of off-farm manure 
disposal would counter the otherwise negative effect on land values so that the 
following holds for high and low soil P land: 
 
31 LL            (II.24) 
 
where equation (II.24) shows higher shadow price for land of low soil P category 
( 3L ).  
 Thus, we have shown for a stylized policy scenario that land internal values 
switch in magnitude order for alternative costs for off-site manure disposal. More 
formally, we present in (Table A.2.) the relevant cases determining the relative 
shadow values of medium and low P soils for our stylized policy scenario and the 
critical values at which the reversal in shadow land values occur.   
 
Explaining the Switch in Land Economic Value 
 When no policy is in effect, the CAFO farm nutrient management does not 
account for the inherent value of soil nutrients. Consequently, and for constant soil 
yield capabilities, the shadow prices are uniform for the soil test P categories of land. 
With the new nutrient policy in effect, however, farm nutrient management and the 
land internal value recognize crop land as a repository of soil nutrients. This intrinsic 
value is obvious in (higher) shadow prices on high soil test P lands when the unit cost 
of off-farm manure disposal is very low.  
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 However, as it costs more to dispose (off-farm) of the manure nutrients 
produced in excess of the farm crop agronomic needs, land takes on additional value 
as manure disposal sites. This economic value of the land accounts for the opportunity 
cost of not putting the land to use as a manure-receiving site. Lower P soils that can 
receive additional manure thus increase in economic value relative to the high P soils 
that would have been more attractive purely from a soil nutrient availability 
perspective. 
 
Table A.2: Relative magnitude on land shadow values given net manure disposal costs 
relative to spreading and the value of manure N on corn land  
 
(CDM-CSM) )( CSMCDMNNC  )( CSMCDMNNC   
(CDM - CSM) < 0  23 LL    23 LL    
(CDM - CSM) = 0  
 
23 LL    23 LL    
(CDM - CSM) > 0  
 
23 LL    23 LL    
 CDM is unit cost of off-site manure disposal; CSM is the unit cost of spreading manure on-farm. The 
difference (CDM – CSM) is the net manure disposal cost. NCN is the value of manure nitrogen on land; 
L3 and  L3 are the internal value of land on low and medium soil test P land, respectively. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESOURCE-BASED SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT:  
AN ENERGY PLANNING MODEL FOR NIGERIA1  
 
Summary 
 As in many countries with rapidly growing economies, energy demand in 
Nigeria has grown at rates that far outpace expansion in the energy industry. In 
particular, severe shortfall in electricity supply in the country has been identified as a 
major constraint to firm and household production. The national government of 
Nigeria, in response to the identified need, has prioritized investment in energy 
utilities to expand capacity for electrical power generation and distribution.  Being a 
major oil-producing and oil-dependent economy, it is expected that much of the 
planned expansion in the energy industry in Nigeria would be financed by rents from 
the petroleum sector. However, the country’s government also aspires to use revenue 
from oil rents to more directly fund social and economic development. Further, the 
government goals for energy expansion and socio-economic development must 
account for the objectives and activities of other major stakeholders in the economy, 
and growing threats to the natural resource-base indicate the need to address 
environmental concerns associated with the various development activities. 
 In this chapter, we present a model for economic development in Nigeria that 
characterizes the interdependent intertemporal optimization behavior of major players 
in the economy—the government, private sector (households and firms), public 
utilities and foreign oil companies.  The model, which is based on established results 
from the literatures on the optimal exploration for and extraction of exhaustible 
                                                 
1 Enahoro, D, with assistance from K.P. Donaghy and C.R. Wymer. In Preparation 
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resources, is employed in a deterministic simulation exercise that takes the form of a 
dynamic policy game. 
 
Introduction 
 Nigeria aspires to use revenue from its rents from natural resource extraction, 
particularly of petroleum resources, to fund social and economic development.  The 
government goals for economic empowerment include the development of material 
and human capacity so as to enhance sustainability and reduce the current heavy 
dependence of the economy on a single nonrenewable resource with highly volatile 
output prices. The government of Nigeria has also identified meeting the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) of the United Nations as an important component of its 
long-term agenda for growth.2  To achieve the outlined goals, urgent attention must be 
paid to sectors of the economy with potential for the most significant impacts. The 
energy sector has been identified as one of these sectors.  (See e.g., World Bank, 
2002.)  With its growing challenges to meet fast-growing household and industry 
demand for electricity in the country, this sector has been touted as playing a critical 
role in Nigeria’s economic outcome. Energy planning in general and electricity 
development in particular, thus, are an important consideration in any discussion on 
economic development planning in Nigeria.  
 Various useful tools have been developed for short- and medium- to long-term 
macroeconomic modeling and planning in Nigeria. In light of recent significant 
changes in the economy and of new developments in the theory and methods of 
macroeconomic planning and modeling, however, there may be a need for updating of 
the old planning tools. New methods that we develop for macroeconomic planning 
                                                 
2 The MDGs can be viewed online at http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/. 
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account explicitly for the oil sector as an important player in the economy, tracking the 
implications of sector-wide changes in this industry on other sectors. The methods also 
account for the increased focus of the government on such objectives as human capital 
development, the expansion of a nonoil sector with export potential and increased 
access to energy for residential and industrial consumers.   
 In this chapter, we attempt to integrate elements from the microeconomic, 
open-economy macroeconomic and natural-resource economics literatures into a 
useful tool for planning in a particular economic environment. We present a stylized 
optimization model for the energy sector in Nigeria that incorporates important 
government objectives for social and economic development with more traditional 
energy-sector planning goals of resource allocation and cost minimization of a public 
utility.  By characterizing activities in the real economy as resulting from 
intertemporal optimization decisions of representative agents, our model is founded on 
microeconomic theory and is much in the spirit of macrodynamic models outlined in 
Turnovsky (2000).  Further, we incorporate the strands of sector economic activities in 
a simulation experiment that takes the form of a dynamic game between the relevant 
agents. We set out to demonstrate how such a tool may be developed in theory and 
application. To the best of our knowledge, no such approach has been applied to 
resource planning and economic development in Nigeria. 
 The model that we develop is intended for use in determining optimal 
combinations of energy development programs that the national government could 
pursue and potential outcomes of activities in government and the private sector. In 
particular, the model could be used to answer such questions as how changes in 
government capital expenditures on public utilities and in non-oil sector development 
would influence productivity in the manufacturing sector. To do this, the estimated 
model could be employed in simulation exercises of a variety of policy scenarios.  
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While the results obtained from simulation exercises may not immediately lend 
themselves to application by policy makers, they should provide useful information 
for the further development of a tool with greater application potential. What the 
current planning model can provide is a sense of the types of policy plans that would 
be required to implement a comprehensive and integrated national plan for Nigeria’s 
energy sector.  
 In the next section, we provide a summary of the current state of the energy 
sector and planning in Nigeria.  Next, we briefly discuss the literature relevant to this 
study. We then present in some detail our model characterizing the intertemporal 
optimizing behaviors of relevant economic agents – the government, private sector 
(households and firms), multi-national oil companies, and a public sector electricity 
utility.  Next, we present the methodology of the model estimation and our application 
of the model to the empirical setting, outlining the data.  We also describe a 
forecasting and simulation exercise that we perform to determine the implications of 
important policy and agent decision variables. Finally, we present conclusions that can 
be drawn from this study. 
 
Energy Sector and Planning in Nigeria 
 Many concerns have been raised regarding the capacity of the energy sector in 
Nigeria to support a fast-growing economy.3  These concerns are however not peculiar 
to the country as they echo reports of similar challenges faced by fast-developing 
economies such as China, India and South Africa. In general, growth in the energy 
sector has not kept pace with the rising energy demand that has followed 
industrialization in these countries.  For example, whilst the annual GDP growth rate 
in China was more than six times that recorded in the United States in 2007, per capita 
                                                 
3 E.g., various local and international media reports and a World Bank (2002) report. 
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energy consumption in China was less than 20 percent that of the United States in the 
same year. Similarly, electricity consumption in India was only 505 kilowatt hours per 
person in 2007 compared to more than 13,000 kilowatt hours per capita per annum in 
the United States in the same year. Meanwhile, GDP growth in India outstripped that 
of the U.S. by 4 percentage points in the reported year. Table 3.1 presents indicators of 
the economic and energy conditions for selected countries in 2007. In the case of 
Nigeria, although economic growth has been more modest than in China, India, or in 
South Africa, energy supply has not kept up with rising demand associated with 
increased economic activity. For example, access to electricity remains severely 
limited with only about 40 percent of the (circa 120 million) population being 
connected to the national electricity grid (not shown in Table). Where customers are 
connected to the grid, frequent blackouts are the norm (ECN, 2003). As such, many 
residential and commercial consumers rely on alternative sources of electrical power 
and energy. 
 
 Table 3.1: Economy and energy indicators for selected countries in 2007 
 
 China India Nigeria 
South 
Africa 
United 
States  
GDP annual growth rate (%) 13 9 6 5 2  
GDP per capita (USD) 2,566 1,047 1,158 5,866 45,642  
Energy consumption per capita       
(million btu) 59 17 7 111 337  
Electricity consumption per capita         
(kWh) 2,150 505 134 4,447 13,023  
CO2 emissions per capita        
(metric tons) 4.74 1.23 0.72 9.59 19.93  
CO2 emissions per GDP  
(metric tons/’000 GDP)  2.20 2.44 5.39 2.16 1.53  
Source: Authors' calculations based on World Bank and EIA data 
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 Reports from recent surveys indicate that urban industries in Nigeria need to 
make up about 70 percent of their requirements for energy (heating and electricity) 
using customer-sited (privately-owned) diesel and gasoline generators.  The operating 
costs for this option are up to five times more than what would be incurred using grid 
electricity exclusively (Adenikinju, 2003).  Further, up to 80 percent of households’ 
cooking, heating and lighting energy needs in rural and urban households are fulfilled 
using wood, kerosene and other alternative fuels (ECN, 2006).  The uses of these 
unconventional power sources could have serious economic as well as environmental 
implications.4  Not unlike many other developing countries, environmental pollution 
in Nigeria may not seem to be a serious threat when measured using standard 
international measures such as total carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions.  Still, these 
levels could be considered high for the levels of economy output. For example, while 
the level of CO2 emissions per capita in Nigeria was less than a unit metric ton in 
2007, this level was more than twice (fourfold) that generated in South Africa (United 
States) on a national income basis (see Table 3.1).5 However, the need for increased 
productivity and rapid economic development cannot be over-emphasized and 
improved access and supply of electrical power has been touted as critical to 
sustaining this industrial competitiveness and economic growth in Nigeria (see World 
Bank, 2002; and IMF, 2008). 
 One obvious objective for energy planning in Nigeria is the expansion of the 
capacity for grid electricity generation, transmission and distribution.  Another goal is 
the diversification of the available energy resources.  Up to 68 percent of the installed 
electricity generating capacity in Nigeria is in natural gas facilities while 31 percent of 
                                                 
4 Fuel wood use increases emissions of harmful air particulates while the use of alternative power 
generators by households and businesses increases noise and air pollution levels.   
5 Productivity limitations rather than increased levels of particulate emissions from economic activity 
may drive these observations. 
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capacity is accounted for by hydroelectricity installations. Less than 1 percent of the 
installed capacity is for electricity generation from oil. However, the natural gas and 
hydro-facilities only account for, on average, 34 and 8 percent respectively, of the 
total energy produced in Nigeria. On the other hand, electricity generated from oil 
accounts for up to 58 percent of all energy consumed (EIA, 2007).  The statistics may 
point out a need to improve capacity utilization in gas and hydro-electric facilities, or 
expand the capacity and efficiency of electricity generation from oil, or both. 
 In an obvious response to the underutilization issues in thermal energy 
production, the government in its role as a petroleum industry regulator has applied 
policies that discourage natural gas flaring by oil-producing companies.6  Oil 
companies are instead encouraged to channel more of the natural gas produced in 
association with crude oil extraction to public energy utilities for electricity 
generation. There is also increased support in public and private stakeholder circles for 
the development of other alternative natural resources for electricity generation.  It is 
anticipated that much of the investment required for development projects in the 
energy sector would come from crude oil rents paid to the federation accounts.  
 The overall planning challenge for the energy sector in Nigeria can be 
identified as the need to integrate goals for energy sector efficiency with more 
economy-wide social and economic objectives.7  Specifically, there is a need for a 
planning model that incorporates government targets for energy security, electricity 
production and consumption efficiency, and sectoral productivity growth with the 
objectives of businesses and households.  We formulate within the framework of an 
intertemporal optimization model such a tool that is relevant for the Nigerian context. 
                                                 
6 While activities in the petroleum sector are often led by multi-national companies, the federal 
government takes on partnership, regulatory and supervisory roles.  
7 Energy policy goals for Nigeria are outlined in ECN (2003).  An abridged version is presented in the 
Appendix (3.A). 
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Review of the Relevant Literature 
 Intertemporal optimization models have been useful for analyzing economic 
growth and other issues of macroeconomic policy.  The theory of intertemporal 
planning has its foundations in work done by Ramsey (1928) on the optimal rates of 
savings and economic growth.  Assuming that the welfare of the economy can be 
characterized by an aggregate utility function, and making assumptions of an infinite 
time horizon, no technological change, constant population and constant capacities for 
‘enjoyment’ and ‘sacrifice’, and independence and aggregability of ‘enjoyment’ and 
‘sacrifice’ over time, Ramsey formulated the now well-known mathematical rule for 
investments/savings in an economy, as in equation (3.1)8: 
 
)()]()(([)())(),,((/ culVcUBtctltkftk     (3.1) 
 
where tk  /  is the rate of change in capital, k(t), over time, t; c(t) is defined as the 
total rate of consumption, and l(t) is the supply of labor.  Income in the economy is 
represented by f, a general function of available labor and capital. B represents the 
maximum obtainable rate of utility; U(c) is the total rate of utility of consumption; V(l) 
is the total rate of disutility of the labor rate, l(t); and u(c) is the change in total rate of 
utility as the consumption rate changes, ccU  /)( . Ramsey’s (1928) contributions 
have formed the basis for much of the later work.   
Other notable contributions have since been made to the literature on optimal 
savings and investments in an economy (see notes to Chapter 10 in Dasgupta and Heal 
(1979), and Part III of Turnovsky (2000) for an overview). For example, Hotelling in 
                                                 
8 In words, the rate of saving multiplied by the marginal utility of money is equal to the amount by 
which the total net rate of enjoyment of utility falls short of the maximum possible rate of enjoyment. 
157 
 
1931 applied similar mathematical techniques as in Ramsey (1928) to problems of 
depletion of resources in an economy.  
 However, the earlier models tended to ignore exhaustible resources in the 
technical possibilities of the economies under investigation.  Dasgupta and Heal 
(1974) addressed this problem in their work that explored the immediate consequences 
of incorporating the existence of exhaustible resources in intertemporal planning, 
investigating the determination of the optimal rates of depletion of exhaustible 
resources and of investments in the economy.  A major contribution of that work lies 
in its proposition that the substitution between reproducible capital and exhaustible 
resources is an important determinant of the characteristics of an optimal policy.9  By 
explicitly accounting for exhaustible resources in the long-term planning model, they 
more directly address planning issues that are critical to many resource-abundant (and 
often resource-dependent) economies.  In another study, Solow (1974) showed that the 
inclusion of the exhaustible resources component in the intertemporal planning models 
led to interesting results but did not significantly alter the basic theoretical principles. 
Much of the more recent work on economic planning in resource-abundant developing 
countries builds on the important contributions made by Dasgupta and Heal (1974), 
and Solow (1974).  
 Hartwick (1977) developed a rule for investing rents from non-renewable 
resources.  According to Hartwick’s calculations, an economy could sustain a maximal 
constant level of consumption through successive generations by investing all of the 
profits or rents accrued from exhaustible resources in reproducible capital, and by 
investing only this amount.  While this rule directly addresses ethical issues of 
intergenerational equity, it also has consequences for economic growth and 
development.  Sachs and Warner (1997) report high natural resource dependence as 
                                                 
9 This proposition lies at the heart of models of optimal long-term growth in resource-rich economies. 
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one of three major structural conditions that dampen economic growth in Sub-Saharan 
Africa and outline a need to better understand the growth experiences of the few 
successful resource-rich developing countries.  
 Hamilton, et. al., (2005) in a follow-up to the earlier work, tested the Hartwick 
(1977) rule using data on investments and rents from exhaustible resource extraction 
for 70 countries. They found that, in general, applying the standard rule as 
development policy would have been extreme. However, they show that resource-rich 
countries, by following an even moderate saving effort, could have substantially 
increased their wealth.  Of particular importance to our paper are the results form 
Hamilton, et. al., (2005) that show that Nigeria could have been five times as well off 
as it was in 2005, had it followed the Hartwick rule in the 30 years prior; and that oil 
would have played a much smaller role in the economy with likely beneficial impacts 
on the nonoil sectors.  The potential for oil-dependent economies to use oil rents for 
the development of other sectors in the context of an overall economic development 
framework remains of interest to researchers and planners alike.  However, the 
application of energy and economic planning models to Nigeria has not gone without 
its challenges.  
 Iwayemi in 1978 proposed the use of an investment planning model that used 
mixed integer programming methods to deal with investment resource allocation 
problems in the electricity sector in Nigeria.  Making alternative assumptions on 
energy costs, and introducing a spatial dimension that accounted for the regional 
location of plants and the transmission of energy, he obtained an optimal generating 
mix from a set of fossil fuel and conventional hydro-plants to meet demand projected 
over three decades. The proposed model provided important insights into the 
characterization of energy investment and supply in Nigeria.  However, Adamson in 
1978 pointed out that energy planning in Nigeria in the 1960’s and 1970’s had largely 
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ignored econometric forecasting models because, amongst other reasons, issues of 
data unavailability and inaccuracy rendered the models inapplicable to practical uses.  
Although, as suggested by Adamson, input-output and mathematical programming 
models fared better given (the effects of) the paucity of accurate data, these models in 
themselves were not unaffected by the challenges experienced with using econometric 
forecasting models in the peculiar planning environment.  Other authors have 
proposed the use of multi-criteria programming methods for allocating energy 
resources among competing sectors of the economy.  In particular, optimization 
models developed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have gained 
popularity in recent years (see ECN (2006)).   
 The older models for energy planning in Nigeria (e.g., Iwayemi, 1978) and the 
more recent modeling approaches (e.g., the IAEA models adopted for use in Nigeria), 
whilst providing important insights on the characterization of electricity demand and 
supply in Nigeria, may have considered the energy sector almost in isolation, largely 
ignoring important feedback with other sectors of the economy. 
 The present research departs from the earlier work by integrating established 
tools from natural resource economics into a framework of intertemporally optimizing 
representative agents from the macroeconomics literature.  Further, following dynamic 
game theory, the present research more completely characterizes the planning 
environment of interest by modeling the strategic pursuit of goals by several agents in 
the resource-rich economy.   
 
The Intertemporal Optimization Model 
 Our formulation of the energy planning model represents a practical 
compromise between introducing sufficient detail to capture the stylized facts of the 
energy sector and economy in Nigeria and accommodating limitations that exist in the 
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data.  We specify the behavior of intertemporally optimizing representative agents in 
the manner presented in Turnovsky (2000).  In line with a time-dependent 
macroeconomic system, the model is formulated in continuous time.  The model 
characterizes the behaviors of five different agents representing the government, 
publicly owned energy producers, multi-national companies involved in oil 
production, privately-owned local firms and households.10  Following the set-up of an 
open-loop noncooperative (Nash) differential game, we assume that each agent takes 
the optimizing behaviors of the other agents as given in making her own decisions.  
Figure 3.1 depicts the representative agents specified in our model of the economy and 
demonstrates how analytical tools are integrated from related disciplines in economics.  
 While the interaction of the agents is depicted within a macro environment, 
micro- and institutional foundations underlie the individual sectoral specifications of 
the model.  For example, microeconomic theory informs the characterization of the 
relevant producer and consumer decisions.  The institutional structure of the Nigerian 
public sector informs our definition of the government agent behavioral function. 
Further, we incorporate the Pindyck (1978) model of the optimal exploration and 
production of nonrenewable resources in the natural resource management component 
of the economy to account for the activities of the oil industry.  
 In developing the economy-wide modeling framework, we have found 
persuasive arguments by Wymer (1993, 1997) for specifying and estimating macro-
dynamic models as nonlinear stochastic differential equation systems.  Wymer (1993) 
argues that small, highly aggregated models of this type, based on sound theoretical 
foundations, can account for a broad range of macroeconomic activity while 
remaining amenable to mathematical and statistical analysis.   
                                                 
10 The optimization problems of energy utilities and firms are given a static cast.  This specification of 
these agents’ decision behaviors is consistent with the two agents’ not making choices affecting capital 
stocks; it also improves mathematical tractability of the model’.  
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 In the spirit of this tradition of research in macro-dynamic modeling, we 
assume that the relevant macroeconomic activities in Nigeria can be characterized by a 
stochastic nonlinear differential equation system representing the behavior of five 
representative agents. 
 
 
  
 
Figure 3.1: Representative agents in model of the economy and integration of 
analytical tools from related economics disciplines 
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Model Specification 
 We derive the equations specifying the model for the economy as the set of 
optimizing conditions for the stated objectives and technological and resource 
constraints faced by the representative agents.  In our abstraction of the economy, a 
government agent owns capital, receives oil rents from the activities of foreign-owned 
oil companies and raises revenues from taxes on household income and the 
consumption of local and foreign goods and services.  The government agent invests 
in the development of agricultural and human capital and is an investor in the energy 
sector, choosing its level of capital to fund electricity production.  The representative 
agent for the petroleum sector is involved in oil and gas exploration and production.  
The electric utility agent uses natural gas generated by activities in the oil sector, along 
with labor and capital, as inputs in electricity production.  The electricity utility in 
Nigeria is currently undergoing a deregulatory process where the government-owned 
establishment maintains responsibility for electricity generation while offering 
opportunities to local private firms to bid for the rights to operate transmission and 
distribution activities.  We ignore this level of detail of industry operation in the 
current specification and assume that the single utility entity operates all aspects of 
electricity supply to firms and households.  The household agent makes decisions on 
her consumption of energy and other local and imported goods.  She invests in 
corporate bonds and foreign assets and derives income from interests accrued on these 
assets. The representative agent for the private local firm uses labor, electricity and 
capital inputs to produce output in the economy.  
 We next present the decision problems of the individual agents in some detail.  
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Government 
 The representative agent for the government chooses government consumption 
and investments in physical and human capital to minimize a weighted sum of 
deviations from policy targets for welfare and capital, subject to an intertemporal 
budget constraint.  The objective functional and constraints are as in equations (3.2) 
through (3.9). 
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where the government agent chooses Ianr, Isc, and Io—her levels of investments in 
agriculture, social and community services, and other economic services—and ODg, 
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her levels of recurrent expenditure on goods and services.11  Kanr is the accumulation 
of government capital in agriculture and can capture attempts to diversify the economy 
through investments in a non-oil sector with export potential.  Ksc is capital 
accumulation in social and community services, a representation of development 
spending on human capital, and Ko is the capital accumulation in physical assets, 
including electricity generation capacity.  Capital investments are assumed to be net of 
depreciation and equations (3.4) to (3.6) define physical constraints on net 
accumulation of human and physical capital.  Ksc and Ko enter into the government 
objective function through   and ngE , endogenous levels of welfare and electricity 
power generation, respectively.    is a mathematical expression transforming (the 
proportions of) social and physical capital, the levels of per capita national income and 
the amount of government recurrent spending into a measurable index of social 
welfare.  (See equation 3.7.)  It can be directly affected by the government agent.  On 
the other hand, ngE , the value of electricity generated by the public utility, is not 
endogenous to the government agent’s optimization problem as it is determined in the 
optimization problem of the utility agent (discussed below).  However, government 
investment in the public utility, Ko, is important in electricity generation in the utility.  
Kanr0 is a specified target level of capital accumulation in agriculture, while  0 
and ngE0  are corresponding target levels for welfare and energy development that are a 
function of government spending on social and other services and capital investment 
in the energy sector.  As shown in equation (3.7),   is also influenced by the levels of 
other variables not directly controlled by the government agent. Kf is the level of 
investments that households make in private (non-oil) local firms. Y is national 
income, defined as the value of gross domestic production (GDP), while Yf  is the 
                                                 
11 Education, health and housing make up community and social services provided by the government.  
Other economic services include energy, water resources, construction, and transport and 
communication. 
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value of the net domestic output from the production function of the non-oil private 
firm (defined later for the local private firm), and pop denotes total population.  The 
government seeks to minimize the period-to-period deviations from the target 
investment and social welfare levels.  
  In the intertemporal budget constraint specified in equation (3.3), the 
government expends income on capital (Ianr, Isc and Io) and recurrent (ODg) projects. 
Costs of adjustments are imposed on period-to-period changes in the levels of physical 
stock and are assumed to be quadratic12.  The adjustment costs serve two major 
purposes in the model.  One, they impose a penalty on model solutions that represent 
substantial deviations in new investments from stable or long-term equilibrium path 
levels. Second, by introducing quadratic terms in investment costs, they ensure that the 
relevant control variables do not vanish from the equations that characterize an 
optimal solution to the agent’s problem.  (See an application in Donaghy et al., 1999).  
 The government receives oil revenues, orev, from the multinationals; and 
taxes, arev, from households and non-oil firms.  Oil revenues accruing to the federal 
government accounts are paid as a fixed proportion of the net proceeds from oil 
production (and exports), which are a function of the levels of oil production. Oil 
exploration and production in turn are set by the multinational (oil) company so that 
orev is taken as given in the set of equations for the government agent. g is the 
proportion of government income from oil revenues that is retained for government 
spending.  This parameter has a value of one when there are no direct transfers of oil 
rents to citizens.  Non-oil income (as shown in equation 3.9) includes taxes paid by 
households on local and foreign goods and on interests charged on assets held abroad. 
c and y are consumption and income taxes, respectively. The government also sells 
                                                 
12 The relevant quadratic function is )2/0.1(2/)( 2, xxxxxxxxxxx KIaIKIaIKIf  , 
where x represents the three forms of capital spending by the government, and a is the adjustment 
parameter associated with x.  
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bonds, B, to raise government capital (Equation 3.3). r is the discount rate in the 
economy and the rate charged on holdings of bonds.  
MGS is the sum of imports of goods and services while Y enters into the 
equations in the model as the sum of the economy’s activities (equation 3.8). C is the 
sum of household expenditures on local goods and services. The value of aggregate 
exports from all sectors is a function of X0, the value of crude oil exports.13  On 
average, ninety-five percent of the oil produced in the country is exported and oil 
exports historically account for ninety-five percent of all exports (EIU, various issues). 
If is the level of new investments in local (non-oil) private businesses, determined by 
the household agent; and DV is the change in the level of inventoried goods. All value 
terms are in naira, the local currency. 
 The model parameters 1g , 2g and 3g are policy weights on the accumulation 
of the three types of capital. These should be determined empirically in the model, as 
should be 1, 2, and 3, the time-dependent compounding factors assumed for the 
target capital accumulation, and w , 1 , and 2 , the policy weights for the welfare 
variable (see equation 3.7) . The first-order necessary conditions for an optimal 
solution to the government agent intertemporal problem are presented in Appendix 
(3.B.1). 
 
Multinational Oil Firm 
 Following  Pindyck (1978), oil and gas firms are assumed to choose levels of 
exploratory and production activities. The firm seeks to maximize net revenues subject 
to cost relationships and restrictions on technology. We assume that the firm is able to 
augment its reserves at a rate that exceeds depletion of the resource in the short run.  
                                                 
13 Xo = P*Q, where P is defined as the real unit price of oil in Nigeria and is given by a price-dependent 
demand function, P = ( Qba  ), where a and b are parameters of the price equation and Q is the 
quantity of oil produced, as defined for the oil firm agent. 
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The aggregate output from the oil industry activities is exported or sold locally14. We 
specify the optimization problem of the firm as in equations (3.10) to (3.12): 
 
Max   dtnWmQRcoQbQae ti )()/()(     (3.10) 
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where Q is the level of production activity; W is the level of exploratory activity (wells 
drilled); R is the known level of reserves of the resource and X is the cumulative 
addition of known reserves.  The first term in the objective function, i.e., QbQa  )(  
in equation (3.10) is the sum of gross revenues received by the oil firm, while (co / R) 
and (m + nW) are the extraction and discovery cost functions respectively.  An average 
(annual) producer price of oil is endogenously determined for Nigeria and is specified 
in equation (3.10) as )( bQa  .  
The change in the levels of cumulative additions to known reserves is defined 
in equation (3.11) as ,uXso eWr
 the discovery rate function.  The discovery rate 
declines as exploration and discovery proceed over time; i.e., it becomes more and 
more difficult to make new discoveries (Pindyck, 1978).  The parameters in the 
objective function, a, b, co, m, and n, are estimated from time-series data, as are the 
parameters from the discovery rate function, ro, u and s.  The parameterization of the 
Pindyck model is such that the price of oil decreases as supplies increase, for positive 
values of the parameter b, and the average cost of production increases—for positive 
values for co and n—as the proven reserve base is depleted, while exploratory costs 
                                                 
14 Non-export sales include supply of crude oil to local refineries and of oil and gas to power stations. 
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increase with exploration.15  First-order necessary conditions for the oil firm 
optimization problem are given in the Appendix (3.B.2). 
 
Electric Utility 
 The electrical utility manager chooses the overall level of electricity 
generation, and levels of capacity utilization and natural gas and labor inputs to 
minimize costs, subject to technology and supply. We specify the optimization 
problem of the utility agent as in equation (3.13): 
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where the utility manager operates thermal and hydro-electricity plants. She chooses 
Lu and NGu, the levels of labor and natural gas inputs to use, and Eu, the amount of 
electricity produced.  She also determines the levels of utilization of installed capacity 
(CAPUu), while ucc and Ko are exogenously determined levels of user cost and 
investments in electric power capacity, respectively. Output of electricity in the 
thermal plants, nguE is represented by the Cobb-Douglas technology function defined 
in equation (3.13) so that k1 , k2  and k3 , the relevant production coefficients on 
natural gas, labor and capital inputs, sum to one. Additional electricity from hydro-
resource units, huE , is assumed to be a fixed proportion of electricity produced in units 
                                                 
15Production costs increase as the proven reserve base is depleted to represent the increasing marginal 
costs of making new discoveries over time.  
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using thermal energy.16  A final technical restriction on the utility’s optimization 
problem is that the total grid electricity consumed by the public and private consumers 
does not exceed electricity produced by thermal- and hydro- stations.  Ef, Eh and Eg in 
equation (3.15) represent electricity consumption by the government, residences and 
private firms. We present the first order conditions for the electric utility in the 
Appendix (3.B.3).  
  
Households 
 In this model, residents are assumed to own all local and foreign capital used in 
production by firms.  The household agent chooses levels of her consumption of 
energy and other goods and her levels of capital formation.  The household objective 
is specified as an iso-elastic intertemporal utility function as in equation (3.16).  
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where the consumer chooses C, her aggregate level of goods consumed and hE , her 
total household energy consumption in value terms.  She also chooses If, her levels of 
investment in local private (non-oil) firms. The constraint on household spending is 
specified in equation (3.17).  nfa denotes net foreign assets and is in form of foreign 
                                                 
16 Huge capital outlays for expansion projects and natural constraints on input availability make the 
year-to-year responses to energy demand more difficult to model in hydroelectricity facilities. 
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bonds held.  y and c are taxes imposed on income and consumption while r denotes 
the rate of returns on foreign capital. The household agent receives a direct public fund 
allocation or income transfers in form of a fixed percentage ( h ) of government 
revenues from the oil companies, orev. Y is gross domestic production and is 
determined in the model as firms’ output so that it enters into the household 
optimization problem as an exogenous variable; MGS is the aggregate value of 
imports of goods and services, chosen by the households. As in the government agent 
optimization problem, quadratic costs of adjustments are imposed on changes to levels 
of capital owned by households—i.e. )21( 1 ff KI in equation 3.17. Equation (3.18) 
denotes the physical constraint on the formation of household capital in firms. The 
relevant first-order conditions for optimization are presented in appendix (3.B.4). 
 
Local Private Firms 
 The representative agent for firms chooses levels of capacity utilization and 
energy and labor inputs to maximize net revenues, subject to expected output demand 
and technology constraints. The optimization problem of the firm is presented in 
Equations (3.19) through (3.21). 
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where Lf is the firm’s total demand for labor; Ef is energy consumed by the firm and 
CAPUf is the level of utilization of installed capacity, Kf.  Net revenue for the firm is 
the value of its total production less the costs for labor, energy and capital inputs. Wf 
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denotes the unit wage rate; Pe is the price paid per unit of electricity consumed in 
production and ucc is the user cost of capital.  The firm’s output, Yf , is produced 
following a Cobb-Douglas production function with energy, labor and capital as 
inputs.  Further, taxes, gg may be paid to the government on taxable levels of 
greenhouse gas emissions, GGf .  Finally, the level of greenhouse gas emissions 
resulting from the firm’s production could be modeled as a function of the level of 
energy used as in equation (3.21).  A negative value for gg, the exponential factor in 
the greenhouse gas emissions equation could indicate, for example, a decrease in the 
ratios of emissions from energy inputs over time as ‘cleaner’ production technologies, 
are developed.17  The relevant first-order conditions for optimization are presented in 
appendix (3.B.5).  
 
Estimation of the Model 
 To employ the model specified above in simulation exercises, its parameters 
must be calibrated.  Estimates of the parameters can be obtained by following 
Wymer’s approach to estimating continuous-time models of intertemporally 
optimizing agents from discrete observations (Wymer, 1993, 1997; Donaghy and 
Wymer, 2011).  According to this approach, a full-information maximum likelihood 
technique is employed, enabling algebraic restrictions on the coefficients of the model 
to be directly imposed during estimation.  Once parameter estimates have been 
obtained, the qualitative properties of the model can be examined and alternative 
policy experiments conducted.  This approach has been applied in other empirical 
settings (e.g. bi-lateral trade in Donaghy et. al., 1999 and environmental policy in 
Balta-Ozkan, et. al., 2007). 
                                                 
17 The emissions tax function is only included in this specification to demonstrate the possibility for 
testing a government policy on emissions levels. Throughout, we assume zero taxes on greenhouse gas 
emissions in our model estimation and simulation exercises, ie., gg fGG   = 0. 
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 An important feature of this approach is that the intertemporal optimization 
assumption of the representative agent is directly incorporated in the estimation 
algorithm (Wymer, 1997).  The state and co-state equations characterizing a macro-
dynamic equilibrium solution are solved such that relevant initial-value and 
transversality conditions are met that account for the effects of changes in resource 
endowments on the objective functional at every data point.  As in Donaghy, et. al. 
(1999) and Balta-Ozkan, et al. (2007), estimation of the macro-dynamic model can 
directly incorporate the assumptions made of the representative agents into a three-
step recursive solution procedure.  In the first step, a set of ‘observations’ is generated 
on the unobserved variables and transversality conditions.  For the first iteration, this 
generation of observations may be done by incorporating a set of plausible values of 
parameters – e.g., from theory – into numerical simulations. In the second-step, a 
variable-step, variable-order Adams method is used to solve intertemporal 
optimization problem characterized by the equilibrium conditions for each of the data 
points, given reasonable assumptions on parameter estimates and on the initial values 
of state and control variables.  Relevant boundary point conditions are imposed on the 
state and co-state (unobserved) variables.  The solution of the model must converge at 
every observation.  The solutions for the unobserved variables are updated at every 
data point.  For the variables for which historical series are available, the dynamic 
solution values are compared with the observed values. A variance-covariance matrix 
is formed (from the computed residuals).  In the third-step, parameter estimates are 
then chosen to minimize the natural logarithm of the variance-covariance matrix by a 
quasi-Newton method.  Parameter estimates employed in the first step are then 
updated. The solutions to the model for the specified time horizon are checked for 
convergence. Steps one through three are repeated if relevant convergence criteria are 
not met. 
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Application to the Empirical Setting 
 We have not yet been able to implement estimation of the full model as 
outlined above, but we have been able to estimate blocs of equations corresponding to 
the different representative agents.  Blocs of equations were estimated with 
continuous-time methods with annual country-level data from 1980 to 2006.  This 
length of the series represents the years for which we could obtain reasonably 
complete data to account for the representative agents’ optimization problems 
specified for the macro-dynamic system. The time series that include data on income, 
production, consumption, investment and energy were obtained from publications of 
the Energy Commission of Nigeria and from various independent local and 
international data sources.18  Table 3.2 presents a summary of selected series in our 
sample of 26 annual observations.  
 The selected period saw an increase in annual crude oil production from an 
average of about 540 million barrels in the 1980s to more than 800 million barrels on 
average, in the last decade for which data were available. As shown in Table 3.2, oil 
production peaked at 960 million barrels a year (in 2005). Crude petroleum revenues 
dominated all payments accruing to the government throughout, ranging from 64 to 86 
percent of annual government income. Further, crude oil accounted on average for 95 
percent of the value of all exports through the years (not shown in Table).  The 
country’s gross domestic production increased 206 percent in real value terms over the 
period of our sample series while the increase in installed capacity for electricity 
generation was more modest (170 percent).  Total annual electricity consumption by 
the residences was 243 megawatt hours in 1980 and up to 1,195 megawatt hours by 
2005, an increase in energy use over time that may depict growth in such factors as 
                                                 
18 See Appendix C for a list of the data series as well as their descriptions, sources and modifications 
employed for the purpose of this research. 
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population, income, installed capacity and generation of electricity.  Electricity 
consumption by firms similarly went up in the selected years.  We find in the data that 
the capacity utilization in firms dropped from more than 70 percent in the early 1980s 
to about 44 percent on average in the last ten years, and 29 percent in 1995.19  Time 
series of currency values were standardized to year 2000 values using the GDP 
deflator.20   
 The data for Nigeria posed significant challenges with respect to availability 
and quality.  The periods for which data were available also may have been marked 
significantly with external and internal shocks that did not lend it readily to formal 
representation.  For example, year-to-year inflation rates of up to 74 percent in the 
mid-1990s drove close to zero, the real values for some important variables such as 
wages received in the firm and utility sectors.  As such, the potential for characterizing 
input demand in these sectors may have been seriously compromised. 
 
Initial Model Experimentation and Simulation 
 To address issues of data unavailability and inaccuracy in the current modeling 
exercise, necessary simplifications were made to the original specification of the 
model.  The most important of which was that the level of government recurrent 
expenditures less repayments of debt was defined exogenously (i.e., ODg in the set of 
government equations).  
                                                 
19 Adenikinju (2003) reports that 61 percent of firm respondents in a 1998 nationwide survey estimated 
that power outages led to drops in their capacity utilization, of 10 to 50 percent.   
20 The TRANSF program in Wymer’s suite of mathematical programs was used to prepare data for 
estimation.  
  
 
Table 3.2: Summary statistics for selected Nigeria data series, 1980 – 20051 
  
            Standard 
Series Unit and Scale2 Minimum Maximum Median Mean Deviation
Gross Domestic Product Billions, Naira 4,815.14 14,735.30 7,161.27 7,685.15 2,701.57 
Government Recurrent Expenditure Billions, Naira 184.36 1,117.73 456.75 558.69 257.95 
Household Expenditure Billions, Naira 3,415.93 8,716.88 4,265.13 4,957.76 1,666.61 
Government Capital Expenditure:        
   Agriculture and Other Non-Oil Billions, Naira 5.68 92.24 20.50 34.17 28.40 
   Education and Social Services Billions, Naira 17.99 302.55 51.28 64.07 56.79 
   Energy and Utilities Billions, Naira 8.46 802.28 149.09 212.96 212.22 
Crude Oil Production Millions, Barrels 452.97 959.02 712.30 682.22 136.23 
Revenues from Oil Production Billions, Naira 599.21 4,762.40 1,165.34 1,623.47 1,084.03 
Revenues from Non-Oil & Taxes Billions, Naira 225.90 918.94 395.06 460.19 198.56 
Electricity:       
   Installed Capacity of Utilities MegaWatts 2,419.90 6,538.30 6,268.30 5,438.55 1,302.26 
   Generation MegaWatt Hours 815.10 2,779.30 1,672.85 1,620.13 521.40 
   Consumption (Households) MegaWatt Hours 194.17 1,195.13 490.66 526.70 216.11 
   Consumption (Firms) MegaWatt Hours 120.91 398.23 236.39 235.58 52.00 
Capacity Utilization of Firms Percent 29.30 73.30 40.35 42.94 11.25 
1 Various sources. See References for Appendix 3. 
2 Money values deflated using gross domestic product deflator. 2005 = 1. 
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The optimization problem of the government agent (i.e., equations 3.2 - 3.9) is 
re-stated as in equations (3.22) to equation (3.30) to reflect this change. 
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where g  is a given starting value for government recurrent spending, ODg, that 
represents government recurrent expenditures (less debt repayment) in period (t = 0); 
and odg  is the assumed (average) growth rate of government spending over the 
relevant period, t.  All other variables and parameters in the government bloc are re- 
stated as in equations (3.2) – (3.9).  
177 
 We present the relevant parameters obtained from estimating the oil firm, 
utility and firm agents’ modules in Table 3.3. Variables occurring as non-endogenous 
(i.e., variables other than the control) in any agent’s optimization problem were 
modeled as forcing functions of time, with the forcing functions being estimated 
outside of the structural modules so that the resultant coefficients were independent of 
the parameters of the dynamic model of interacting agents (as in Balta-Ozkan, et. al., 
2007).21 
 
Model Simulation Exercise 
 Table 3.3 presents the parameters used in the simulation of the full model.  
These parameter values were either obtained from estimations of the independent 
agent blocs using available data (i.e., for the oil, local non-oil and energy utility firm 
modules) or deduced from the literature and following historical trends (i.e., for the 
government and household agents).  These parameter values and given values of 
control and state variables were used to structure the simulation exercise with the full 
model.  The calibrated zero- and first-order conditions of the optimization problems 
for the five agents were solved subject to boundary conditions over a relevant time 
horizon as a nonlinear system of simultaneous equations (see Appendix 3.B).  The 
time-path solutions of the variables indicate how the economy might evolve, given the 
interrelationships between the agents.  It is important to emphasize here that the 
solution of the current simulation exercise only represents possible future outcomes, 
given the model capturing of the historical trend.  The values are not a prediction of 
future economic conditions. 
   
                                                 
21 Forcing functions of time for the exogenous variables were estimated using the non-linear FIML 
estimation program ASIMUL and the blocs of equations corresponding to the different representative 
agents were estimated in ESCONA. 
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Table 3.3: Parameters of the modules for the Intertemporally 
 Optimizing Agent Behaviors1 
 
Parameter 
 
Value 
 
Parameter 
 
Value 
Government Agent: Oil Firm Agent: 
a1 8.00 a 2.688 
a2 20.00 b 1.655 
a3 100.00 co 3.595 
1  0.75 m -0.005 
2  0.25 ro 0.363 
g  0.03 s 0.500 
t1  0.02 u 0.003 
t2  0.02 n 0.0087 
t3  0.02 o  0.018 
ODg  0.03   
1g  1.00 Private Firm Agent: 
2g  1.00 f1  0.56 
3g  1.00 f2  0.30 
g  0.96 f3  0.10 
c  0.06 f4  0.04 
y  0.12 f  2.16 
w  1.1 f  0.02 
    
Household Agent: Energy Utility Agent: 
h  0.03 u1  0.16 
1  0.22 u2  0.33 
2  0.09 u3  0.51 
h  0.04 u  1.80 
  10.00 u  0.02   -0.10   
 
Following the evidence from the available data, the tax rates on consumption 
and income (i.e., c and y ) were set at 6 and 12 percent, respectively. The assumed 
values for the adjustment costs on investment variables (i.e., , a1, a2 and a3) were 
modified for the current exercise from upper bounds used in Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1995). Following the historical trend, real interest rate in the economy was pegged at 
3 percent over the period for which the economy was simulated. 
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The parameters on the proportions of government oil revenues retained by the 
government or allocated to residents (i.e., g and h , respectively) denote a baseline 
agreement for oil revenue sharing in Nigeria. The parameters for government policy 
weights on capital accumulation (i.e, 1g , 2g  and 3g ) were arbitrarily set to 1.0, 
denoting equivalent importance for the types of capital. Other plausible values were 
derived from the data (e.g., 1 and 2 ) and from expert opinion (e.g., g and h ). 
 Starting values for the unobserved variables in the model are presented in 
Table 3.4. 
 
Table 3.4: Values for Unobserved Model Variables 
 
 
Variable Starting values defined for 
 t = 0 t = 60 
  -0.001 Undefined 
  -7.1 Undefined 
1  -0.02 0.0 
2  0.18 0.0 
  -0.0003 Undefined 
qganr  10.49 Undefined 
qgsc  3.0 Undefined 
qgo  22.8 Undefined 
 
 Next, we present in Table 3.5, the initial values for observed variables in the 
intertemporal optimization model. This set of values represents the values observed 
for a single observation of data. Typically, a data point (i.e., time, t) is chosen that is a 
viable candidate for a long-term equilibrium. This could be a period in the series for 
which important variables are somewhat stable from year to year. For our modeling 
purposes, starting values for the observed variables were chosen for year 1995 of the 
26 years (1980 – 2005) of available time series data.  
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Table 3.5: Initial Values of Observed Model Variables 
 
 
Variable Description (Unit)1 Value at t = 0 
B Government debt  1.411 
C Household consumption 2.548 
Ianr Change in capital stock in agriculture -0.900 
If Change in capital stock in firms 0.100 
Io Change in capital stock in utilities 0.200 
Isc Change in human capital investment 0.100 
Kanr Capital in agriculture 0.665 
Kf Capital in firms 6.816 
Ko Capital in utilities 2.938 
Ksc Capital in human development 0.889 
MGS Consumption of foreign goods 0.500 
Nfa Net foreign assets 0.071 
ODg Government recurrent expenditure 0.200 
P Price of oil (Naira)2  1.600 
Q Quantity of oil produced 0.700 
R Proven reserves of oil 17.900 
W Number of oil wells drilled 7.200 
X Cumulative additions of reserves 26.789 
Y Economy output 3.000 
Ypf Output from local nonoil firms 3.000 
1 Variable units are as reported in Table A.3 in the appendix; and are scaled 
  as reported here for standardization of units in the model. 
2 Assuming 1995 real price and constant rice of USD 80 per barrel. 
 
Results from the Initial Model Experimentation  
 The simplified model of the intertemporally optimizing agents was solved for a 
time horizon of 60 years from the initial period (t = 0).  This length of time is 
considerable, given the level of complexity of agent and variable interactions in the 
model, and is consistent with the long-term window typically adopted for oil resource 
and development planning.22  Relevant variables were relatively stable over the 
simulated period with immediate results indicating high importance of the household 
and government budget equations, both of which were defined as linear identities of 
                                                 
22 However, the initial root mean squared error (0.206325) indicates room for improvement in the 
model fit to the generated data. 
181 
the agent’s incomes and expenditures. The model’s solution provides some 
information on such policy questions as the optimal rates of oil extraction and 
exploration in Nigeria. The results are for a baseline measure of direct oil wealth 
transfers to households and track investments in other (non-oil) sectors. 
 While no formal sensitivity analysis has been conducted at this stage of model 
development, the current specification of optimality conditions depicting relevant 
agent interactions was found to respond significantly to adjustment costs on 
investments. The solution paths of key variables are summarized below. 
  
Optimal Oil Extraction and Exploration Rates 
 The model’s determination of optimal production and drilling rates for the oil 
resource in Nigeria are presented in Figure 3.2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Optimal Crude Oil Production and Exploration: 60-Year Simulations 
  
Based on the properties of the Nigerian economy as represented by the 
simplified optimization model, the year-to-year increase is expected to dampen over 
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the simulation period while oil production increases.  In particular, crude petroleum  
production increases every year by about 0.25 percent in the initial years of the 
simulation but this rate tapers to 0.05 percent on average in the last decade of the 
simulations (i.e. from years 50 through 60). In level terms, crude oil production starts 
out at over 699 million barrels annually (approximately 1,916 thousand barrels per 
day) in the initial time and rises roughly 5 percent over the forecast period, to about 
2,018 thousand barrels a day by end of period. New oil drilling on the other hand is 
expected to fall rapidly. The results suggest that oil exploration would fall from a peak 
drilling rate at the start of the forecasts of around 100 new wells a year, to a new well 
being drilled every other year, in the terminal simulation period.  
Crude petroleum prices move in the opposite direction of production so that 
the real price of oil decreases as an exponential function of time as output levels 
increase. Oil revenues in addition are sensitive to production and rise with increasing 
production (see Figure 3.3).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Oil Revenues and Real Prices of Oil: 60-Year Simulations 
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However, price reductions become sufficiently large as to counter the rise in 
income (following increased production), so that oil revenues dip at the end of the 
forecast period. The projected movements in oil prices and revenues are depicted in 
Figure 3.3. Oil revenues rise by up to 10.2 percent (from about 1,420 million local 
currency in real value) to the period (t = 48), after which revenues fall by up to 3.3 
percent by the end of the forecast period. Oil prices on the other hand record a four 
percent increase through the period.  
 
Output in Economy 
From the solutions to the optimization model of the Nigerian economy, 
economic output increases substantially over the simulation period (see Figure 3.4). 
Output follows an increasing growth pattern almost throughout with an average 
growth rate of about 4.5 percent per year.23 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Level and Per Capita Output of Nigeria Economy: 60-Year Simulations 
                                                 
23 Real GDP levels rise by 4.5 percent on average for over 5 decades, then drop by about 3 percent per 
annum on average over the last four years of simulations. 
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The intertemporal model solutions suggest an almost ten-fold increase in 
output by the end of the period. When compared with the expected growth in 
population, the increased output seems to pass on to improvements in the welfare of 
residents. An annual growth in population of 1.5 percent (based on United Nations 
projections) is accompanied by per-capita output increases of up to 2.4 percent per 
year on average over the simulations. However, the income per head falls by an 
average of 4 percent from year-to-year for the last five years of the simulations. This is 
consistent with the decreases in output observed for the overall output levels over the 
same period (see Figure 3.4). 
 
Investment by the Government 
In addition to the oil industry and general economy, important results come out 
of the government agent model. The levels of government investment in agriculture 
and human capital development are presented in Figure 3.5.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Investment in Agriculture and Human Capital: 60-Year Simulations 
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The level of capital spending in social and community services increases 
throughout, but at a decreasing rate, i.e., as more and more social capital is 
accumulated, the rates of new investments in this form of development are reduced. 
On the other hand, investments in agriculture and natural resources are almost level 
for a period, falling significantly several years into the future. This could suggest that, 
given the starting assumptions of the current model, increased government investment 
in the agricultural sector may not provide optimal use of limited public resources. 
More detailed modeling of the economy is however required to reach a more 
substantive conclusion on the prospects (or constraints) in general of directly 
transferring public funds into sectors of the economy to boost market-led economic 
growth. 
The model solutions in addition provide information on the government agent 
investment in the public energy utility. The level of government investment in energy 
utilities is shown in Figure 3.6. According to our model solutions, investments in 
electricity production increase following an exponential function for more than a 
quarter of the simulation period, then declines at a more significant rate.24 
 The energy investment growth rates may not be inconsistent with huge lump 
investment patterns traditionally observed in the energy industry, particularly in 
developing regions such as Nigeria. The production of electricity associated with the 
levels of government investment in the industry as shown in Figure 3.6, is represented 
in Figure 3.7 below.  
According to the model solutions, electricity production and consumption (not 
shown in figure) increase over time. While production declines at the end of the 
simulation period, it is still significantly higher than the unit level of electricity 
                                                 
24The late decline is most likely an artifact of the transversality condition on the capital stock of the 
energy utility.  
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produced in the initial year of the energy projections. This solution might underscore 
the need for improved electricity supply to support national economic development. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6: Investment in Electrical Utilities: 60-Year Simulations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.7: Electricity Production Per Capita: 60-Year Simulations 
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Household Consumption and Investment 
Households in the optimization model respond to the improved levels of output 
and other economic conditions with increased spending on local and imported goods 
(see Figure 3.8).  The year-to-year adjustments indicate monotonic changes that cause 
consumption to rise by about 32 percent through the end of the projections. 
Expenditures on local goods and services (including energy) increase at a faster rate 
than consumption of imports (see Figure 3.8). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.8: Households Consumption of Goods: 60-Year Simulations 
 
Further, according to the model output, households increase their investments 
in local private firms through time (Figure 3.9).  As shown in Figure 3.9, investments 
increase (or disinvestments decrease) from a period of no new investments in the local 
firm, to a relatively lengthy period of stable investment rates and finally, positive and 
increasing capital spending in local industry at the end of the model projections.  The 
model solutions thus indicate increased transfers of household wealth into firm 
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production in the latter years, consistent with increased production (and consumption) 
of locally- produced goods in the economy (refer to Figure 3.8). 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.9: Household Investment in Firms: 60-Year Simulations 
 
The solution paths of these variables further suggest that much of the increase 
in national income is transferred into ownership of foreign assets.  (See Figure 3.10.)   
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.10: Net Foreign Asset Ownership: 60-Year Simulations 
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  The model solution is sufficiently interesting to suggest continued 
development of models of this nature.  As pointed out earlier, however, data and 
related challenges limit the immediate application of the current results to direct policy 
interpretation.   
 
Summary of Results and Implications 
 The current research set out to apply recent developments in macro-dynamic 
modeling techniques to an energy-economy planning problem in Nigeria. The 
specification of the model of the economy accounted for the dependence of the 
economy on crude petroleum, a nonrenewable natural resource, and outlined 
intertemporal optimization objectives of distinct economic agents. The model 
specification allowed for the transfer of the wealth accrued from oil exports into 
capital expenditures on three major types of investments representing the government 
objectives for economic diversification (or the development of an alternative industry 
to oil export earnings); human capital; and local energy development. It also allowed 
for households to make investments in a local non-oil production or manufacturing 
sector and accounted for activities in a publicly-held energy utility. Components of the 
intertemporal optimization model were estimated for each of the economic agents to 
obtain model parameter values for a forecasting exercise. Plausible estimates were 
obtained for other parameters and unobserved variables from the literature.  In 
addition, initial values of the observed variables were obtained from available data 
series using regression and similar techniques. Solutions to the model provided 
indicators on the optimal production and exploration rates for crude petroleum in 
Nigeria that are useful from a planning perspective. The solutions also suggest 
important information for investment in the various types of capital useful for socio-
economic development. 
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Oil production increased over a 60-year planning horizon although year-to-
year increases in production were observed to fall slowly. Optimal oil exploration 
rates declined at a much faster rate, decreasing to almost no new wells being 
developed at the end of the forecast period. Projections of oil prices showed expected 
declines in the future as optimal production increased. On the other hand, national 
(government) revenues from oil are expected to increase on average in association 
with the increased supply of the crude oil output, although declining prices at the end 
of the forecast period overshadow the effects of increased production so that total 
revenues from oil rents eventually decline. The results could indicate that the Nigerian 
economy is fast approaching a peak crude production level beyond which potential 
production could decline, given the reserves. Potential for reduced incomes from oil 
rents, in addition to further risks from external price shocks may state the case for 
increased diversification of the resource and economic base in Nigeria.  
However, the results indicate that whilst it is optimal for the government to 
increase its levels of investments in human capital and energy development, increased 
direct involvement in agriculture and natural resources is not optimal. In particular, the 
model projections show level investments in agriculture and natural resources for a 
relatively lengthy period and significant declines into the future. 
In the production sector, model projections show increased output and income 
in the economy on absolute and per capita basis. Households in turn respond with 
increased consumption of both local and foreign goods and services. National 
ownership of foreign assets is also increased. These measures together suggest 
improved levels of welfare in the economy. However, the results from the current 
modeling exercise are not directly applicable to policy interpretations. 
 Significant challenges were associated with using the data on Nigeria; i.e., 
concerning its availability and accuracy. Further, peculiarities of the Nigerian 
191 
economy posed increased difficulties to the modeling (e.g., economy-wide shocks 
such as adjustment programs and their effects). For example, very high inflation in the 
mid 1990’s led to the difficulties of dealing with near zero values for real wages in 
some years. That being said, the current modeling exercise did provide useful insights 
for the future development of techniques to address similar questions of resource 
extraction and rent allocation for development.  
 
Further Development of the Model and Future Research 
 Immediate changes that could be made to the model to improve the 
characterization of the Nigeria economy and its application to forecasting and policy 
simulation include accounting more completely for interactions between and amongst 
the representative agents. For example, an attempt could be made to re-define the 
variable representing the government recurrent spending as an endogenous variable so 
that the direct effects of its changes can be explicitly accounted for in the household 
objective function.  
 Production in the (multinational) oil industry could be modeled to influence 
natural gas supplies (and production) in the public electricity sector directly. 
Currently, natural gas supplies for energy production in the economy do not account 
for useful gas produced (sometimes as a byproduct) alongside the crude petroleum 
output.  Further, labor demand in households and non-oil firms should in a more 
complete characterization of the economy correspond to labor supplied by the 
households and should account for a proportion of the income coming to residents. 
However, improvements to the model need be accompanied with improvements in the 
quality of the data for meaningful progress to be made.  
 In a more advanced development of the present model, the level of interactions 
between the oil sector and the other economic agents could be increased further so that 
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the model more completely describes the non-autonomous nature of the oil industry 
(i.e., from government regulation) and the involvement of households and local 
private firms in the oil industry. 
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APPENDIX 3.A  
OBJECTIVES FOR NIGERIA NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY 
 
1. Achieve national energy security and an efficient energy delivery system using 
 an optimal mix of the nation’s diversified energy resources. 
2.  Guarantee increased contribution of energy productive activities to national 
 income. 
3.  Guarantee adequate, reliable and sustainable energy supply at appropriate costs 
 and in an environmentally friendly manner, to the various sectors of the 
 economy. 
4.  Guarantee an efficient and cost effective consumption pattern of energy 
 resources. 
5.  Accelerate the process of acquisition and diffusion of technology and 
 managerial expertise in the energy sector and indigenous participation in 
 energy sector industries, for stability and self-reliance. 
6.  Promote increased investment and development of the energy sector with 
 substantial private sector participation. 
7.  Ensure comprehensive, integrated and well-informed energy sector plans and 
 programs for effective development. 
8.  Foster international co-operation in energy trade and projects development in 
 Africa and in the world at large. 
9.  Promote international co-operation. 
 Source: ECN, 2003 
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APPENDIX 3.B 
 THE FIRST ORDER NECESSARY CONDITIONS 
B.1: The Government 
 
In addition to the 3 state equations defined in the text, the other first-order necessary 
conditions for the government agent are derived as in equations (B.1.1) through 
(B.1.8). The relevant boundary point and transversality conditions are in equations 
(B.1.9) through (B.1.12): 
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B.2: The Oil Firm 
 
In addition to the 2 state equations defined in the text, the derived first-order necessary 
conditions for the oil firm include equations (B.2.1) to (B.2.4): 
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B.3:  The Electric Utility 
 
The first-order necessary conditions for the utility manager (in addition to the 
constraint equations defined in the text), choosing natural-gas and labor as inputs to 
minimize the cost of producing some targeted level of capacity of natural-gas based 
power, nguE , are: 
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B.4:  The Household 
 
In addition to the 2 state equations defined in the text, the Hamiltonian system of 
equations for the representative agent of the household are defined in equations 
(B.4.1) to (B.4.21): 
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B.5:  The Private Local Firm 
In addition to the constraint equations defined in the text, the first-order necessary 
conditions for the firm, choosing labor and energy inputs to minimize the costs of 
producing gross domestic product, Y, are as follows: 
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APPENDIX 3.C: DATA DESCRIPTION 
Table A.3: Description of the Nigeria Data Series 
  
Variable Source1 Unit Series Description and Modifications 
arev CBN Naira Gross non-oil revenues  
B CBN Naira Sales of government bonds  
   Derived: B = (rB / r) 
C EIU Naira Household expenditures (private consumption) 
Capuf CBN Percent Capacity utilization in firms 
Capuu CBN Percent Capacity utilization in utilities 
   Derived: percent electricity generated of installed generation capacity 
Cg CBN Naira Government recurrent expenditures (government consumption) 
Ef CBN mWh Electricity consumption by firms 
Eg CBN mWh Electricity consumption by government 
   (street lighting and government buildings) 
Eh CBN mWh Electricity consumed by residences 
Ehu CBN mWh Electricity generation from hydro facilities 
Engu CBN mWh Electricity generation from thermal facilities  
Eu CBN mWh Total electricity generation 
Ianr CBN Naira Capital expenditures on agriculture and natural resources 
Ich I&A Megawatts Installed capacity of hydro-electricity  
If IFS Naira Capital investments in firms 
   (Gross fixed capital formation)  
Io CBN Naira Capital expenditures on other economic services 
   (transportation, communication, construction and electricity) 
Isc CBN Naira Capital expenditures on social and community services 
Lf ILO Units Labor employed in firms 
   Derived: manufacturing (percent of) GDP*employed persons over age 15  
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Table A.3 continued 
 
Variable Source1 Unit Series Description and Modifications 
Lu ILO Units Labor employed in public utilities 
   Derived: utilities (percent of) GDP * employed persons over age 15 
MGS EIU Naira Imports of goods and services 
NFA EIU Naira Net foreign assets (commercial banks) 
Ngu NNPC Cubic feet Natural gas used in electricity generation (as fixed proportion of gas produced) 
orev CBN Naira Gross revenue from crude petroleum 
   (international and local sales, petroleum profit tax and treaties) 
Pe CBN Naira Unit price of electricity produced 
Pgdp EIU Unit GDP deflator (2000 = 1) 
Png CBN Naira Unit cost of natural gas used in electricity production 
Poil CBN Naira Unit cost of crude petroleum; Derived 
r CBN Percent Discount rate 
R EIU Barrels Known levels of crude oil reserves 
rB CBN Naira Recurrent expenditures on government debt 
trn CBN Naira Capital investments on transfers 
ucc IFS Percent User cost of capital 
 NBS;  Derived: Interest rate plus depreciation less inflation 
W NNPC Units Number of oil wells dug 
Wf CBN Naira Average annual wage paid in the private sector (manufacturing) 
Wu CBN Naira Average annual wage paid in the public sector 
X EIU Barrels Cumulative additions of known oil reserves 
   Derived: Xt = Xbar +  Xt-1, where Xbar = Rt - Rt-1 + Qt for t = year 
Xo EIU Naira Value of crude oil exports 
Y EIU Naira Gross domestic production, deflated (2000=1) 
1 Sources : CBN, EIA; EIU; I&A: Ibitoye and Adenikinju; IFS; ILO; NBS and NNPC. See References for Appendix 3. 
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